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State failure in Somalia is not an abstract concept. It is a daily reality for millions of Somalis. The country has ranked as the world's most fragile state for over a decade. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) controls only parts of Mogadishu and a few other urban centres. There is no functioning judiciary. The security forces are unreliable and often abusive. For asylum decision-makers, Somalia state failure means one thing: the state cannot protect its people.[1]
This article explains what the Somali government actually controls, why its institutions do not work, and what this means for people seeking international protection. It draws on evidence from the Fund for Peace, the UN, Human Rights Watch, the World Bank, and the International Crisis Group. For related analysis, see our country reports. Watch our latest country analysis on our YouTube channel, The Human Rights.
Fragile States Index ranking (2024)
Freedom House score (Not Free)
Internally displaced persons (2025)
Without effective central government
The World's Most Fragile State
The Fragile States Index (FSI) is published each year by the Fund for Peace. It measures how well a country's government works. It looks at things like security, rule of law, public services, and economic stability. Somalia has ranked first or second on this index for over fifteen years. In 2024, it again held the top position as the world's most fragile state.[2]
This ranking is not just a number. It reflects real conditions. Somalia scores critically on almost every measure. The government cannot provide basic services like healthcare or education. It cannot maintain law and order across its territory. It cannot collect enough taxes to fund itself. Without international aid and foreign troops, the government would likely collapse entirely.
Other indexes confirm this picture. Freedom House gives Somalia a score of 8 out of 100 (Not Free). The World Bank's governance indicators place Somalia at the bottom globally. Transparency International ranks Somalia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Every major international assessment reaches the same conclusion: Somalia does not have a functioning government.[3]
What the Federal Government Actually Controls
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) exists on paper. It has a president, a parliament, and ministries. But its actual power is very limited. The FGS controls parts of Mogadishu. It has some presence in other urban centres like Baidoa, Beledweyne, and Kismayo. Beyond these towns, its control fades quickly.
Even within Mogadishu, control is not complete. The government relies heavily on African Union (now ATMIS) forces to secure the capital. Al-Shabaab carries out regular attacks in the city. Car bombs and assassinations are common. Government officials travel with armed escorts. Many parts of the city are effectively controlled by clan militias, not the government.[4]
The federal system adds more complexity. Somalia has five Federal Member States (FMS): Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland. Each has its own president and administration. Relations between the FGS and the FMS are often hostile. Puntland has refused to recognise the federal constitution at times. The FMS operate largely independently. This means there is no unified national government in any real sense.[5]
Note: Somaliland, in the northwest, declared independence in 1991. It has its own government, elections, and security forces. It functions better than southern Somalia but is not internationally recognised. For asylum purposes, Somaliland is treated separately from south-central Somalia. For more details, see our human rights analysis.
No Functioning Judiciary
A working court system is one of the most basic things a government must provide. In Somalia, the judiciary barely exists. There are very few courts. The ones that operate are poorly staffed, underfunded, and often corrupt. Most Somalis have no access to formal courts at all.[6]
Instead, three different legal systems fill the gap. First, there is xeer (customary clan law). This is the traditional system. Clan elders mediate disputes and set compensation. But xeer works only between clans. It does not protect minorities. It discriminates against women. And it cannot deal with serious crimes like murder by powerful clan members.
Second, there is Sharia law. Some areas use Islamic courts. These vary widely in quality. In Al-Shabaab areas, the group runs its own Sharia courts. These courts are fast but brutal. They order floggings, amputations, and executions. There is no right to a lawyer. There is no appeal.[7]
Third, the few formal courts that exist follow the Somali legal code. But judges are poorly trained. They face threats from clans and Al-Shabaab. Corruption is widespread. A person with money or clan connections can buy a favourable result. A person without these things has no chance of justice. For expert witnesses in asylum cases, this is a crucial point: there is no effective legal system in Somalia.
Security Forces: Unreliable and Abusive
Somalia's security forces are made up of several groups. The main ones are the Somali National Army (SNA), the Somali Police Force (SPF), and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). None of these forces can protect civilians effectively.
Somali National Army (SNA)
The SNA is underpaid, poorly trained, and organised along clan lines. Soldiers often do not receive their salaries. Some sell their weapons to fund themselves. Others desert. The army is not a national force. It is a collection of clan militias wearing government uniforms. This means soldiers protect their own clan members and may threaten others.[8]
National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
NISA is Somalia's intelligence service. It operates with no oversight. Human Rights Watch has documented serious abuses by NISA. These include extrajudicial detention (holding people in prison without any legal process), torture, and enforced disappearances. NISA detains journalists, political opponents, and anyone seen as a threat to those in power. Detainees are held in secret facilities without access to lawyers or family.[9]
African Union Forces
ATMIS (the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) provides much of the actual security in the country. But ATMIS is withdrawing. Its troop numbers are falling. By the end of 2025, the force will be significantly reduced. Somali forces are not ready to fill this gap. The withdrawal creates a growing security vacuum.[10]
What the Government Controls vs. What It Does Not
| Function | Government Controls | Government Does Not Control |
|---|---|---|
| Territory | Parts of Mogadishu; some regional capitals | Most rural south-central Somalia; roads between towns |
| Security | Some urban areas (with AU support) | Most of the country; cannot prevent Al-Shabaab attacks even in Mogadishu |
| Courts / Rule of Law | A few courts in Mogadishu and regional capitals | Most of the country relies on xeer, Sharia, or Al-Shabaab courts |
| Police | Limited police in some urban areas | No police presence in rural areas; police are clan-based and corrupt |
| Taxation | Some customs revenue at ports | Al-Shabaab collects more tax revenue than the government in many areas |
| Public Services | Minimal health and education in Mogadishu | Most services are provided by NGOs, not the government |
| Border Control | Mogadishu airport; some ports | Land borders are effectively open and uncontrolled |
Somalia State Failure: Fragile States Index Over Time
No State Protection Available
In asylum law, there is a test called the "sufficiency of protection" test. Decision-makers ask: can the person's home country protect them from the harm they fear? For Somalia, the answer is clearly no. The evidence shows that the Somali state cannot protect anyone.
The government cannot protect people from Al-Shabaab. It cannot even protect its own officials from assassination. The police are too few, too poorly trained, and too clan-biased to offer real protection. The courts barely function. There is no witness protection. There is no effective investigation of crimes. People who report abuses to the authorities risk making their situation worse.[11]
Key legal point: The "sufficiency of protection" test in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] requires a system of law enforcement and justice that operates to deter and punish persecutory acts. Somalia fails this test completely. There is no system of criminal law and enforcement that offers practical protection to civilians.
Furthermore, the government itself is sometimes the source of harm. NISA carries out arbitrary detention and torture. SNA soldiers commit abuses against civilians. Clan-based government officials use state power to benefit their own clan and harm rivals. In many cases, the state is not just unable to protect; it is the persecutor.[12]
The Somali federal government's authority remains largely confined to parts of the capital. Its capacity to provide basic governance, security, and justice to the population is extremely limited. For most Somalis, the state offers no meaningful protection.
International Crisis Group, 'Building Somalia's Federal State' (2024)
Implications for Asylum Claims
Somalia state failure has major implications for asylum claims. For decision-makers and expert witnesses, several points are critical.
First, the sufficiency of protection test fails completely. Any claim that relies on the argument that "the Somali government can protect you" is not supported by the evidence. The government cannot protect anyone reliably. This applies to all types of persecution: political, religious, gender-based, or clan-based.
Second, for non-state persecution claims, the key question is whether the state is able to provide protection against non-state actors (such as Al-Shabaab, clan militias, or family members). In Somalia, the answer is no. This means that even when the persecutor is not the state, the claim can succeed because the state cannot offer protection.[13]
Third, for claims under Article 15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive (serious and individual threat from indiscriminate violence), the level of violence in south-central Somalia remains extremely high. The absence of a functioning state makes this violence worse. There is no one to maintain order or protect civilians. For UK-based claims, the same principles apply under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules.[14]
Fourth, internal relocation fails as an argument. A person cannot safely relocate within a country where the state does not function. Moving from one part of Somalia to another does not bring a person under state protection, because state protection does not exist in any meaningful way. For detailed guidance on Somali asylum claims, see our asylum guide.
Conclusion
Somalia state failure is a well-documented reality. The country has been without a functioning central government for over thirty years. The Federal Government of Somalia exists, but it controls only small parts of the country. It has no functioning judiciary, no reliable police force, and no ability to protect civilians from armed groups or from its own security forces.
For asylum purposes, this means that the sufficiency of protection test fails. The state cannot protect anyone from persecution, regardless of the source of that persecution. Internal relocation does not provide an alternative because the state's inability to protect is nationwide. Every major international index and every credible source confirms this picture.
Asylum decision-makers and expert witnesses should treat Somalia state failure as a foundational fact in any Somali asylum claim. The question is not whether the state can protect; the evidence clearly shows it cannot. The question is what specific risks the individual faces in this environment of total state collapse.
Footnotes
- Fund for Peace, 'Fragile States Index 2024' (2024); UNHCR, 'International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Somalia' (January 2024)
- Fund for Peace, 'Fragile States Index Annual Report 2024' (2024); Somalia has ranked #1 on the FSI in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2020, 2023, and 2024, and #2 in the remaining years
- Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2025: Somalia' (2025); World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators: Somalia' (2024); Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2024' (2025)
- International Crisis Group, 'Keeping Al-Shabaab Down in Somalia' (Africa Briefing, 2024); ACLED, 'Somalia: Mogadishu Conflict Events Data' (2024)
- International Crisis Group, 'Building Somalia's Federal State' (2024); Menkhaus K, 'Federalism and Conflict in Somalia' (2014) International Peacekeeping
- World Bank, 'Somalia: Justice Sector Assessment' (2023); UNDP, 'Access to Justice in Somalia: Baseline Assessment' (2023)
- Amnesty International, 'Somalia: Al-Shabaab's Courts and Summary Justice' (2023); Menkhaus K, 'Governance Without Government in Somalia' (2006) International Security 31(3)
- International Crisis Group, 'Rebuilding Somalia's Security Forces' (2024); UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, 'Report to the Security Council: SNA Capacity Assessment' (S/2024/200, 2024)
- Human Rights Watch, 'Somalia: Intelligence Agency Detains, Tortures' (2024); Amnesty International, 'Somalia: NISA Abuses and Arbitrary Detention' (2024)
- UN Security Council Resolution 2710 (2023); International Crisis Group, 'After ATMIS: Preventing a Security Vacuum in Somalia' (2025)
- UNHCR, 'International Protection Considerations: Somalia' (January 2024), paras 30-45; EUAA, 'Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia — Security Situation' (2024)
- Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2025: Somalia' (January 2025); UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia' (A/HRC/54/98, 2024)
- Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489; EU Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, Art 7 (actors of protection)
- EU Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, Art 15(c); Upper Tribunal (IAC), MOJ and others (Return to Mogadishu) [2014] UKUT 00442; Immigration Rules, para 339C
Sources
- Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index: Somalia, 2018-2024
- International Crisis Group, Somalia Reports and Briefings, 2023-2025
- Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Somalia, January 2025
- Amnesty International, Somalia Country Profile, 2024-2025
- UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Somalia, January 2024
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Somalia, 2025
- World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Somalia, 2024
- EUAA (formerly EASO), Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia, 2024
- UN Human Rights Council, Reports of the Independent Expert on Somalia, 2023-2024
- UNDP, Access to Justice in Somalia Programme Reports, 2023
- Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, 2025
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