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Social media evidence now appears in many asylum appeals, and it can work for or against the person who relies on it. A Facebook timeline can show years of real political activity. It can also show a holiday in the country the claimant says they fear, or a page of protest photos that nobody outside a small circle ever saw. In both the UK and the US, judges and officials now look at online material closely. Moreover, they increasingly know how easy it is to fake.
This guide explains how UK tribunals and US immigration courts assess posts, screenshots and account data. It then sets out what helps a claim, what destroys it, and how to prepare the evidence step by step. It also covers where a country expert report fits, because the key question is often whether the home state can see the posts at all. Last reviewed: October 2026.
Physical transnational repression incidents recorded, 2014-2025
USCIS forms, including the I-589, cleared to collect social media handles
After this, a deleted Facebook account cannot be restored
XX (Iran) CG: UK guidance on Facebook evidence
Why social media evidence matters in asylum claims
Social media evidence does two jobs in an asylum case. First, it can prove facts the claimant asserts: political opinion, religious conversion, sexual orientation, or a threat received online. Second, it can prove risk. If the home state monitors its diaspora, public posts may themselves create a danger on return. This second use is common in sur place claims, where the risk arises after the person left home. Our guide to sur place asylum claims covers that legal test in detail.
However, the same material is open to the other side. The Home Office and US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lawyers can search public profiles. They can also ask the claimant to show the full account. As a result, a social media page is never neutral evidence. Every post, photo and privacy setting can be read in two ways.
How UK tribunals assess social media evidence
XX (Iran): the leading country guidance
The main UK authority is XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC). The Upper Tribunal promulgated it on 20 January 2022. Although it concerns Iran, tribunals often use its approach to evidence for other countries too.[1]
On evidence, the headnote makes two points that every practitioner should know. First, a few printed photographs or extracts "may be of very limited evidential value" when the person has not disclosed the full account. Facebook's "Download Your Information" function produces the full timeline and access locations "in a matter of moments". Second, printouts are easy to manipulate by changing the page source data. Therefore, where the decision-maker cannot see the actual account, printouts may carry little weight.[1]
On risk, the tribunal found a "stark gap" between Iran's claims about its surveillance and its real capability. The evidence did not show that Iran can monitor Facebook accounts on a large scale. Instead, focused searches target people of "significant adverse interest". Whether a person is targeted depends on their existing profile and where they sit on a "social graph", meaning their network of contacts. The tribunal also identified the emergency travel document (ETD) application as the likely first "pinch point". At that stage, basic open internet searches are likely.[2]
Deleting accounts and HJ (Iran)
XX also addresses deletion. In the tribunal's words, the "timely closure" of an account neutralises the risk from a critical Facebook account, provided the state did not specifically monitor it before closure. Furthermore, a decision-maker may consider whether the person would close the account before applying for an ETD. In contrast, a person of significant interest gains nothing by deleting, because the state has probably already seen the material.[2]
This is where HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 matters. Under HJ, a person cannot be expected to hide a protected characteristic out of fear. XX applies the same two-step inquiry: what would the person do, and why? Nevertheless, the tribunal said deleting a Facebook account is unlikely to amount to persecution. The Refugee Convention protects political neutrality, not access to a particular platform. So the key distinction is between deletion out of fear of persecution, which engages HJ, and deletion for other reasons, which does not.[3]
BA, Danian and genuineness
Offline activity still sets the frame. BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) lists factors such as the nature of the activity, the risk of identification and the triggers on return. Online posts are measured against the same factors. Meanwhile, Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000 holds that bad faith does not exclude a person from refugee status if the risk is real. In practice, though, the motive finding affects credibility and the question of whether the state would care.[4]
The Court of Appeal applied these ideas in S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482. The claimant's Facebook evidence "comprised photocopied extracts, rather than full disclosure in electronic format". Moreover, the court found no reason why he could not close the accounts before the ETD stage, because the posts did not reflect a genuine belief. He lost.[5]
Home Office policy and document reliability
The Home Office follows XX closely. Its Iran country policy note on social media (version 2.0, April 2025) tells caseworkers to consider the person's profile, the level and nature of the online activity, and the size of its audience. It also notes that a deleted Facebook account can be restored within 30 days, after which the data is gone.[6]
In addition, the general rule on documents applies. Under Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, the claimant must show that a document is reliable, and the judge looks at all the evidence "in the round". The Upper Tribunal confirmed in QC (China) [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC) that this remains good law. Practice Directions add formal rules. For example, a document in a foreign language needs a signed typed translation next to the original, with the translator's details.[7]
Several court decisions guide how tribunals treat online activity and sur place claims. In the UK, the most cited are:
- AB and Others (internet activity - state of evidence) Iran [2015] UKUT 00257 (IAC): the Upper Tribunal reviewed evidence that Iran monitors diaspora internet activity and that returnees can have their phones and online accounts examined at the airport.
- BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC): taking part in demonstrations abroad can create a risk on return, depending on the person's profile and visibility.
- YB (Eritrea) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 360: protest photos and other sur place activity must be assessed against evidence of how the home state monitors its diaspora.
- HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31: a person cannot be expected to hide their sexual orientation to avoid persecution. The same principle matters when the only way to stay safe would be to delete or hide an LGBTQ+ online identity.
How US immigration courts and USCIS treat online evidence
US immigration courts do not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence strictly. Instead, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has said the "sole test" for admission is whether evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair. In Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011), the Board added that the method of authentication may affect weight. Immigration judges keep "broad discretion" to accept a document as authentic or not.[8]
The key social media precedent is Matter of E-F-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2022). A Cameroonian claimant said he was in hiding without internet access between 2012 and 2013. During cross-examination, DHS produced images showing he had posted and shared pictures on Facebook during that period. He blamed a former girlfriend. However, he had first said he lost access to the account and later admitted full access. The Board upheld the adverse credibility finding. It held that judges may rely on impeachment evidence if it is probative, its admission is fair, and the witness can respond.[9]
Under the REAL ID Act, a judge can base credibility on any inconsistency, "without regard to whether" it goes to the heart of the claim. Consequently, a single old post that contradicts the asylum application can do serious damage in a US case.[10]
DHS and State Department vetting since 2025
Government screening has grown fast. In March 2025, USCIS proposed collecting social media identifiers on nine forms, including the I-589 asylum application. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the Office of Management and Budget, approved the collection on 11 February 2026. USCIS says it will not ask for passwords, so officers will see public content linked to the handles applicants list.[11]
At the same time, USCIS changed what officers look for. On 9 April 2025, it announced that social media content supporting antisemitic terrorism or antisemitic activity would count as a negative factor in discretionary decisions. Then, on 19 August 2025, Policy Alert PA-2025-16 added endorsement of anti-American views to the discretionary factors. Similarly, the State Department now asks applicants in many visa classes to set all social media profiles to "public". Its page lists F, M, J, H-1B and other classes, with I, TN and TD added from 1 October 2026.[12]
Warning for US cases: list every account on the I-589 consistently with what DHS can find. An undisclosed account, or a handle that does not match, invites an inconsistency finding of the kind upheld in E-F-N-.
What helps a claim
Strong social media evidence usually has four features. Above all, it has a history. An account that posted about politics, faith or identity for years before the claim is far more persuasive than one that started last month. For example, posts from inside the home country, written in the local language and reacting to local events, are hard to fake after the fact.
Second, it is complete. A full account download shows the timeline, dates, privacy settings and login locations. This is exactly what XX says decision-makers expect. Screenshots still help when they show the full URL, the date and the account name. Nevertheless, they should support the download, not replace it.
Third, it shows reach. Followers, shares, comments and media coverage show who saw the content. The judicial guidelines that the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges (IARMJ) issued in October 2025 ask judges to look at such engagement data. They also tell judges to check whether pages were public at the relevant times.[13]
Fourth, it links to evidence of monitoring. A post matters only if the home state is likely to see it and care. Therefore, the strongest files connect the account to country evidence: hostile comments from regime-linked accounts, questioning of relatives at home, or reports of the state targeting people with a similar profile. Our article on how China monitors its diaspora abroad shows the kind of country evidence that supports this link.
What destroys a claim
The weaknesses mirror the strengths. Recent, self-serving posts are the most common problem. A burst of anti-government posts after a refusal letter looks like a tactic, and S shows how tribunals treat it. Similarly, privacy settings that limit posts to a few friends undercut any claim that the regime saw them.
Contradictions do even more harm. Photos of a holiday or a return trip to the home country, check-ins during a claimed period of hiding, or posts showing a different religion or political view can end a case. In addition, deleting the account just before a hearing looks like hiding evidence. Fake or bought followers are also easy for an opponent to detect, and they damage everything else in the file.
| Helps the claim | Destroys the claim |
|---|---|
| Long-standing public activity that started before the claim | A burst of posts after refusal or shortly before a hearing |
| Full account download with metadata and login history | A few printed photos or cropped screenshots |
| Screenshots showing URL, date and account name | Undated images with no link to the account |
| Public settings and real engagement from strangers | Posts visible only to a few friends |
| Hostile comments or contact from regime-linked accounts | Holiday photos or return trips to the home country |
| Consistent religious or political content over time | Posts showing a different faith or political view |
| Account kept and disclosed in full | Account deleted or hidden before the hearing |
| Organic followers | Bought followers or fake accounts |
Step by step: preparing social media evidence
Preparation should start early, ideally before the first interview. The steps below work in both jurisdictions.
- Download the full account. Use the platform's data export tool (on Facebook, "Download Your Information"). Keep the original file and record the date.
- Audit the whole account with the representative. Look for anything that contradicts the claim, such as travel, a different name, or posts during a claimed period of hiding. Explain these in the witness statement rather than waiting for the other side to find them.
- Capture key posts properly. Take full-screen captures that show the URL, date, time and account name. For public pages, an independent web archive copy adds a third-party date.
- Record visibility. Note the privacy setting of each key post, follower numbers and shares. Show when posts went public.
- Translate and index. Provide certified translations next to the originals and a short index that links each post to a fact in the statement.
- Do not delete without advice. Deletion can look like concealment. Under XX, it also raises the HJ question of why the person would delete.
- Disclose handles consistently. In US cases, the accounts listed on the I-589 must match the evidence.
Social media rarely carries a case alone. It works best alongside other evidence, such as party letters, witness evidence and, where relevant, medical evidence under the Istanbul Protocol. Our video below explains how experts check whether documents from more than 50 countries are reliable.
Where a country expert report fits
A social media account proves what the claimant posted. It does not prove what the home state does with that information. That gap is where a country expert helps. Training material for UK experts lists "whether dissident activities abroad are monitored" among the standard questions experts address. Specifically, an expert can explain the state's real surveillance capacity, which platforms it watches, how it treats returnees with a similar profile, and whether relatives at home face pressure.[14]
The expert must also deal with country guidance. For example, if the report suggests Iranian monitoring is wider than XX found, the tribunal will expect "very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence" before it departs from the guidance. Likewise, the expert must stay within their field. Credibility is for the judge. In the First-tier Tribunal, an expert report must also address the tribunal, stay focused on the disputed issues and normally not exceed 20 pages.[15]
In the US, the same report can support a "pattern or practice" argument. It can also explain why a regime acts on perceived, not real, political opinion. For US filing deadlines that may turn on new online activity, see our guide to the one-year filing deadline.
Common questions about social media evidence
Are screenshots enough?
Usually not on their own. XX says partial extracts may have very limited value where a full download is available. Screenshots with URLs and dates help, but they should sit alongside the complete account data.
Should I delete my account before returning or before a hearing?
Get legal advice first. Deletion before a hearing can look like hiding evidence. Moreover, in UK cases the tribunal may ask whether you would close the account before an ETD application, and why.
Can the Home Office or DHS look at my profile?
Yes. Both can search public content, and DHS lawyers have used Facebook images in cross-examination. In the US, the I-589 is now cleared to collect social media handles.
Does a private account protect me?
It protects you from some searches. However, it also weakens any argument that the home state saw your posts. The answer depends on which side of the case the evidence supports.
Where to get help
Start with a qualified immigration lawyer, solicitor or accredited representative. They can advise on disclosure, deletion and what to include in the bundle. If the case turns on whether the home state monitors people like the claimant, a country expert can address that question with sources. You can find an expert witness for the relevant country through our directory.
Conclusion
Social media evidence helps a claim when it is genuine, long-standing, complete and visible to the people the claimant fears. It destroys a claim when it is recent, selective, private, inconsistent or deleted at the wrong moment. UK law gives detailed rules through XX, BA, Danian and HJ (Iran). US law reaches similar results through the probative and fair test, E-F-N- and expanding DHS vetting. In both systems, the winning file proves three things. It shows what the claimant posted, that the state can see it, and what the state does to people like them.
An expert can explain whether online activity is likely to be seen by the authorities in the country of origin; lawyers can use our expert witness finder to find one.
Footnotes
- XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) (promulgated 20 January 2022), headnote paras 7-8.
- XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), headnote paras 1-6.
- HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [2011] AC 596; XX (PJAK) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), headnote para 9.
- BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), headnote; Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3000 (28 October 1999).
- S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 (6 December 2024), [49].
- Home Office, 'Country policy and information note: social media, surveillance and sur place activities, Iran' (Version 2.0, April 2025, page updated 26 August 2026), paras 3.1.2 and 3.3.7-3.3.9.
- Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 (starred); QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC); Practice Directions, Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, para 8.2(b).
- Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445, 458-59 (BIA 2011), citing Espinoza v INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995) and Vatyan v Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2007).
- Matter of E-F-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2022) (decided 30 June 2022), headnote and 592-93.
- Immigration and Nationality Act s 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 USC 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
- USCIS, 'Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms', 90 FR 11324 (5 March 2025) and 90 FR 44693 (16 September 2025); OIRA, ICR Reference No 202511-1615-008, OMB Control No 1615-0169 (approved with change, 11 February 2026).
- USCIS, 'DHS to Begin Screening Aliens' Social Media Activity for Antisemitism' (9 April 2025); USCIS, Policy Alert PA-2025-16, 'Clarifying Discretionary Factors in Certain Immigration Benefit Requests' (19 August 2025); US Department of State, 'Announcement of Expanded Screening and Vetting for Visa Applicants' (updated 18 September 2026).
- IARMJ COI, Expert Evidence and Social Media Working Group, 'Judicial Guidelines for the Analysis of Social Media Evidence in Refugee, Protection and Migration Appeals' (1 October 2025, revised 27 November 2025), as reported by EIN (17 December 2025).
- London expert witness training, 'Methodology' (course material for country experts), list of typical expert issues; Freedom House, 'Authoritarian Collaboration Fueled Transnational Repression in 2025' (16 April 2026).
- Home Office, Iran CPIN (Version 2.0, April 2025), para 3.3.18, applying SG (Iraq) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940; Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (1 November 2024), paras 9.1-9.3.
Sources
- Upper Tribunal, XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), January 2022
- Upper Tribunal, BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), February 2011
- National Archives, S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482, 6 December 2024
- Upper Tribunal, Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, February 2002
- Home Office, CPIN: social media, surveillance and sur place activities, Iran, Version 2.0, April 2025
- US Department of Justice (EOIR), Matter of E-F-N-, 28 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2022)
- US Department of Justice (EOIR), Matter of D-R-, 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011)
- OIRA, Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Identifier(s) on Immigration Forms, approved 11 February 2026
- Federal Register, USCIS 60-day notice on social media identifiers, 5 March 2025
- USCIS, DHS to Begin Screening Aliens' Social Media Activity for Antisemitism, 9 April 2025
- USCIS, Policy Alert PA-2025-16, 19 August 2025
- US Department of State, Announcement of Expanded Screening and Vetting for Visa Applicants, updated September 2026
- EIN, New IARMJ guidelines offer practical framework for social media evidence in asylum appeals, 17 December 2025
- Freedom House, Authoritarian Collaboration Fueled Transnational Repression in 2025, 16 April 2026
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