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In 2025, Al-Shabaab retook the central towns of Moqokori, Adan Yabaal and Mahas, and by March 2026 it held about 30% of Somalia's territory.[1] These towns were among the gains the government made in its 2022 to 2023 offensive. Somalia country conditions in late 2026 therefore look worse for civilians than at any point since that offensive began. Political violence also reached a new peak: ACLED recorded 8,753 deaths in the twelve months to March 2026.[1]
Two questions decide most Somali asylum claims. How far does Al-Shabaab's reach extend? And can the person rely on clan protection? This update answers both. It also covers the crisis over the president's term, the current Home Office notes, US Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the evidence that works in court.
Conflict deaths, April 2025 to March 2026 (ACLED via EUAA, May 2026)
Internally displaced people (UNHCR, 30 June 2026)
Children recruited and used in 2025, 560 by Al-Shabaab (UN, June 2026)
Freedom House score, 2026 (Not Free)
Somalia country conditions in brief
Somalia has had no fully functioning central government since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. Today the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) governs from Mogadishu and a network of towns. Al-Shabaab, an armed group linked to al-Qaeda, controls most rural areas of the south and centre. In the north, Somaliland runs its own state, and Puntland and Jubaland have cut ties with the federal government.
Five facts shape Somalia country conditions for asylum purposes in November 2026. First, Al-Shabaab has reversed part of the government's 2022 to 2023 gains and set up checkpoints near Mogadishu. Second, its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, and its tax system reach into towns the government holds. Third, clan membership still decides who gets help, land, work and justice, and minority groups often have no one to call on. Fourth, the president's mandate expired on 15 May 2026 under the old rules. The dispute over his term turned violent in Mogadishu in June 2026. Fifth, humanitarian conditions are poor, with 3.3 million people displaced as of 30 June 2026.[2]
Freedom House rated Somalia "Not Free" in its 2026 report, with 8 points out of 100. It gave Somalia 2 out of 40 for political rights and 6 out of 60 for civil liberties.[3] Our video gives a short overview of why people leave the country:
More country videos are on our YouTube channel.
Political context: an expired mandate and a split federation
The 2026 term dispute
Somalia planned to move from clan-based indirect elections to "one person, one vote" in 2026. That did not happen. In March 2026, parliament passed constitutional amendments that extended the terms of the president and parliament from four to five years. The parliament's term was due to end on 14 April 2026 and the president's on 15 May 2026.[4] President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud says the amendments give him one more year. In contrast, the opposition coalition, the Somali Future Council, says his mandate ended in May.
The dispute turned violent. On 3 June 2026, government forces and guards of opposition leaders fought for more than 20 hours. The fighting took place near the homes of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire and former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Bakara market closed and hundreds of families fled the area.[5] Later, on 15 October 2026, the electoral commission set parliamentary elections for 15 April 2027 and a presidential vote for 15 May 2027. The opposition rejected the timetable because there was no political agreement behind it.[6]
Federal member states
Somalia has five federal member states: Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Puntland. As of March 2026, Puntland and Jubaland did not recognise the federal government. In addition, Jubaland and federal forces fought each other in July and August 2025. At the end of March 2026, the federal army entered Baidoa, removed South West State leader Abdiaziz Laftagareen and set up an interim administration.[4] In late December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland as an independent state, which widened the gap between Hargeisa and Mogadishu.[4]
Clan politics and the 4.5 formula
Clan politics is a constant feature of Somalia country conditions. Power still runs through clans. Under the "4.5 formula", the four major clan families (Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Rahanweyn) each receive one share of seats. All minority groups together receive half a share. As a result, minorities are always outnumbered, and politics often comes down to which sub-clan controls which ministry or district. Freedom House notes that "no direct national elections have been held to date".[3]
Al-Shabaab reach in Somalia: territory, Amniyat and taxes
Al-Shabaab's reach is the first test of Somalia country conditions in any claim, and it goes well beyond the land the group holds. The group controls territory, but it also taxes, judges and gathers intelligence in places the government claims. Our separate article on Al-Shabaab territory control in Somalia maps the areas district by district. This section summarises what changed in 2025 and 2026.
The 2025 offensive and the reversal of 2022 to 2023 gains
The government's offensive, launched in 2022, pushed Al-Shabaab out of many towns in Hiraan, Middle Shabelle and Galmudug. However, it stalled in 2025. Al-Shabaab then changed tactics, from hit-and-run raids to holding ground. Between February and April 2025, it advanced in Middle and Lower Shabelle to within 50 kilometres of Mogadishu.[1] By 31 March 2026, it had regained Mahas, Moqokori, Adan Yabaal, Nur Dugle, El Baraf and Hawadley. Its control had grown "much more substantially" in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle.[1]
The group's command centre remains in Jilib, in Middle Juba. According to the UN Panel of Experts, as of late 2025 there was no "substantial degradation" in its ability to carry out attacks.[7] Meanwhile, in late 2025 and early 2026, US-backed airstrikes helped the government retake some areas, but independent checks were difficult.[1] Fighting continues. On 26 October 2026, an ambush near Jameeca in Burhakaba district, Bay region, killed at least 20 soldiers, according to a surviving officer.[8]
Reach into Mogadishu and government-held towns
Mogadishu is not under Al-Shabaab control, but the group operates there. In 2025, it set up new checkpoints on the Balcad to Mogadishu and Afgooye to Mogadishu roads. In December 2025 and January 2026, it moved into coastal areas north-east of the city. There it cut the main road from Mogadishu to coastal Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud.[1] Inside the city, however, its attacks now focus on military and government targets. For example, on 18 May 2025, a suicide bomber killed about a dozen young men queuing to join the army at the Damanyo base. On 4 October 2025, fighters dressed as soldiers stormed the Godka Jilicow prison, which is linked to the intelligence agency NISA.[1]
ACLED recorded 354 security incidents and 225 deaths in Benadir (Mogadishu) between April 2025 and March 2026, fewer than in earlier years.[1] Nevertheless, a lower count of incidents does not mean a lower risk for people Al-Shabaab chooses to target. Instead, the group selects its victims, and the danger falls on specific profiles.
Amniyat: the intelligence network
The Amniyat is Al-Shabaab's intelligence and internal security wing. According to the EUAA, it has "repeatedly infiltrated government and security agencies" and that Al-Shabaab collects taxes from businesses in Mogadishu's big markets.[9] Similarly, the UN Panel of Experts, cited in the Home Office's July 2025 note, reports that the Amniyat is present in government-controlled areas. Somali security services have found it hard to disrupt.[10] This matters for internal relocation. The group may trace a wanted person through clan, family or business contacts in another city. Our article on the Amniyat and internal relocation in south-central Somalia explains how tribunals have treated this evidence.
Taxes, zakat and checkpoints
Al-Shabaab funds itself mainly from taxes. The UN Panel of Experts found that its income for 2023 "exceeded 150 million USD".[11] Sources include checkpoint fees and a yearly zakat, an Islamic alms levy that is often 2.5% of wealth or profits. The group also takes levies on crops and livestock, extorts businesses and taxes imports through Mogadishu port.[11] An April 2025 study by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) looked at the capital. It found that the group kept a wide intelligence and tax network in Mogadishu, even without control of the city.[1]
As a result, refusing to pay carries real risk. Traders who refuse may be threatened with death, turned back or charged double, especially if their goods serve government areas.[11] Similarly, the Home Office accepts that business people in Mogadishu who refuse to pay Al-Shabaab taxes may face persecution. It notes that attacks on business people made up about a quarter of recorded attacks on civilians in the city.[10]
AUSSOM and international forces
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaced the earlier ATMIS mission on 1 January 2025. Its ceiling is 11,826 uniformed personnel. In December 2025, UN Security Council Resolution 2809 extended its mandate to 31 December 2026.[1] However, the mission has a serious funding gap. On 31 July 2026, troop-contributing states met in Kampala and asked the Security Council for a further extension.[12] Turkey has also sent F-16 jets, helicopters and tanks, and its ground troops took part in combat against Al-Shabaab for the first time.[1]
In addition, the United States carries out frequent airstrikes. US Africa Command announced at least 117 strikes on Al-Shabaab and Islamic State targets between April 2025 and March 2026. ACLED recorded 433 air or drone strikes by all forces in the same period, with 1,694 deaths.[1] In Puntland, local forces fought Islamic State in Somalia in the Cal Miskad mountains of Bari region. The UN estimated that the group had fallen from about 1,000 fighters to 200 to 300 by late 2025.[1]
Clan protection in Somalia: how it works and who lacks it
Clan protection in Somalia is a system of mutual duty between relatives, and the state plays little part in it. Most Somalis "rely on support from patrilineal clan relatives", according to the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA).[13] A person's clan is traced through the father's line. The clan helps with daily problems such as housing, work and loans. At the extreme, it pays or receives diya, a blood price paid when a member of one clan kills or injures someone from another.[13] Groups with "long" genealogies (laan dheere in Somali) have many living members and so more manpower. This gives them an advantage over smaller groups.[9]
Xeer and diya in practice
In most areas, elders settle disputes under Xeer, the Somali customary law. Clan elders "act as mediators, arbiters and judges". The EUAA estimates that about 80% of civil and criminal cases in Somalia are settled through Xeer.[13] In practice, a weak clan gets weak justice. Diya, called mag in Somali, is paid to the victim's wider clan group, not to the closest family. Clan power also sets the level of compensation, so victims from minority or marginalised clans are "worth" less than victims from powerful clans.[9] Moreover, sexual offences are often handled under Xeer, which treats the crime as a matter between clans rather than an act by one person. This leaves women with little control over the outcome.[9]
The EUAA concludes that clan support "cannot be considered as meeting the requirements" of protection under EU law.[13] In other words, a clan can help a person survive, but it is not an actor of protection in the legal sense. This point is useful in UK and US cases too. The Home Office itself accepts that the Somali state is "willing but not able" to protect people from Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu.[10]
Majority clans and minority groups
For Somalia country conditions, the split between majority and minority clans matters most. The majority clan families are the Hawiye, Darood, Dir and Rahanweyn (Digil-Mirifle). However, a person can belong to a majority clan and still be a minority locally, for example a Darood family living in a Hawiye area. The EUAA treats "clans which can be considered minority groups in local contexts" as a separate risk profile.[14]
In addition, several groups sit outside the clan system or at its bottom:
- Somali Bantu (Jareer): farming communities in the Juba and Shabelle valleys, many descended from people brought to Somalia as slaves. Their physical features make them easy to identify.
- Occupational groups such as the Madhiban (also called Gaboye), Tumal and Yibir: traditionally leather workers, metal workers and ritual specialists. Majority clans often refuse to marry them.
- Benadiri, including the Reer Hamar: old urban trading communities of Mogadishu and the coast.
The EUAA lists these groups among profiles where decision makers must look at "risk-impacting circumstances" in each case.[14] Clan conflict also continues. Between April 2025 and March 2026, local media reported fighting between Jareer and Abgaal communities in Middle Shabelle.[1] Our article on Somalia's minority clans and their lack of protection covers each group in more detail.
Is there clan support in Mogadishu for returnees?
This is the central question in most UK return cases. In MOJ (2014), the Upper Tribunal found that clans in Mogadishu now provide "social support mechanisms". They perform "less of a protection function than previously". It also found that help from wider clan members "is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members". Minority clans, it said, "may have little to offer".[15]
In OA (2022), the Tribunal added that Somali family networks are "very extensive". In its view, a returnee with family links in the UK is unlikely to be more than "a small number of degrees of separation" from a relative or clan member in Mogadishu.[16] It also found that the Reer Hamar hold a "comparatively advantageous position" compared with other minority clans. It held that only people with "no clan or family support", no remittances and no real prospect of a livelihood face conditions that make relocation unreasonable.[16] The Home Office's July 2025 note adds that minority clans "may struggle to offer significant levels of practical assistance". Even so, they can usually vouch for a person as a guarantor.[17]
As a result, the claimant's clan, sub-clan and actual network in Mogadishu must be proved, not assumed. A Bantu or Madhiban returnee with no relatives in the city stands in a very different place from a majority clan returnee with close relatives there.
Somalia human rights violations: civilians, children and women
Attacks on civilians
Violence against civilians is the clearest measure of Somalia country conditions. Between April 2025 and March 2026, ACLED recorded 4,676 security incidents. These included 2,969 battles, 936 explosions or remote attacks and 771 incidents of violence against civilians.[1] Al-Shabaab took part in 2,944 incidents with 6,652 deaths. Government and state forces took part in 2,901 incidents with 5,733 deaths, and clan militias in 805 incidents with 1,038 deaths.[1] The worst-hit regions were Lower Shabelle (1,905 deaths), Lower Juba (1,334), Middle Shabelle (1,149) and Hiraan (1,139).[1] Moreover, real numbers are likely higher, because Al-Shabaab bans mobile phones in many areas it controls, which limits reporting.
Children
The UN Secretary-General's June 2026 report on children and armed conflict verified 2,195 grave violations against 1,703 children in Somalia in 2025. It found that 701 children were recruited and used by armed groups, 560 of them by Al-Shabaab and 100 by clan militias. Abduction was the main method of recruitment (407 cases).[18] In addition, Al-Shabaab carried out 736 of the 785 child abductions. It was also responsible for 132 of 201 cases of sexual violence against girls.[18] Meanwhile, state forces detained 91 children for alleged links to armed groups.
Women and girls
The 2020 Somali Health and Demographic Survey, the latest national data, found that 99.2% of women aged 15 to 49 had undergone female genital mutilation (FGM).[19] In addition, forced and early marriage is common, and in Al-Shabaab areas women face strict dress and movement rules. The Home Office's July 2024 note on women fearing gender-based violence is the current UK policy on these claims.[20]
Journalists and critics
Journalists in Somalia face threats from several sides at once. Al-Shabaab kills reporters it sees as government supporters. At the same time, federal and state security forces, including NISA, arrest journalists who cover security failures, corruption or the term dispute. Clan militias also threaten reporters who cover local conflicts. As a result, a journalist's risk depends on what they covered, for whom, and in which region.
Groups at risk under Somalia country conditions
Risk in Somalia falls mainly on people with a specific profile. The Home Office's July 2025 note names the people most at risk from Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. They are those linked to the government or its allies, and those who resist the group, such as "peace activists, community leaders, clan elders, electoral delegates".[10] The table below summarises the main profiles.
| Profile | Main source of risk | Key issue in the claim |
|---|---|---|
| Government, security and NGO workers | Al-Shabaab, Amniyat | Accepted risk profile in the July 2025 CPIN |
| Clan elders and electoral delegates | Al-Shabaab | Role in the 2026 to 2027 election process |
| Business people refusing tax | Al-Shabaab | Proof of demands and refusal |
| People who resist recruitment | Al-Shabaab | Home area under Al-Shabaab control or influence |
| Al-Shabaab defectors | Al-Shabaab and state forces | Exclusion issues and risk of detention |
| Minority clan members | Majority clan militias, discrimination | Clan support in Mogadishu |
| Women and girls | Family, clan, armed groups | FGM, forced marriage, lack of male support |
| LGBT people | State law, Al-Shabaab, family | Article 409 Penal Code; no safe region |
Forced recruitment
Al-Shabaab recruits both by persuasion and by force, and sources describe a spectrum between the two. In March 2024, the Bertelsmann Foundation found that the group was pressing local communities and elders to hand over young recruits.[9] The UN data on child recruitment above shows the scale. However, MOJ found no real risk of forced recruitment for civilians living in Mogadishu. The Home Office's July 2025 note says that "no source consulted" reported forced recruitment in the city.[10] Recruitment claims therefore turn on the home area and whether relocation to Mogadishu is reasonable.
Al-Shabaab defectors
People who leave Al-Shabaab face danger from both sides. The group treats leaving as betrayal, and the Amniyat may track defectors. At the same time, state forces detain suspected members, sometimes without trial. Defector cases also raise exclusion questions under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. The person's role in the group therefore needs careful examination.
LGBT people
Article 409 of the Somali Penal Code punishes sexual acts between people of the same sex with three months to three years in prison.[21] In areas under Al-Shabaab, people accused of homosexuality have been executed. Social hostility is strong across Somalia, including in Somaliland and Puntland, so internal relocation is rarely a realistic option.
Legal framework: three systems and weak courts
Somalia's Provisional Federal Constitution was adopted on 1 August 2012. It protects rights such as equality and freedom from torture. However, voters never approved it by referendum, and the March 2026 amendments are themselves disputed.[4] There is no functioning constitutional court to settle that dispute.
In practice, three legal systems work side by side. Statutory law, including the 1962 Penal Code, comes from colonial-era codes. Sharia (Islamic law) governs family matters. Xeer, the clan customary law, settles most everyday disputes through elders. In Al-Shabaab areas, the group's own courts apply a harsh reading of Sharia, with flogging, amputation and execution, and no appeal. In government areas, courts are few, slow and open to clan and political pressure. For asylum purposes, the key point is that formal justice rarely reaches people who lack a strong clan.
Internal displacement and humanitarian conditions in Somalia
Displacement shows how Somalia country conditions affect ordinary families. As of 30 June 2026, UNHCR counted 3.3 million internally displaced people.[2] Between April 2025 and February 2026, conflict displaced 161,630 people, mostly in Lower Juba, Hiraan and Gedo. Drought and floods displaced another 554,897.[1] UN data show that Benadir (Mogadishu) alone hosted about 1.1 million IDPs in 2025.[1]
For example, most IDPs in Mogadishu live on private land without secure tenure. The Norwegian Refugee Council recorded 164,768 people evicted across Somalia between April 2025 and March 2026.[1] The government declared a drought emergency in November 2025. By January 2026, about 4.8 million people, a quarter of the population, faced crisis or emergency levels of hunger. Food aid reached only 17% of them.[1] Funding cuts closed more than 200 health facilities and 300 nutrition sites in 2025.[1]
These figures matter in Article 3 "living conditions" cases. OA held that the worst IDP camps are "dire", but also that very few returning members of the diaspora end up in them.[16] Therefore, evidence that a returnee would in fact end up in a camp carries great weight. A lone woman from a minority group is a common example.
Somalia country conditions in UK law: CPINs and country guidance
Home Office CPINs
When we checked the Home Office Somalia CPIN page on 2 November 2026, it listed three current notes:[22]
- Mogadishu: Al Shabab and the security situation, version 2.0, July 2025.[10]
- Humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, version 2.0, July 2025.[17]
- Women fearing gender-based violence, July 2024.[20]
However, two older notes have gone. The Home Office withdrew its note on majority clans and minority groups on 17 October 2022. It withdrew its general note on fear of Al-Shabaab on 10 July 2024. Neither has been replaced.[22] As a result, there is no current Home Office policy on minority clans, and no current note on Al-Shabaab outside Mogadishu. Lawyers should not read this silence as a finding that these groups are safe.
The July 2025 security note concludes that there is "not a real risk of serious harm in Mogadishu" from indiscriminate violence for an ordinary civilian. It accepts that the state is willing but not able to protect people from Al-Shabaab. It also says that refused claims are "unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded'".[10] The note dates from mid-2025. It does not cover the October 2025 prison attack, Al-Shabaab's move to the coast north-east of Mogadishu or the 2026 political crisis.
Country guidance: MOJ and OA
Two country guidance cases govern UK claims. MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC) found that an "ordinary civilian" returning to Mogadishu faces no real risk under Article 15(c). It also set out the factors for assessing a returnee without close family in the city.[15] OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT 00033 (IAC), promulgated on 2 February 2022, confirmed that paragraph 407 of MOJ "remains applicable". It added guidance on clan networks, remittances, the Reer Hamar and IDP camps.[16]
Moreover, we found no newer Somalia country guidance case. The Upper Tribunal's list of pending country guidance cases, dated October 2026, includes no Somalia case.[23] Both decisions rest on evidence from 2013 and 2021, before Al-Shabaab's 2025 advance towards Mogadishu. As OA puts it, a departure from country guidance needs "very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence". Updated expert evidence is therefore the main tool for showing that conditions have changed.[16]
How UK and EU guidance compare
| Question | UK (CPIN July 2025, OA 2022) | EU (EUAA Country Guidance, October 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Indiscriminate violence in Mogadishu | No real risk for an ordinary civilian | Reaches a "high level"; fewer individual factors needed |
| Relocation to Mogadishu | Likely viable with a network or funds | Only "in exceptional cases" |
| Role of clan | Support network for return | A key factor for relocation in every city; not protection |
The EUAA guidance does not bind UK or US decision makers. However, it is a recent assessment by EU states based on the same evidence, and tribunals can weigh it.[14]
US position: Somalia TPS ended in August 2026
The US Department of Homeland Security published the end of Somalia's Temporary Protected Status on 14 January 2026 (91 Fed Reg 1547). It was to take effect on 17 March 2026. It said Somalia "no longer met the conditions" for TPS. DHS estimated 1,082 approved beneficiaries and, as of 8 December 2025, 1,383 pending applications.[24] On 13 March 2026, the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts stayed the termination in African Communities Together v Noem. The Supreme Court then decided Mullin v Doe on 25 June 2026. Following that ruling, the district court lifted its stay on 14 August 2026, and USCIS lists the termination as effective from that date.[24] The plaintiffs have appealed and continue a discrimination claim.[25]
Former TPS holders should therefore consider asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Time spent in TPS can count as an "extraordinary circumstance" for the one-year asylum deadline under 8 CFR 208.4(a)(5)(iv). The same country evidence that supports UK claims applies in the US. However, US cases often need more focus on the link to a protected ground, such as clan membership as a particular social group.
Return risk under Somalia country conditions: relocation to Mogadishu
Return risk depends on the person's profile, home area and network. UK country guidance assumes return to Mogadishu, so the question is usually whether the person is safe in Mogadishu and can reasonably live there.
In our view, three changes since OA deserve careful evidence. First, Al-Shabaab checkpoints now stand on roads just outside the city. They limit travel to home areas and leave many returnees confined to Mogadishu. Second, the June 2026 fighting showed that the political dispute can bring armed clashes into central districts. Third, AUSSOM's mandate ends on 31 December 2026 unless the Security Council extends it, and its funding is uncertain.[12]
On the other hand, MOJ and OA remain binding. The Home Office still argues that an ordinary returnee with a clan network can settle in Mogadishu. A successful case usually shows either a specific risk profile or a lack of real support. For a full analysis of return factors, see the Somalia expert witness page, which lists the country experts we work with.
What Somalia country conditions mean for an asylum claim
The country evidence supports several Refugee Convention grounds. Al-Shabaab treats government workers, elders and people who refuse its demands as enemies, which engages imputed political opinion or religion. Clan identity can engage race or particular social group, especially for Bantu, Madhiban and other minority groups. Women at risk of FGM can form a particular social group in UK law, following Fornah [2006] UKHL 46. Where no Convention ground applies, claims may still succeed under Article 3 ECHR or humanitarian protection.
In most cases, the decision turns on four questions:
- Does the claimant fit a profile that Al-Shabaab or another actor targets?
- Is the home area under Al-Shabaab control or influence, as of the date of the hearing?
- Can the state or the clan protect this person? The CPIN accepts that the state cannot, and the EUAA says clan support is not protection.
- Is relocation to Mogadishu safe and reasonable, given the person's clan, sub-clan, gender, health and real contacts there?
Which evidence works in Somali claims
Evidence in Somali claims should match the four questions above. The most useful items are:
- Clan and sub-clan identity: a detailed account of lineage, home area, elders and known relatives. Decision makers test this account closely, so gaps and contradictions matter.
- Home-area control: dated territorial control data for the specific district, not the region. Control in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle changed several times between 2025 and 2026.
- Threats and demands: letters, phone records, witness statements and any record of tax demands or recruitment quotas.
- Network in Mogadishu: evidence of who the claimant actually knows there, what support they could offer, and any remittance history in the household.
- Gender evidence: medical evidence of FGM, and evidence of the absence of male relatives who could support a woman on return.
- Current country evidence: UN, EUAA and ACLED material dated after the July 2025 CPIN, showing how conditions have moved since OA.
What open sources miss and why expert evidence helps
Public reports on Somalia are useful, but they leave gaps that often decide cases. ACLED data come mainly from media reports, and Al-Shabaab's ban on phones in its areas means many events go unrecorded.[1] Territorial maps show broad zones, but they cannot say whether a particular village paid zakat last year or whether a road is open this month.
In particular, open sources say little about individual clans. The Home Office has had no note on minority clans since October 2022. The EUAA lists minority groups, but it does not place each sub-clan in each district. Likewise, no report can test whether a claimant's account of their lineage fits the clan they claim. Nor can it say whether a named sub-clan holds power in a named Mogadishu district.
For this reason, a country expert can fill these gaps with Somali-language sources and field contacts. The expert can assess whether the claimed clan and home area are plausible. They can explain who controls the home district now and describe the Amniyat's reach into the relocation area. They can also test the Home Office's view of clan support against the claimant's real network. Because MOJ and OA set a high bar for departing from country guidance, this kind of specific, current and sourced evidence is often what the tribunal needs. An expert report supports the claim with evidence, but it cannot guarantee any outcome. Timescales are agreed when the instruction is accepted.
Conclusion
Somalia country conditions in late 2026 are shaped by three forces. Al-Shabaab has retaken ground, the federal government's mandate is disputed, and the clan system still decides who is protected. Al-Shabaab holds about 30% of the country, taxes and spies inside government areas, and recruited at least 560 children in 2025. Meanwhile, 3.3 million people are displaced, and the AU mission faces a funding cliff at the end of 2026.
For UK claims, MOJ and OA still set the legal test, and the July 2025 CPINs find no general risk in Mogadishu. However, the Home Office has no current policy on minority clans, and the EUAA takes a much stricter view of relocation to Mogadishu. In the US, Somalia TPS ended on 14 August 2026, so asylum is now the main route for many former holders. To instruct a Somalia country expert for an individual case, use our expert witness finder.
Footnotes
- European Union Agency for Asylum, 'Somalia: Security Situation' (Country of Origin Information Report, May 2026), reference period 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026, pp 15-34, 57-61, including EUAA analysis of ACLED data (as of 16 April 2026), UNHCR PRMN data and UNOCHA harmonised IDP figures (30 October 2025). https://www.euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2026-05/2026_05_EUAA_COI_Report_Somalia_Security_Situation.pdf
- UNHCR, 'Somalia Refugees and Internal Displacement, June 2026' (22 July 2026). https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/123401
- Freedom House, 'Somalia: Freedom in the World 2026' (2026). https://freedomhouse.org/country/somalia/freedom-world/2026
- EUAA, 'Somalia: Security Situation' (May 2026) pp 15-17, citing Somali Guardian, 'Somalia president, parliament extend mandates by one year after constitutional amendments' (7 March 2026), International Crisis Group, 'Somali Government Topples State Leader as Electoral Dispute Escalates' (31 March 2026) and BBC, 'Why Israel's recognition of Somaliland as an independent state is controversial' (30 December 2025).
- Al Jazeera, 'Why Mogadishu clashes are deepening Somalia's political crisis again' (5 June 2026). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/5/why-mogadishu-clashes-are-deepening-somalias-political-crisis-again
- Al Jazeera, 'Somalia says it will hold elections in 2027' (15 October 2026). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/15/somalia-says-it-will-hold-elections-in-2027
- UN Security Council, 'Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia submitted pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)' (28 November 2025) UN Doc S/2025/777, paras 5-8, 29-30, as cited in EUAA, 'Somalia: Security Situation' (May 2026) pp 21-22.
- Associated Press, 'Islamic militants kill at least 20 Somali soldiers in ambush', Taipei Times (29 October 2026). https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2026/10/29/2003866831
- EUAA, 'Somalia: Country Focus' (Country of Origin Information Report, May 2025) pp 19, 28, 51, 61, 100. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2125806/2025_05_EUAA_COI_Report_Somalia_Country_Focus.pdf
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Mogadishu: Al Shabab and the security situation, Somalia' (version 2.0, July 2025). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-mogadishu-al-shabab-and-the-security-situation-somalia-july-2025-accessible
- EUAA, 'Somalia: Country Focus' (May 2025) s 1.10.1, citing UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (October 2024) UN Doc S/2024/748, para 62. https://www.euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/country-focus/110-individuals-who-have-pay-taxes-al-shabaab-or-other-groups-and-militias/1101-repercussions-refusing-pay-taxes-al-Shabaab-or-paying-taxes
- AllAfrica, 'Uganda: Aussom Troop-Contributing Nations Seek UN Extension for Somalia Mission At Kampala Summit' (31 July 2026). https://allafrica.com/stories/202607310358.html
- EUAA, 'Country Guidance: Somalia' (2 October 2025), Common Analysis, s 1 'General remarks' and s 5.3 'Considerations of clan support'. https://www.euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-somalia/53-considerations-clan-support
- EUAA, 'Country Guidance: Somalia' (2 October 2025), Guidance Note and s 3.9 'Persons belonging to minorities'. https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-somalia/guidance-note
- MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), para 407 (headnote (ii) to (x)).
- OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT 00033 (IAC) (promulgated 2 February 2022), headnote. https://tribunalsdecisions.service.gov.uk/utiac/2022-ukut-00033
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, Somalia' (version 2.0, July 2025) paras 3.1.16-3.1.18. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-humanitarian-situation-in-mogadishu-somalia-july-2025-accessible
- UN General Assembly and Security Council, 'Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General' (June 2026) UN Doc A/80/723-S/2026/357, paras 158-165. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/A_80_723--S_2026_357-EN.pdf
- Somalia National Bureau of Statistics, 'Somali Health and Demographic Survey 2020' (2020), as cited in EUAA, 'Somalia: Country Focus' (May 2025) s 12.2. https://www.euaa.europa.eu/coi/somalia/2025/country-focus/12-women-and-girls/122-fgmc-and-repeated-fgmc
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Women fearing gender-based violence, Somalia' (July 2024). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-country-policy-and-information-notes
- Somali Penal Code, Legislative Decree No 5 of 16 December 1962, art 409.
- UK Visas and Immigration, 'Somalia: country policy and information notes' (last updated 28 July 2025), change history, accessed 2 November 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-country-policy-and-information-notes
- Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 'Pending Country Guidance Cases' (October 2026). https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Pending-CG-Cases-October-2026.pdf
- Department of Homeland Security, 'Termination of the Designation of Somalia for Temporary Protected Status' (14 January 2026) 91 Fed Reg 1547; USCIS, 'Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Somalia' (last updated 14 August 2026). https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-somalia
- USCIS, 'Update on Termination of Temporary Protected Status for Somalia' (12 August 2026); CUSP, 'TPS Somalia update' (14 August 2026), on African Communities Together v Noem, No 26-cv-11201 (D Mass). https://www.wearecusp.org/resources/tps-somalia-update/
Sources
- Upper Tribunal, OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT 00033 (IAC), 2 February 2022
- Upper Tribunal, MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), 2014
- Home Office, Somalia: country policy and information notes (Mogadishu security and humanitarian notes, July 2025; women fearing GBV, July 2024)
- UN Secretary-General, Children and armed conflict, A/80/723-S/2026/357, June 2026
- UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2025/777, 28 November 2025
- US Department of Homeland Security, Termination of the Designation of Somalia for TPS, 91 Fed Reg 1547, 14 January 2026
- EUAA, Somalia: Security Situation, May 2026
- EUAA, Country Guidance: Somalia, 2 October 2025
- UNHCR, Somalia Refugees and Internal Displacement, June 2026, 22 July 2026
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Somalia, 2026
- Al Jazeera, reporting on the Mogadishu clashes (5 June 2026) and the 2027 election timetable (15 October 2026)
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