Seven Conflict Flashpoints Dominate Africa’s 2026 Peace and Security Agenda

Last updated: 21 September 2026

Deadly conflict in Sudan has forced nearly 13 million people to flee their homes since 2023, according to the UN Refugee Agency, including those pictured here seeking to escape horrific violence in Darfur and South Kordofan in late 2025.

On February 9, 2026, the International Crisis Group published a briefing identifying seven crises and conflicts that it says should be at the top of Africa’s peace and security agenda in 2026: Sudan, Burundi-Rwanda, the Sahel, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Cameroon, and South Sudan. The paper argues that the continent is entering the year under growing strain, with mass displacement, expanding proxy rivalries, institutional fragility, and weakening international support all combining to make conflict prevention more difficult. It also says the African Union (AU) is entering this period from a position of unusual weakness, limiting its ability to act as the anchoring force many African crises would normally require.

A major theme of the briefing is that Africa’s security problems are worsening just as the institutions meant to manage them are struggling. The paper says the AU still has important assets, including convening power, a peace and security architecture, and continent-wide legitimacy, but it argues that the body has become financially and politically constrained. The briefing notes that only 17 of 55 member states have implemented a 2016 levy meant to strengthen AU funding, while the organization’s Peace Fund had risen to just over $400 million. It also points to several setbacks in 2025, including the AU’s limited role in Sudan, difficulties in South Sudan, funding shortfalls for its Somalia mission, and criticism after it congratulated incumbents following disputed elections in Cameroon and Tanzania. In that setting, the paper says, the most realistic path to conflict management may often lie with coalitions of African states, regional powers, Gulf countries, and occasionally external actors such as the United States or France rather than the AU acting alone.

The first and most urgent priority identified in the report is Sudan. The briefing says the war that erupted in April 2023 between the army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” remains the continent’s most devastating active conflict. By early 2026, the war had effectively split the country in two: the army controlled much of the east and centre, while the RSF held sway across most of the west. The conflict’s most dramatic recent turning point came when the RSF overran El Fasher in October 2025 after a prolonged siege, committing what the paper calls shocking mass atrocities against civilians as it seized the last army stronghold in Darfur. The report says the current frontline now runs through Kordofan, where both sides are trying to break the stalemate, but it warns that a deadlock and de facto partition are increasingly plausible. It also stresses that outside support continues to fuel the war: the UAE is described as the RSF’s main backer, while the army relies on a more diverse group of supporters including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Qatar, Iran, and Eritrea. The briefing concludes that renewed high-level U.S. engagement still offers the best hope for de-escalation, despite earlier failures of peace efforts by the so-called Quad of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and the United States.

A second major danger zone, the paper argues, is the growing tension between Burundi and Rwanda, driven largely by the escalating war in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The report says the relationship between the two neighbors has been deteriorating for years, with each suspecting the other of supporting armed proxies aimed at destabilization. With both countries already militarily involved in the DRC, the briefing warns that open confrontation between them would mark a catastrophic escalation in a region already battered by repeated violence. The concern here is not only border tension in the narrow sense, but the risk that regional competition will further destabilize the Great Lakes and complicate any effort to calm eastern Congo.

The Sahel is identified as a third priority because its insurgency has entered a more dangerous phase. The briefing says the crisis that has gripped the central Sahel for more than a decade took on a new dimension in 2025, when jihadist groups further expanded their reach and deepened insecurity across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. It notes that the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) carried out significant pressure campaigns and that insecurity persists even in areas where governments have claimed tactical success. In Burkina Faso, the paper says, up to 10 percent of the population remains displaced, while in Niger a February 2026 attack on the country’s main airport and military base showed that the threat is far from contained. The briefing also stresses that civilians remain trapped between jihadist violence and abuses by state forces and their allies, including Russian partners in Mali. The broader warning is that the Sahel’s instability is no longer a contained insurgency problem, but a protracted regional emergency with major humanitarian and political consequences.

A fourth flashpoint is the mounting risk of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The paper says both countries are preparing for the possibility of renewed conflict, driven largely by Ethiopia’s increasingly public ambition to secure its own seaport access, ideally on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast. Those statements are viewed in Asmara as highly provocative, while relations have also worsened because of new tensions inside Tigray, where rival factions and past wartime alliances are shifting again. The briefing reminds readers that Ethiopia and Eritrea have already moved from cooperation to war and back again over the last three decades, including the devastating border war that ended in 2000 and the partial rapprochement that began after Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. But it argues that the current moment is especially dangerous because military planning, political mistrust, and unresolved regional tensions are all converging at once. It suggests that outside actors such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and European powers may need to use their leverage to prevent a slide into another interstate war in the Horn of Africa.

The fifth priority is Somalia, where the paper sees a convergence of military, political, and geopolitical risks. It says backing for the campaign against Al-Shabaab is under fresh strain as traditional security partners lose patience with Mogadishu and the African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) faces major funding constraints. The report warns that Somalia is also being pulled into a wider Gulf rivalry, especially the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which may intensify proxy competition around Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland. Another destabilizing development came on December 26, 2025, when Israel formally recognized Somaliland as an independent state, prompting sharp opposition from the Somali federal government and many regional actors who see the move as inconsistent with Africa’s long-standing respect for post-colonial borders. The briefing says the most urgent priority is to help Mogadishu stabilize security even if international support shrinks, while regional states should also broker a political compromise over upcoming elections and restart serious talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa about Somaliland’s future status. Without that dual effort, it argues, Somalia could become more fragmented just as security gains against Al-Shabaab remain fragile.

The sixth case is Cameroon, where the paper says the aftermath of the October 2025 presidential election has opened a particularly dangerous period. The election, it argues, brought the strongest challenge yet to Paul Biya’s long rule, and many Cameroonians viewed the result as stolen. At the same time, the country still faces the unresolved conflict in its Anglophone regions, which began in 2016 after government attempts to impose Francophone teachers and judges in English-speaking areas. The briefing says the army has been on the back foot in parts of the Anglophone conflict, suffering repeated ambushes in 2025, while jihadists also continue attacks in the Far North. It warns that Cameroon now faces a combination of succession uncertainty, lingering anger over the election, and a grinding insurgency that could further destabilize the country if negotiations do not resume. The paper suggests the European Union, France, the UN, and potentially Canada could still play a useful role by quietly pressing Yaoundé to end repression, restart talks with Anglophone leaders, and avoid a dangerous downward spiral as the country approaches an eventual political transition.

The seventh and final priority is South Sudan, where the briefing says the country has already returned to open conflict. In January 2026, a renewed rebellion led in part by commanders loyal to Riek Machar captured substantial territory in Jonglei state before government forces launched a major counter-offensive. The paper says the political pact that has long held South Sudan’s ruling elite together has once again unraveled, making renewed civil war and retaliatory ethnic violence increasingly likely. It adds that the conflict is now tied more closely to Sudan’s own war: after the RSF captured the Heglig oil fields near the border in November 2025, South Sudanese forces entered the area, raising the risk that fighting in one country could spill directly into the other. The report also notes that over half the South Sudanese population suffers severe food shortages and that climate shocks, insecurity, and cuts to aid budgets are worsening the humanitarian emergency. Its recommendation is that concerned African states, including Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia, should intensify diplomacy to prevent state collapse and renewed ethnic war.

Overall, the briefing presents Africa’s 2026 peace and security agenda as defined by a mix of active wars, fragile transitions, insurgencies, and interstate rivalries, all unfolding in a world where multilateral institutions are under strain and external meddling remains common. Its argument is not that solutions are unavailable, but that they will require far more pragmatic, coordinated, and politically realistic action than African and international actors have shown so far.

Conclusion

The briefing shows that Africa’s main peace and security risks in 2026 are not isolated conflicts, but interconnected crises shaped by weak institutions, outside intervention, and unresolved political settlements. From Sudan and South Sudan to the Sahel, Somalia, and the Great Lakes, the report suggests that instability is becoming more regional, more prolonged, and in several cases more internationalized.

More broadly, the paper argues that the question is no longer simply whether African states and institutions can respond, but whether they can do so quickly and collectively enough to prevent further escalation. In that context, the seven priorities it identifies serve not only as a conflict map for 2026, but also as a measure of how much political will still exists to address the continent’s most urgent security challenges.