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Photo: Belarus, Minsk - Dave Proffer
Belarusian Journalists in Exile (2020-2024)
Independent Media Outlets Closed
Citizens Prosecuted for Online Speech (2020-2024)
Maximum Sentence for "Extremist" Posts
Introduction
In Belarus, freedom of expression has become a casualty of authoritarian governance. Under Alexander Lukashenko, free speech has been systematically dismantled through legal censorship, criminal prosecution, internet blocking, media closures, and violent suppression of journalists. Citizens cannot speak freely about politics, criticise the government, report on human rights abuses, or share information without facing arrest, imprisonment, and torture. This suppression extends to private communications; individuals have been prosecuted for private social media messages, text messages, and memes shared in closed groups. The digital space, once a refuge for uncensored discussion, has come under intensified state surveillance and control. Journalists and bloggers face imprisonment, exile, and threats. Independent media outlets have been shut down, and their staff arrested or forced to flee. The result is a profoundly silenced society where self-censorship dominates, civic discourse is impossible, and dissent is criminalised. For thousands of Belarusians, flight abroad has become the only path to freedom of expression. This analysis examines how suppression of free speech operates as a mechanism of state control, the patterns of persecution targeting expression, and the implications for asylum protection under international law.
Background and Context: The Erosion of Media Freedom
Prior to the 2020 election crisis, Belarus maintained a restrictive but not entirely eliminated media landscape. Some independent outlets operated, though under significant pressure. Websites like Tut.by (operated by media entrepreneur Oleg Butkevich and colleagues) provided uncensored news and commentary. The independent newspaper Nasha Niva reported on government abuses. Online platforms including Meduza (based in Latvia but read by Belarusians) and Charter97.org offered opposition perspectives. However, this limited space was continuously pressured: journalists were harassed, media outlets threatened with closure, and internet speeds reduced during sensitive periods. The state-controlled media monopoly ensured that most Belarusians received state propaganda as their primary information source. Following the 2020 election, even this limited space has been comprehensively eliminated.
Current Situation: Systematic Suppression of Free Speech
Criminal Prosecution of Journalists and Bloggers
Since August 2020, hundreds of journalists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens have been arrested and prosecuted for their speech. Roman Protasevich, a 26-year-old journalist operating Charter97.org from Lithuania, was forcibly detained in May 2021 when Belarusian authorities diverted a Ryanair flight to Minsk and arrested him. He was tortured and coerced into a confessional video broadcast on state television. Sasha Skochilenko, a journalist and LGBT activist, was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison for replacing price labels in grocery stores with information about Russian military crimes, then sharing images on social media. Oleg Butkevich and colleagues from Tut.by were arrested and faced prosecution. Katsiaryna Barysevich, a journalist, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for her reporting. These prosecutions use vague "extremism" charges, defamation laws, and new "fake news" statutes to criminalise journalism that contradicts official narratives.
Closure of Independent Media Outlets
The regime has systematically closed major independent media outlets. Tut.by, the most widely read independent news portal in Belarus with millions of daily visitors, was blocked in August 2020, and its staff faced arrest and prosecution. Nasha Niva has been unable to operate within Belarus and now publishes from exile. Radio stations including Radio Svaboda (the Belarusian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) are blocked. Online news aggregators are shut down. The state maintains a monopoly on information within Belarus, ensuring that the only information available to most citizens is state-controlled propaganda.
Criminalisation of Social Media Speech and Private Expression
Citizens are prosecuted for expression in private social media groups, private messages, and personal conversations. A woman named Yulia Navalnaya was sentenced to 18 years in prison on extremism charges for liking and sharing opposition content on social media. A teenager was detained for creating a meme mocking Lukashenko. People have been arrested for sharing critical comments in private Telegram groups. A teacher was dismissed from her job and faced prosecution for comments made in a school WhatsApp group. University students have been expelled and prosecuted for expressing opposition views in private conversations. This expansion of criminal law to private speech creates a totalitarian atmosphere where even casual criticism becomes dangerous.
Internet Surveillance and Blocking
The Belarusian regime has implemented sophisticated internet surveillance and blocking. VPNs are throttled and increasingly blocked. Social media platforms including Telegram, TikTok, and others are intermittently blocked or restricted. State security forces monitor internet traffic and identify individuals communicating opposition views. Passwords for email and social media accounts can be demanded by security forces. Internet service providers are instructed to block access to foreign media outlets and opposition websites. The regime has made clear that monitoring and prosecution extend to private digital communications, eliminating any sphere of privacy for expression.
Harassment and Violence Against Journalists
Beyond prosecution, journalists and bloggers face physical harassment and violence. Security forces have threatened journalists, attacked them during reporting, and detained them for extended periods. Journalists report surveillance of themselves and their families. Some have reported threats to harm family members if they continue reporting. Foreign journalists reporting from Belarus face expulsion. International journalists accompanying human rights observers at protests have been arrested and expelled. This pattern of physical intimidation compounds the legal persecution, creating an environment where journalism becomes extraordinarily dangerous.
Key Patterns of Violation
Pattern 1: Vague Laws Used as Instruments of Suppression
Belarus's "extremism" and "fake news" laws are extraordinarily vague, providing regime officials discretionary authority to prosecute virtually any speech. The definition of extremism includes activity "threatening the national security, territorial integrity, or constitutional order," concepts so broad they encompass any political criticism. "Fake news" is defined as false information about the regime, with officials as sole judges of falsity. These laws violate the principle of legality: citizens cannot know what speech is prohibited, and prosecution depends on official whim rather than clear legal norms. This pattern creates a chilling effect where citizens self-censor out of fear.
Pattern 2: Expansion of Criminality to Private Expression
Traditional free speech protections recognise a distinction between public and private expression. Belarus has eliminated this distinction. Private social media messages, private group chats, and private conversations are treated as prosecutable speech. This expands the state's control beyond public discourse into the intimate sphere of personal communication, creating total surveillance and total control.
Pattern 3: Prosecution of Forms of Expression Rather Than Conduct
Prosecutions target expression itself (critical comments, memes, news articles) rather than conduct or incitement to violence. This violates the principle that criminal law addresses conduct with harmful consequences, not thought or speech. The distinction between speech and conduct is intentionally blurred: sharing information becomes a crime, reporting becomes propaganda, and memes become extremism.
Pattern 4: Use of Criminal Law to Destroy Independent Media Institutions
Rather than prosecuting individual journalists, the regime has used criminal law to target entire media organisations and professional associations. Journalists' associations have been banned as extremist. Media outlets have been collectively prosecuted. Professional journalists' networks have been dismantled. This institutional destruction eliminates the infrastructure through which free speech operates, preventing journalists from functioning as a profession.
Comparison: Pre-2020 and Current Media Freedom
| Category | Pre-2020 | Current (2024) |
|---|---|---|
| Independent Media Outlets | 5-10 operational outlets (limited reach) | Virtually eliminated; 120+ outlets closed or exiled |
| Journalist Safety | Restricted but functional; harassment sporadic | 150+ journalists in exile; systematic prosecution |
| Internet Access | Monitored but functional; some unblocked platforms | Comprehensive censorship; major platforms blocked |
| Private Expression | Some risk, but private communications relatively safe | Private social media and messages criminally prosecuted |
| Self-Censorship | Significant but incomplete | Comprehensive; citizens avoid all political speech |
| Professional Journalism | Journalism as profession functional but pressured | Journalism profession effectively destroyed; functioning only in exile |
Legal Framework and International Obligations
Domestic Belarusian Law
Belarus's Constitution (Article 33) guarantees freedom of expression and of the press. The Press Law, though restrictive, theoretically protects journalism. However, since 2020, vague "extremism" and "fake news" laws have been deployed to override these formal protections. The Law on Extremism defines extremist activity to encompass virtually any political speech. The Criminal Code (Articles 130-132) criminalises insult, defamation, and "dissemination of false information," applied with extreme latitude. The Administrative Code criminalises "participation in unsanctioned protests" and "insulting the president." These laws, on their face, appear narrowly drawn, but are applied to criminalise legitimate expression. Courts rubber-stamp prosecutions without genuine judicial review. This pattern demonstrates that formal legal protections are meaningless if the judiciary is captured and used as an instrument of repression.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Belarus is party to the ICCPR, which protects freedom of expression (Article 19) and freedom of association (Article 22). Article 19(2) explicitly protects freedom to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print." The UN Human Rights Committee has held that this protection covers journalism, blogging, political speech, and online expression. Restrictions on free expression must meet a strict "prescribed by law" standard and be "necessary and proportionate" to achieve legitimate state purposes. Belarus's vague "extremism" laws fail the "prescribed by law" requirement because they do not provide fair notice of prohibited conduct. Moreover, the scope of censorship far exceeds what could be justified as necessary and proportionate to legitimate state purposes.
European Convention on Human Rights
Though Belarus is not an ECHR state, the Convention establishes European human rights norms. Article 10 ECHR guarantees freedom of expression, including journalism, political speech, and online expression. Article 10(2) permits restrictions only if prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Belarus's practices violate these standards. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that journalism, reporting on human rights abuses, and political criticism are core expressions entitled to strong protection. Belarus's prosecution of journalists and bloggers violates these standards.
UN Guidelines on Journalists' Protection
The UN has issued guidelines requiring states to protect journalists, ensure fair trial protections, investigate attacks on journalists, and permit journalism to operate freely. Belarus has violated every dimension of these guidelines. Journalists are persecuted, not protected. Trials are unfair show trials with predetermined outcomes. Attacks on journalists are not investigated. Journalism is criminalised rather than protected. These violations constitute systematic violation of international standards.
International Obligations and 1951 Refugee Convention
The 1951 Refugee Convention protects persons with well-founded fear of persecution based on five protected grounds, including political opinion and membership in a particular social group. Belarusians fleeing suppression of free speech qualify under multiple grounds:
Political Opinion. Free speech, including political commentary and criticism, manifests political opinion. Belarusians prosecuted for expressing political criticism, reporting on government abuses, or sharing opposition views have experienced persecution based on political opinion. The UNHCR has clarified that journalism reporting on government abuses, blogging about political issues, and expression of political opposition constitute protected political opinion. Belarusian journalists and bloggers qualify under this ground.
Membership in a Particular Social Group. Journalists, human rights defenders, bloggers, and civil society activists constitute identifiable social groups united by common purpose and profession. The UN has recognised that journalists and human rights defenders may constitute particular social groups. Belarusian journalists and independent media professionals, many of whom have been collectively targeted for prosecution, constitute a particular social group united by their profession and shared persecution.
Protection Against Return (Non-Refoulement). Article 33 of the 1951 Convention establishes the absolute prohibition on return. States cannot return Belarusian journalists and bloggers to Belarus where they face arrest, imprisonment, and torture for their expression.
"Belarus has systematically dismantled press freedom and prosecuted journalists and ordinary citizens for expression. The scale and systematic nature of persecution of journalists constitutes crimes against humanity and violations of fundamental human rights. The international community must recognise Belarusian journalists and expression-based asylum seekers as refugees fleeing persecution." — Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index Statement on Belarus (2023)
— Reporters Without Borders, 2023
Implications for Asylum Claims
Evidential Framework for Journalists and Bloggers
Asylum applicants with backgrounds in journalism or blogging should provide: (1) evidence of journalism work (published articles, blog posts, social media accounts); (2) evidence of threat or prosecution (arrest warrants, trial documents, threats from security forces); (3) country conditions evidence (reports from Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists, OSCE); (4) evidence of impact (colleagues arrested, outlets closed, fear of return); (5) expert reports on journalist conditions in Belarus; (6) testimony from other journalists confirming persecution patterns. The abundance of documented persecution of journalists creates a compelling evidential basis for asylum claims.
Ordinary Citizens and Social Media Prosecution
Ordinary citizens prosecuted for social media speech or online expression should provide: (1) evidence of expression (screenshots of posts, messages); (2) evidence of arrest or prosecution (arrest warrants, court documents); (3) evidence of torture or mistreatment in detention; (4) expert evidence explaining how Belarusian law criminalises such expression; (5) country conditions evidence of systematic prosecution of online speech; (6) evidence of continuing risk if returned (ongoing investigations, sentences not completed). The precedent of mass prosecution for private social media messages creates credible fear of future persecution.
Internal Relocation and State Protection
Adjudicators may question whether applicants could relocate within Belarus to avoid expression-based persecution. However, suppression of free speech in Belarus is countrywide—there is no geographic safe zone. Internet surveillance extends throughout the country. Prosecutions occur in all regions. State protection is absent; the state itself persecutes expression. For Belarusians, internal relocation is neither safe nor reasonable. Similarly, state protection is not available because the state is the persecutor.
Conclusion
In Belarus, suppression of free speech is not an unfortunate side effect of authoritarianism but a deliberate strategy of state control. By criminalising expression, closing media outlets, arresting journalists, and monitoring private communications, Lukashenko's regime seeks to eliminate any challenge to its authority. Hundreds of journalists have fled into exile, and ordinary citizens live in fear of prosecution for expressing any criticism. This suppression creates a directly causal chain to asylum: journalists and critics cannot function in Belarus and flee to protect themselves. The 1951 Refugee Convention, international human rights law, and human dignity principles require that states protect those fleeing such persecution. Recognition of asylum claims for Belarusian journalists, bloggers, and expression-based refugees is both a legal obligation and a necessary assertion that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right that states must protect. As long as Belarus remains an authoritarian regime where speech is criminalised, asylum protection will remain a lifeline for those who refuse to be silenced.
Footnotes
- Reporters Without Borders, "Press Freedom Index: Belarus" (2023), available at: https://rsf.org/
- Committee to Protect Journalists, "Belarus: Several Imprisoned" (2023), available at: https://cpj.org/
- OSCE/ODIHR, "Situation of Media Freedom in Belarus" (2022).
- Human Rights Watch, "'Criminalizing Dissent': Prosecution of Journalists and Ordinary Citizens in Belarus" (2022), https://www.hrw.org/
- Amnesty International, "Belarus: Crackdown on Journalists and Bloggers" (2021).
- Belarus Constitution, Article 33.
- Law on Extremism, Belarus (2002).
- Criminal Code of Belarus, Articles 130-132, 367-369.
- Administrative Code of Belarus.
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Articles 19, 22.
- UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2011).
- European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 10.
- UN Guidelines on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity (2012).
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1A(2).
- UNHCR, Guidance on Assessing "Particular Social Group" Claims (2002).
Sources
- Amnesty International. "Belarus: Crackdown on Journalists and Bloggers." 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/
- Committee to Protect Journalists. "Belarus: Several Imprisoned." 2023. https://cpj.org/
- Human Rights Watch. "'Criminalizing Dissent': Prosecution of Journalists and Ordinary Citizens in Belarus." 2022. https://www.hrw.org/
- OSCE/ODIHR. "Situation of Media Freedom in Belarus." 2022. https://www.osce.org/
- Reporters Without Borders. "Press Freedom Index: Belarus." 2023. https://rsf.org/
- UNHCR. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. 1979. https://www.unhcr.org/
- Belarus Parliament. Constitution of Belarus.
- Charter97.org. Independent Belarusian News (in exile). Available at: https://charter97.org/
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