Sudan: RSF Offensive Spreads to New Regions — 2026 Update

Last updated: 16 September 2026

Photo: _MG_0755a - Oxfam East Africa

The Sudan RSF offensive update for 2025-2026 documents a significant expansion of RSF territorial control beyond the original conflict zones of Khartoum and Darfur. The RSF has pushed into Gezira State, Sennar State, White Nile State, and North Kordofan, creating a new wave of displacement and expanding the zone of danger for civilians. Furthermore, the SAF has responded with aerial bombardment in RSF-controlled areas — adding to civilian harm rather than reducing it. As a result, country conditions across Sudan have deteriorated significantly compared to 2023-2024. This update summarises key developments and their implications for asylum claims.[1]

For background, see the Sudan civil war overview.

2024 Developments: Consolidation and Expansion

In 2024, the RSF consolidated its hold over Khartoum, North Khartoum, and Omdurman while pushing into Central Sudan. Furthermore, the RSF captured Wad Madani (Gezira State) in December 2023 and spent 2024 suppressing resistance and looting the region. The fall of Wad Madani was strategically significant: it was Sudan's second city, the national agricultural heartland, and had served as a refuge for Khartoum IDPs. As a result, hundreds of thousands of already-displaced people fled again. Therefore, Gezira became the first example of the "second displacement" pattern that would characterise 2024-2025.[2]

SAF counteroffensive: limited success

The SAF attempted a counteroffensive in 2024, retaking parts of North Khartoum and Omdurman. Furthermore, Sudan acquired drone and air systems from Turkey and Iran to strike RSF positions. However, SAF airstrikes caused extensive civilian casualties in RSF-controlled areas. As a result, both forces were causing civilian harm simultaneously — the RSF through ground atrocities, the SAF through aerial bombardment. The counteroffensive failed to fundamentally alter the balance of control. Therefore, by end-2024, the RSF retained most of its territorial gains.[3]

2025 Offensives: New Fronts

In 2025, the RSF opened new fronts. Most significantly, RSF forces advanced into Sennar State — a region that had been relatively stable — in early-to-mid 2025. Furthermore, RSF units pushed south along the White Nile corridor, threatening the SAF's main north-south supply route. North Kordofan experienced intensified fighting as RSF pressured El Obeid (the state capital). As a result, the conflict zone expanded to cover most of Sudan's 18 states. Therefore, the notion of "safer" regions within Sudan became increasingly untenable.[4]

Port Sudan: The SAF Capital Under Threat

Port Sudan became the de facto capital of the SAF-aligned Sudanese government after Khartoum fell. Furthermore, it served as the main humanitarian hub and entry point for international aid. However, in 2025, Port Sudan itself came under drone attacks — reportedly carried out by the SAF/government against RSF infrastructure, or vice versa in one of the war's most complex dynamics. As a result, even the main humanitarian corridor was compromised. Therefore, aid delivery to the interior became even more difficult.[5]

"The RSF offensive is not limited to Darfur. It is transforming into a nationwide campaign that threatens to destabilise the remaining SAF-held regions and cut off humanitarian access across the country."UN OCHA Sudan Update, 2025

Peace Talks: Jeddah, Geneva, Failure

Multiple peace processes have failed. The Jeddah Process (2023), mediated by Saudi Arabia and the US, produced a humanitarian ceasefire that neither side respected. The Geneva talks (2024) broke down without agreement. Furthermore, the RSF has shown no strategic interest in a settlement that would reduce its territorial control, while the SAF position insists on RSF disarmament and dissolution. As a result, no credible ceasefire process is operational as of early 2026. Therefore, the conflict is expected to continue, with the RSF maintaining or expanding its territorial control and the SAF retaining the northeast.[6]

Supply Lines and the Famine Dimension

The RSF offensive has targeted agricultural regions and supply routes. Gezira State (Sudan's breadbasket) fell to the RSF in December 2023. Furthermore, the fighting in Sennar and White Nile threatens further agricultural disruption. As a result, the IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) declared famine conditions in parts of Sudan by mid-2025 — the first such declaration in the country in decades. Therefore, the war's humanitarian consequences now include famine alongside direct violence, making return even more dangerous.[7]

Asylum Implications: Updated Country Conditions

The 2025-2026 RSF offensive updates have direct asylum implications. First, they undermine all internal relocation arguments — there are no safe areas. Second, they demonstrate that the conflict is ongoing and worsening — rebutting any suggestion that conditions have improved since an applicant fled. Third, they establish that new regions are now affected — meaning applicants from Gezira, Sennar, and White Nile who previously might not have had strong individual claims now face genuine danger. Furthermore, the UNHCR and OCHA updates from 2025 should be submitted in all pending Sudanese asylum cases. As a result, representatives should update existing bundles and prepare skeleton arguments addressing country updates.[8]

Conclusion: An Expanding War with No End in Sight

The Sudan RSF offensive update for 2025-2026 confirms a significant geographical expansion of the conflict. Furthermore, all peace processes have failed. As a result, country conditions across Sudan are worse than in 2023 — not better. Therefore, asylum decisions based on pre-2025 country guidance should be reviewed, and pending claims should incorporate the latest OCHA, UNHCR, and conflict monitoring data.