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Country Reports Post-Soviet Region (CIS) Risk Assessments

Russia Return Risk: Draft Evaders and Activists

Russia Return Risk: Draft Evaders and Activists

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This Russia return risk assessment examines the dangers facing individuals who would be returned to the Russian Federation in 2026. The analysis covers draft evaders, anti-war activists, political opposition members, LGBTQ+ individuals, journalists, and religious minorities. For expert witnesses and asylum decision-makers, this assessment provides a structured evaluation of the risks upon return, the state's capacity (and willingness) to protect, and the viability of internal relocation. The overall finding is that Russia return risk is rated HIGH for all categories examined.

Working on a Russia case? We write country conditions reports for UK tribunals and US immigration courts.Mr Dmitry Shcherbak

This assessment draws on evidence from UNHCR, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, OVD-Info, AGORA International, and the UK Home Office's country policy and information notes. It is relevant to asylum claims involving Russian nationals across all major jurisdictions. For comprehensive background on Russia's legal and political environment, see the Russia country reports.

HIGH
Overall Russia return risk level
100%
Airport screening rate by FSB
0
State protection available
N/A
Internal relocation viability

Overview of Current Conditions in Russia (2026)

Russia in 2026 operates as a consolidated authoritarian state. The war in Ukraine continues with no prospect of resolution in the near term. Domestic repression has intensified steadily since February 2022, and the legal framework for persecution has expanded through successive waves of legislative amendments. Freedom House rates Russia 13 out of 100 ("Not Free"), Reporters Without Borders ranks it 164 out of 180 on the Press Freedom Index, and the UN Human Rights Council has expressed "grave concern" over systematic violations of fundamental rights.[1]

The security apparatus — comprising the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the National Guard (Rosgvardia), and the Investigative Committee — operates with broad discretion and minimal judicial oversight. Moreover, the withdrawal from the Council of Europe in 2022 eliminated the European Court of Human Rights as an oversight mechanism. There is no independent judiciary capable of providing meaningful protection against state action. Consequently, the conditions for individuals in risk categories have continued to deteriorate.[2]

Categories of People at Risk

Draft Evaders and Deserters

Risk Level: HIGH. Individuals who evaded mobilization under Presidential Decree No. 647 or who deserted from military service face guaranteed criminal prosecution upon return. Criminal Code Articles 337 and 338 carry maximum penalties of 15 years' imprisonment during wartime. The mobilization decree has never been rescinded, and there is no statute of limitations for desertion in wartime. Russian border databases maintained by the FSB flag all individuals with outstanding military obligations. Detention at the point of entry is virtually certain.[3]

Furthermore, electronic summons introduced through the Gosuslugi portal in 2023 may have generated criminal liability for individuals who never received physical notification. Men of military age (18-30 since the 2023 extension, plus all reservists regardless of age) who left Russia after September 2022 are presumed to have evaded mobilization unless they can demonstrate a lawful exemption. In practice, exemptions were rarely granted and even more rarely documented.

Anti-War Activists

Risk Level: HIGH. Individuals who have publicly opposed the war in Ukraine face prosecution under multiple Criminal Code provisions. Article 207.3 (spreading "false information" about the armed forces) carries up to 15-20 years' imprisonment. Article 280.3 ("discrediting" the armed forces) carries up to seven years for repeat offences. Russian authorities monitor social media activity of citizens abroad through both technical means and informant networks. Consequently, anti-war statements made while abroad can and do form the basis for criminal prosecution.[4]

Risk Category Primary Legal Threats Risk Level
Draft evaders / deserters Art. 337, 338, 328 (up to 15 years) HIGH
Anti-war activists Art. 207.3, 280.3 (up to 20 years) HIGH
Opposition members Art. 282.2, 284.1 (up to 10 years) HIGH
LGBTQ+ individuals Art. 282.2 ("LGBT extremism"), Art. 6.21 KoAP HIGH
Independent journalists Art. 207.3, "foreign agent" law, Art. 275 (treason) HIGH
Religious minorities Art. 282.2 (Jehovah's Witnesses), Art. 205.5 (Hizb ut-Tahrir) HIGH
Table 1: Russia return risk assessment by category. Sources: Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; UNHCR eligibility guidelines; OVD-Info.

Political Opposition Members

Risk Level: HIGH. Individuals associated with organizations designated as extremist (FBK, Navalny's regional network) or undesirable (over 100 designated organizations) face criminal prosecution under Articles 282.2 and 284.1 respectively. Russian authorities have seized donor databases and volunteer lists, meaning that even minor past involvement can trigger prosecution. Furthermore, individuals who participated in opposition activities while abroad — attending protests, making public statements, or collaborating with designated organizations — are subject to prosecution upon return.[5]

LGBTQ+ Individuals

Risk Level: HIGH. The November 2023 Supreme Court ruling declaring the "international LGBT movement" an extremist organization fundamentally transformed the legal landscape for LGBTQ+ individuals in Russia. Any expression of LGBTQ+ identity or advocacy can be prosecuted as "participation in an extremist organization" under Article 282.2, carrying up to six years' imprisonment. Moreover, the expanded "propaganda" law (Federal Law No. 478-FZ) criminalizes any positive portrayal of non-traditional relationships across all age groups. In Chechnya, the risk extends to extrajudicial violence, including documented cases of torture and killing.[6]

Independent Journalists

Risk Level: HIGH. Journalists who have worked for independent or foreign media face prosecution under the "foreign agent" law, Article 207.3 (false information), or — in extreme cases — Article 275 (treason), which carries up to 20 years. Over 800 individuals and organizations carry the "foreign agent" designation. Additionally, at least 22 journalists were imprisoned in Russia as of early 2025, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The case of Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter sentenced to 16 years on espionage charges widely regarded as fabricated, illustrates the severity of risk facing journalists.[7]

Religious Minorities

Risk Level: HIGH. Jehovah's Witnesses, banned as an extremist organization since 2017, face systematic prosecution. Over 800 criminal cases have been opened against members, with sentences reaching six or more years. Crimean Tatars face prosecution for alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir membership, with sentences reaching 20 years. Members of other religious groups deemed extremist — including certain Muslim communities and Scientologists — also face criminal liability upon return.[8]

Documented Cases of Harm Upon Return

FSB Airport Screening

The Federal Security Service operates border control at all Russian international airports and land crossings. All arriving passengers undergo identity verification against centralized federal databases. These databases include the federal wanted persons list, the extremism and terrorism watchlist maintained by Rosfinmonitoring, military commissariat records of individuals with outstanding summons, and records of individuals flagged for "prophylactic conversation" by the FSB.[9]

Documented cases of individuals detained upon return include a man arrested at Sheremetyevo Airport in March 2023 after returning from Turkey, who was charged under Article 337 for failing to report to his military commissariat. He received a four-year sentence. In another case, a woman returning from Georgia was detained and questioned for 12 hours about her contacts with "undesirable organizations" abroad before being released under travel restrictions pending investigation. AGORA International documented at least 47 cases of individuals detained or interrogated at Russian border crossings between October 2022 and December 2024 for mobilization-related or political offences.[10]

The FSB maintains comprehensive databases that enable the immediate identification and detention of individuals flagged for political or military offences. Return to Russia for anyone in a risk category means walking into a system designed to detect and punish them.
AGORA International Human Rights Group, 'Surveillance and Prosecution of Returning Nationals,' 2024

Criminal Prosecution Upon Return

Individuals detained at the border face expedited criminal proceedings before military courts (for mobilization-related offences) or regular courts (for political offences). Conviction rates in Russian criminal courts exceed 99%, according to data from the Russian Judicial Department. Consequently, detention upon return is effectively a guarantee of conviction. Sentences in military-related cases have ranged from two to 10 years' actual imprisonment. Sentences in political cases have reached 25 years, as in the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza.[11]

Criminal Court Conviction Rate in Russia
Conviction
99.6%
99.6%
Acquittal
0.4%
0.4%
Figure 1: Criminal court conviction vs. acquittal rate in Russia (2024). Source: Russian Judicial Department, Annual Report on Court Activity.

State Capacity to Protect

The Russian state provides no meaningful protection for individuals in any of the risk categories identified in this assessment. On the contrary, the state is the primary agent of persecution. The following factors confirm the absence of state protection.

First, the persecution is conducted through the formal legal system. Criminal Code articles described in this report are enacted by the State Duma, enforced by prosecutors, and adjudicated by courts. There is no separation of powers that would allow one branch of government to check the repressive actions of another. Second, the judiciary operates under direct executive influence. The conviction rate of 99.6% demonstrates the absence of independent judicial review. Third, complaints to domestic oversight bodies — including the Presidential Human Rights Council and the Ombudsman — produce no meaningful remedies. These bodies have been co-opted and serve a legitimizing function rather than a protective one.[12]

Assessment: State protection is entirely absent for all risk categories. The Russian state is the agent of persecution. There is no domestic mechanism capable of providing effective protection against state-sponsored criminal prosecution, surveillance, or violence.

Internal Relocation Assessment

Internal relocation within Russia does not provide a viable alternative to international protection for any of the risk categories identified. Several structural factors make internal relocation ineffective.

Centralized FSB Databases

Russia operates a highly centralized system of federal databases accessible to law enforcement across all 89 federal subjects. The "wanted persons" database, the extremism watchlist, and military commissariat records are accessible at any police checkpoint, during routine document checks, and through the propiska (residence registration) system. Moving to a different region does not remove an individual from these databases. Consequently, any interaction with state authorities — registering a new address, seeking medical care, enrolling children in school, or passing a police checkpoint — can trigger identification and arrest.[13]

SORM Surveillance System

The System of Operative-Investigative Measures (SORM) provides Russian security services with comprehensive communications surveillance capabilities. SORM-1 intercepts telephone communications, SORM-2 intercepts internet traffic, and SORM-3 collects metadata on all communications in real time. All Russian telecommunications providers are legally required to install SORM equipment, and the FSB can activate surveillance without judicial authorization in practice, despite formal legal requirements. This means that an individual's location, communications, and digital activity can be monitored regardless of where they reside within Russia.[14]

Residence Registration (Propiska) System

Russian law requires all citizens to register their place of residence with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Failure to register within 90 days of changing one's address constitutes an administrative offence. The registration system creates a comprehensive record of individuals' locations. Furthermore, landlords who fail to register tenants face administrative liability. This makes it extremely difficult for individuals to relocate discreetly. Moreover, employment, access to healthcare, and children's school enrolment all require current registration, creating multiple points of potential detection.[15]

Factor Assessment Impact on Internal Relocation
Federal databases Centralized, accessible nationwide Relocation does not remove from databases
SORM surveillance Covers all telecommunications nationwide Location tracking possible anywhere in Russia
Propiska system Mandatory registration creates detection points Re-registration triggers identification
Facial recognition Deployed in Moscow, St. Petersburg, expanding Identification in public spaces without documents
National application of laws All Criminal Code articles apply uniformly No regional variation in legal risk
Table 2: Factors rendering internal relocation non-viable in Russia. Sources: AGORA International; Privacy International; OVD-Info.

Additionally, Moscow and St. Petersburg have deployed extensive facial recognition camera networks. As of 2025, Moscow alone operates over 200,000 surveillance cameras integrated with facial recognition technology. This system has been used to identify and detain protest participants, individuals flagged in wanted databases, and draft evaders. The technology is being rolled out to other major cities. Therefore, even without registering a new address, individuals can be identified through automated surveillance in public spaces.[16]

Assessment: Internal relocation is not viable for any risk category. The combination of centralized federal databases, SORM surveillance, the mandatory propiska system, expanding facial recognition networks, and the nationwide application of all relevant Criminal Code provisions means that relocation to a different region provides no meaningful reduction in risk. For detailed analysis of conditions across Russian regions, consult the country reports. Expert witness evidence can address internal relocation viability in individual cases.

What This Means for Russian Asylum Claims

Return risk is assessed as high for Russian draft evaders, anti-war activists, opposition members, LGBTQ+ people, journalists and religious minorities. Activists, opposition members and journalists rely on political opinion, draft evaders often on imputed opinion; religious minorities rely on religion; LGBTQ+ people fall within a particular social group. Where the state itself is the source of risk, it cannot protect, and internal relocation fails because federal authorities reach every region. Our Russia country expert witness reports address each profile.

Conclusion: Risk Level Assessment

This Russia return risk assessment concludes that the risk level is HIGH for all categories of individuals examined: draft evaders and deserters, anti-war activists, political opposition members, LGBTQ+ individuals, independent journalists, and religious minorities. The risk of serious harm upon return is not merely theoretical — it is supported by documented cases, systematic legal provisions, and a comprehensive enforcement infrastructure.

The Russian state provides no protection for any of these groups. On the contrary, the state is the agent of persecution, operating through a formal legal framework that criminalizes dissent, identity, and resistance to military service. Internal relocation does not provide a viable alternative, given the centralized nature of Russian security databases, the SORM surveillance system, and the mandatory residence registration regime. For expert witnesses preparing reports and asylum decision-makers assessing claims, the evidence supports a finding that return to Russia would expose individuals in these categories to a real risk of serious harm amounting to persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.


Footnotes

  1. Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2025: Russia' (2025), score 13/100; Reporters Without Borders, 'Press Freedom Index 2025' (2025); UN Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Russia (2024)
  2. Council of Europe, 'Russia's Withdrawal from the Council of Europe' (16 March 2022); International Commission of Jurists, 'Russia: Judicial Independence Under Threat' (2024)
  3. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Articles 337 and 338 (as amended by Federal Law No. 365-FZ, September 2022); Presidential Decree No. 647 (21 September 2022, not rescinded); OVD-Info, 'Mobilisation: Legal Consequences of Non-Compliance' (2023)
  4. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Articles 207.3 and 280.3; OVD-Info, 'Criminal Cases for Anti-War Speech: Statistical Report' (2025); Human Rights Watch, 'Russia: Social Media Monitoring Used to Prosecute Dissent Abroad' (2024)
  5. Moscow City Court, FBK Extremism Designation Decision (9 June 2021); Ministry of Justice, 'Register of Undesirable Organizations' (2026); OVD-Info, 'Prosecuted for a Donation: Article 282.2 Cases' (2023)
  6. Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Decision on the 'International LGBT Movement' (30 November 2023); Federal Law No. 478-FZ (5 December 2022); Russian LGBT Network, 'Report on Persecution in Chechnya' (2024)
  7. Federal Law No. 255-FZ, 'On Foreign Agents' (2022); Committee to Protect Journalists, 'Journalists Imprisoned in Russia' (2025); Moscow City Court, Verdict in the Case of E. Gershkovich (2024)
  8. Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Decision Banning Jehovah's Witnesses (20 April 2017); European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, 'Persecution Report 2024' (2024); Crimean Solidarity, 'Political Prisoners in Crimea' (2025)
  9. Federal Law No. 114-FZ, 'On the Procedure for Exit from and Entry to the Russian Federation'; Rosfinmonitoring, 'Federal List of Extremists and Terrorists' (publicly accessible, 2025); AGORA International, 'Surveillance at Russian Borders' (2024)
  10. AGORA International, 'Surveillance and Prosecution of Returning Russian Nationals' (2024); Mediazona, 'Detained at the Border' (2023); OVD-Info, 'Cases of Detention Upon Return to Russia' (2024)
  11. Russian Judicial Department, 'Annual Report on Court Activity in 2024' (2025), conviction rate data; Moscow City Court, Verdict in the Case of V. Kara-Murza (17 April 2023)
  12. International Commission of Jurists, 'Russia: The Rule of Law in Decline' (2024); Venice Commission, 'Opinion on Russia's Judicial System' (2020); Human Rights Watch, 'Russia: Presidential Human Rights Council Fails to Protect' (2023)
  13. AGORA International, 'Digital Surveillance and Law Enforcement Databases in Russia' (2024); Federal Law No. 5242-1, 'On the Right of Citizens to Freedom of Movement' (as amended)
  14. Privacy International, 'Russia's Surveillance State: The SORM System' (2023); Federal Law No. 144-FZ, 'On Operative-Investigative Activity' (as amended); AGORA International, 'SORM: Legal Framework and Practice' (2024)
  15. Federal Law No. 5242-1, 'On the Right of Citizens to Freedom of Movement, Choice of Place of Stay and Residence' (as amended); Code of Administrative Offences, Article 19.15.2 (violations of registration rules)
  16. Moscow Mayor's Office, 'Facial Recognition in Moscow: Implementation Report' (2024); OVD-Info, 'Facial Recognition Used to Identify Protesters' (2023); Privacy International, 'Facial Recognition Expansion in Russia' (2024)

Sources

  1. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Russia, 2025
  2. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Russia, January 2025
  3. OVD-Info, Political Persecution and Mobilisation Monitoring Reports, 2022-2025
  4. Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Country Reports, 2022-2025
  5. Privacy International, Russia's Surveillance State: SORM and Facial Recognition Reports, 2023-2024
  6. Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia: Press Freedom and Imprisoned Journalists, 2025
  7. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended through 2025)
  8. Russian Judicial Department, Annual Reports on Court Activity, 2023-2024
  9. UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Notes: Russia, 2024-2025

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Frequently asked questions

What does the law say in Russia?

Risk Level: HIGH. Individuals who evaded mobilization under Presidential Decree No. 647 or who deserted from military service face guaranteed criminal prosecution upon return. Criminal Code Articles 337 and 338 carry maximum penalties of 15 years' imprisonment during wartime.

What is the risk on return in Russia?

The Federal Security Service operates border control at all Russian international airports and land crossings. All arriving passengers undergo identity verification against centralized federal databases.

Who is affected in Russia?

Return risk is assessed as high for Russian draft evaders, anti-war activists, opposition members, LGBTQ+ people, journalists and religious minorities. Activists, opposition members and journalists rely on political opinion, draft evaders often on imputed opinion; religious minorities rely on religion; LGBTQ+ people fall within a particular social group.

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