A Turkish client tells you he was dismissed from his teaching post by decree in 2016, that he has never been charged with anything, and that his passport was cancelled. Another tells you he was convicted of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, and that the evidence against him was a messaging app on a phone he no longer owns. Both files look thin. Both are, in UK and US practice, among the more winnable Turkish claims, and for the same reason: the Turkish state has written down what it did.
This note sets out what a Gülen accusation actually consists of in a Turkish court file, what the European Court of Human Rights said about the central piece of evidence, and what a country expert can and cannot add to the picture.
What a Gülen file actually contains
Turkish courts convicting for membership of FETÖ/PDY have relied on a short and recognisable list of criteria. The Home Office quotes them in its country policy note on the Gülenist movement, published in August 2025:
"(I) making monetary contributions to the Bank Asya, and to other companies which were closed down with emergency decrees; (II) using the messenger application ByLock; (III) police or secret service reports; (IV) analysis of social media contacts; (V) donations made to certain legal persons which were closed down by emergency decrees; (VI) websites visited; (VII) being resident in student dormitories belonging to the movement."
Read that list as a practitioner and the problem is immediate. Six of the seven items are things an ordinary person does without any political intent: holding an account at a bank that was legal at the time, living in a cheap student dormitory, visiting a website, donating to a charity that was lawful on the day of the donation. Only the third item, a police or intelligence report, resembles conventional evidence, and it is the item the defence can least easily test.
The same note lists the factors that raise risk for a person who is or is believed to be affiliated with the movement: using ByLock, holding an account with Bank Asya or a subscription to the Zaman newspaper, owning Gülenist literature, having attended or sent children to Gülenist schools, membership of affiliated organisations, rapid promotion in the public service or military, dismissal from employment on grounds of alleged involvement, and having family members who are suspected Gülenists.
There is a caution in the note that is worth quoting to any decision maker who treats the list mechanically: "These should not be treated as a checklist. Each case must be considered holistically, on its individual facts and merits."
ByLock: the app that became the evidence
ByLock was an encrypted messaging application available on public app stores. After the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 the Turkish authorities treated the presence of the app on a device, or the appearance of a user in server data obtained by the intelligence service, as proof of membership of an armed terrorist organisation. Tens of thousands of prosecutions followed on that basis.
The defence difficulty is structural rather than factual. A claimant is rarely in a position to show what the raw data said, how a user identifier was matched to a person, or whether the data set was complete. In the Turkish proceedings the material behind the match was often not disclosed in a form the defence could examine.
Strasbourg: Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye
On 26 September 2023 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye. The applicant was a teacher convicted of membership of FETÖ/PDY after the attempted coup. The Court held that there had been violations of the right to a fair trial, of the right to no punishment without law, and of freedom of association.
Two parts of the judgment matter beyond the individual case. First, the Court treated the problems that produced the violations as systemic in nature, and held that Türkiye had to take general measures as appropriate to address them, notably with regard to the Turkish judiciary's approach to ByLock evidence. Second, the Court recorded that approximately 8,500 applications raising similar complaints about the right to a fair trial or to no punishment without law were then on its docket.
That second number is the one to put in front of a tribunal that is being invited to treat a Turkish conviction as a settled finding of fact. A conviction reached on this evidence is not an ordinary foreign conviction. It belongs to a class of cases that the Grand Chamber has described as systemically defective, and that class is large enough to have its own queue in Strasbourg.
What a dismissal by decree does to a life
The second route into a Turkish claim does not involve a court at all. After July 2016 public servants were dismissed by emergency decree, the kanun hükmünde kararname or KHK. There was no individual hearing before dismissal, and the name of the dismissed person was published in an annex to the decree in the Official Gazette.
The consequences run past the loss of the job. Beyond the lost post, the note records the cancellation of over 230,000 passports as part of the same campaign, alongside the closure of businesses and institutions and the seizure of assets. A person whose name appears in a decree annex carries a public, searchable mark: it is visible to any future employer, to any bank, and to any official who runs the name.
Recovery has been rare. The note records that only 515 judges or prosecutors dismissed after the coup attempt were reinstated.
The scale, in the Home Office's own numbers
The August 2025 country policy note describes a campaign against individuals and groups believed to have links with the Gülen movement that has produced "hundreds of thousands of arrests and detentions, over 117,000 convictions under anti-terrorism laws, the dismissal of over 130,000 public servants, the cancellation of over 230,000 passports, the closure of businesses and institutions and subsequent seizure of assets, and the pursuit of Turkish nationals residing outside of Turkey."
Those are not historical figures that stopped in 2017. The same note records that in the first week of April 2023, 61 people were detained, including students, doctors, teachers and former military cadets, among them people accused of using the ByLock app, and that according to a statement by the Interior Minister on 6 July 2023, 748 people were detained in June 2023 alone.
In November 2021 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the pre-trial detention of 426 people suspected of membership of the Gülen movement had been unlawful.
The commission that was supposed to fix it
Turkey's answer to criticism of the decree dismissals was an administrative body: the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures. A dismissed person applies to the Commission, and the Commission decides whether to reverse the measure.
The Commission's own figures, as recorded in the Home Office note, show what that remedy is worth in practice. During the state of emergency 125,678 civil servants were dismissed, 270 scholarships were cancelled, 2,761 institutions were closed and the ranks of 3,213 security personnel were annulled. As of 31 December 2022 the Commission had received 127,292 applications to reverse actions taken under the emergency decrees. It accepted 17,960 and rejected 109,332.
That is an acceptance rate of about one application in seven. For a representative the point is narrow and useful: the existence of a domestic remedy is not the same as the availability of one, and the numbers are published by the body itself.
The mark also persists outside the Commission's reach. Details of dismissed individuals are recorded on a social security system database that potential employers can access. Freedom House, quoted in the same note, states that dismissed civil servants cannot find employment because they may be deemed guilty by association.
Prosecutions have not wound down
The note records 1,634 people sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment with no chance of parole, and investigations still under way in respect of 67,893 people. Turkey has asked 112 countries to extradite 1,271 people connected with the movement, and in June 2023 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed concern at Turkey's pursuit of its nationals living abroad.
On treatment in custody, the note records reporting that people detained in connection with the Gülen movement were more likely to be subjected to mistreatment, abuse or possible torture, and the European Commission's assessment that credible and grave allegations of torture and ill-treatment had increased, occurring in detention centres, prisons, informal places of detention, transport vehicles and on the streets.
Why a Strasbourg win does not end the case at home
A representative should be careful about the submission that the client can simply take his case to Strasbourg and go home. The Home Office note records increased concern about the Turkish judiciary's adherence to international and European standards, "in particular in relation to the refusal to implement rulings by the European Court of Human Rights". It also records that only 515 judges or prosecutors dismissed after the coup attempt were reinstated, despite several having been acquitted.
Acquittal, in other words, has not reliably restored a career, and a judgment in Strasbourg has not reliably reopened a case in Ankara. Both facts belong in the risk assessment rather than in a footnote.
Where the UK position already helps a claimant
Three statements in the August 2025 note do work for a representative before any country evidence is filed.
On state protection, the note states that where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state, they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection from the authorities. On internal relocation, it states that where the fear is of the state, the person is unlikely to be able to relocate to escape that risk. On certification, it states that where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
The Convention reason is recorded as actual or imputed political opinion. That framing matters for the client who was never a member of anything: the question is what the state believes about him, not what he believes.
The reach beyond Turkey
The campaign has not stopped at the border. The campaign reaches people who have already left. The note describes the pursuit of Turkish nationals abroad through renditions, abuse of extradition proceedings, Interpol Red Notices and anti-terror financing measures, and through co-opting other states to deport or transfer people unlawfully. It records that the European Court of Human Rights found that in 2018 the Republic of Moldova had illegally transferred seven teachers of Turkish nationality to Türkiye, circumventing the guarantees of domestic and international law and breaching their right to liberty under Article 5(1) of the Convention.
For a claimant this cuts both ways in argument. It supports a submission that the risk follows the person abroad. It also explains why a client with no conviction may still be frightened of a document check in a third country.
Evidence that carries weight on appeal
The documents that do the most work in these files are the ones the Turkish state produced itself:
- the page of the Official Gazette carrying the decree annex with the client's name, which fixes the date and the fact of dismissal without any need for the client's testimony;
- the indictment and the judgment, which usually set out which of the seven criteria were relied on, in order;
- the passport cancellation record or the refusal of consular renewal;
- bank correspondence closing an account, and employment records showing the reason for dismissal;
- any UYAP or e-Devlet record the client can still reach, and a note of when access was lost.
Where the client cannot obtain these, the inability to obtain them is itself a fact about the case, and one an expert can address directly: who can request what, from where, and what happens to a person who asks.
What a country expert can and cannot say
A country expert in a Gülen case is not there to say whether the client was a member of anything. That is for the tribunal. The expert's work sits in four places.
The first is explaining how the evidence was built: what a ByLock match is, what it is not, and what the Grand Chamber found about the use made of it. The second is placing the client's profile against the risk factors recorded in the country evidence, and saying where the profile sits and where it does not. The third is the question of what happens on return: who is checked, against which registers, and what follows a match. The fourth is the limits of the available reporting, including which numbers are official, which come from monitoring groups, and where the sources disagree.
An expert who goes further than this, and offers a view on whether the client is a Gülenist, is doing the tribunal's job and weakening the report.
Sources
- Home Office, Country policy and information note: Gülenist movement, Turkey, August 2025. gov.uk
- European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber judgment Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, 26 September 2023. echr.coe.int
Need an expert witness report for your case?
Our country experts provide independent reports for asylum and immigration cases in the UK, US, Canada, and EU.
Order an expert witness report |
Find a country expert witness |
About our expert team