Sudan’s Civil War Deepens as Military Gains, Atrocity Warnings, and Humanitarian Collapse Converge

Last updated: 22 September 2026

A Sudanese Armed Forces soldier walking on the Shambat bridge that once connected Omdurman with the Khartoum neighborhood of Bahri on the opposite bank of the River Nile on April 27, 2025. Giles Clarke/Avaaz via Getty Images

On February 18, 2026, the Council on Foreign Relations updated its Global Conflict Tracker entry on Sudan’s civil war, presenting the conflict as a worsening power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The article describes a war that has entered its third year, with front lines shifting, peace efforts stalled, and the humanitarian toll continuing to rise across Sudan and neighboring countries.

According to the update, the war began on April 15, 2023, after tensions between SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo escalated into open fighting in Khartoum. The article explains that the conflict grew out of Sudan’s failed transition to civilian rule after the 2019 overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, when both military factions had initially shared power before turning against each other over the future of the state and the proposed integration of the RSF into the regular army.

The background section places today’s war within Sudan’s longer political history. It recalls the country’s post-colonial instability, the deep divide between the north and south, the two long civil wars that shaped the modern state, and the eventual secession of South Sudan in 2011. It also notes Bashir’s long dictatorship, during which the state relied heavily on coercive institutions and militias, including the forces that later evolved into the RSF. In this framing, the current war is not presented as an isolated military rupture, but as the latest phase in a long cycle of authoritarian rule, militarization, and unresolved regional grievances.

A major part of the article focuses on the origins of the RSF itself. It says the group emerged from the Janjaweed militia, which was used during the Darfur war and became notorious for brutal attacks on non-Arab populations, including mass displacement, sexual violence, and kidnapping. The update links that legacy directly to the present conflict, suggesting that the RSF’s methods in today’s war cannot be separated from its earlier role in Darfur. This historical continuity is important because it helps explain why so many current reports of abuse in western Sudan are being understood through the lens of past atrocity patterns.

The article presents the humanitarian consequences of the war as catastrophic. It says death toll estimates vary widely, with the former U.S. envoy for Sudan suggesting that as many as 400,000 people may have been killed since the conflict began. It also says more than 11 million people have been displaced, creating what it describes as the worst displacement crisis in the world. More than 4 million displaced Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries including Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, placing additional strain on already fragile refugee systems. The update adds that more than 30 million people now need humanitarian assistance, while worsening food insecurity is driving what it calls the world’s largest hunger crisis.

The article emphasizes that mediation efforts have repeatedly failed. It says the leaders of the SAF and RSF have refused to halt the violence, while regional and international powers have taken sides in the conflict, making a negotiated settlement harder to achieve. In this sense, Sudan’s war is described not only as a domestic struggle for power, but also as a conflict shaped by foreign involvement and competing outside interests. The update specifically mentions the role of the United Arab Emirates and the Wagner Group, suggesting that external military influence has deepened the rivalry at the core of the crisis.

Recent battlefield developments occupy a large part of the update. It says that in the latter half of 2024, the SAF launched a coordinated offensive around Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri, catching RSF forces off guard and allowing the army to seize significant territory in and around the capital for the first time since the war began. As 2025 opened, the fighting intensified further, with the army driving RSF forces out of Omdurman, recapturing an important oil refinery north of Khartoum, and regaining near-total control of Bahri. In February 2025, SAF forces also ended the RSF’s two-year siege of Obeid, a strategically important city linked by rail to the capital. These gains are presented as some of the government’s most important military advances since the outbreak of war.

At the same time, the RSF has continued trying to consolidate its own power. The article says that in February 2025, RSF leaders and allies met in Nairobi, Kenya, to advance plans for a parallel government, signing a charter that referred to secularism, democracy, decentralization, and a unified national army. In early March 2025, the RSF reportedly signed a new constitution, which the update interprets as part of an effort to gain diplomatic leverage and political legitimacy. This suggests that the war is now being fought not only militarily, but also through competing claims to state authority and future governance.

One of the most alarming parts of the article concerns Darfur, where violence has continued to intensify. The update says the RSF captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and the last major city in the region still under government control, on October 27, 2025, after an 18-month siege. It adds that reports of widespread atrocities surfaced in the days that followed, including mass killings, sexual violence, and other abuses. The article also notes growing fears of genocide, especially given the RSF’s targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur. It cites a report from Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab, which said satellite imagery showed closely packed objects and ground discoloration that researchers believe could be evidence of human bodies.

The article links these recent events to the broader history of mass atrocities in Darfur. It recalls that the Darfur war, which began in 2003, was later described by the International Criminal Court as a genocide targeting non-Arab populations, including the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit peoples. It also notes that several NGOs and international actors have documented renewed evidence of ethnic cleansing and war crimes in the current conflict. In this way, the update suggests that the present violence in Darfur is not only severe in its own right, but also carries the weight of earlier historical trauma and unresolved impunity.

The humanitarian emergency extends far beyond direct fighting. The article says attacks have destroyed hospitals and other vital infrastructure, the health system has collapsed in many areas, and fears of disease outbreaks remain high. It recalls that the United Nations described the conflict as “spiraling out of control” and that the UN’s humanitarian chief called Sudan “one of the worst humanitarian nightmares in recent history.” In El Fasher and elsewhere, famine conditions have added another layer of devastation. The update notes that nearly 400,000 people are facing starvation, showing how siege warfare, displacement, and market collapse are combining to deepen the crisis.

The article also highlights how international concern has sharpened in early 2026. In its news updates, it says the UN Security Council expressed grave concern over the deteriorating situation in Kordofan and announced sanctions against RSF leaders linked to atrocities during the siege of El Fasher. It also notes reports that a UN-backed fact-finding mission found the situation in Darfur bore the “hallmarks of genocide,” and that the United States reiterated its own position that the RSF had committed genocide, while sanctioning additional commanders. These developments suggest that the legal and diplomatic language surrounding the war is becoming more severe as evidence of atrocities accumulates.

At the political level, the article suggests Sudan’s war is now shaped by three overlapping realities: a military contest over control of the capital and major regions, an atrocity crisis centered especially in Darfur, and a humanitarian collapse affecting civilians across the country. Neither side is portrayed as close to a negotiated settlement, and the update makes clear that the conflict’s regional effects are already profound. Refugee flows are overwhelming neighboring states, cross-border insecurity is rising, and outside powers continue to influence the battlefield. In that sense, the war is no longer simply Sudan’s internal crisis; it has become a broader regional emergency with implications for the wider Horn of Africa and Sahel.

Conclusion

The CFR update presents Sudan’s war as a conflict that has grown more dangerous rather than more containable. Military advances by the SAF, the RSF’s consolidation in Darfur, growing warnings of genocide, and worsening famine all suggest that the war is entering a more destructive phase rather than moving toward resolution.

More broadly, the article shows why Sudan remains one of the world’s most urgent crises: it combines state collapse, mass displacement, regional spillover, and atrocity risks on an enormous scale. In that context, the conflict draws attention not only because of the fighting itself, but because of what it reveals about the failure of mediation, the weakness of international protection, and the long shadow of impunity in Sudan.