Religious Extremism and Sharia-Based Persecution Drive Somalis Abroad

Last updated: 5 October 2026

Somalia remains one of the world's most protracted and complex crises. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the country has experienced continuous armed conflict, chronic political fragmentation, and repeated humanitarian emergencies. Freedom House classifies Somalia as Not Free. Al-Shabaab operates as both an insurgent threat and a parallel governing authority, while clan violence, state fragility, and climate shocks compound civilian insecurity. Between April 2023 and March 2025, Somali nationals lodged nearly 38,000 EU+ asylum applications with an overall recognition rate of approximately 56%. This report examines Al-Shabaab insurgency, clan dynamics, humanitarian crisis, and the implications for international protection claims.[1]

Political System and State Fragility

Somalia formally operates as a federal parliamentary republic but its political system is shaped by negotiated arrangements among clan actors, federal authorities, and regional administrations. The Federal Government controls the capital and parts of South-Central Somalia but its authority elsewhere is inconsistent. Federal member states often pursue their own agendas, and Puntland has long maintained significant autonomy. Somaliland functions as a de facto independent entity since 1991 with more stable institutions. Clan affiliation remains central through the 4.5 formula, which allocates political representation among major clan families while marginalising minority groups.[2]

Al-Shabaab and Insurgent Governance

Al-Shabaab remains the most significant armed threat and principal driver of civilian insecurity in South-Central Somalia. The al-Qaeda-affiliated movement combines insurgent military operations with systems of local taxation, parallel justice, coercive governance, and ideological control. Between January and November 2024, Al-Shabaab killed 205 civilians and injured 506 others. The group targets people perceived to support the government, journalists, humanitarian staff, and community leaders. One of the most alarming aspects is the systematic recruitment and use of children, with the group raiding schools and communities to force children into combat roles.[3]

Clan Violence and Minority Vulnerability

Clan violence remains a persistent driver of displacement separate from the insurgency. Land disputes, access to water, local political influence, and competition over resources trigger inter-clan confrontations that displaced tens of thousands in 2024. Minority groups such as the Bantu, Benadiri, and occupational caste communities including the Midgan or Gabooye face particular vulnerability, lacking armed protection and political influence available to dominant clans. They face discrimination in access to justice, land, employment, and protection. Sexual violence remains a serious concern, with Al-Shabaab, security forces, and clan militias all implicated.[4]

Humanitarian Emergency and Displacement

By end 2024, approximately 4.4 million people required urgent food assistance and 6.9 million needed humanitarian support overall. In the first eight months of 2025, UNHCR recorded 279,000 internal displacements. In early 2026, a newly declared drought emergency displaced around 180,000 civilians within days. Conditions in IDP settlements are extremely poor, with overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, limited healthcare, and heightened risks of exploitation and gender-based violence.[5]

Migration and Asylum Relevance

The 2025 EUAA country guidance confirms that protection analysis must differentiate between South-Central Somalia (highest concern due to Al-Shabaab intensity and state weakness), Puntland (mixed, requiring individual analysis), and Somaliland (comparatively more stable). The 56% EU+ recognition rate reflects complexity: some applicants establish refugee claims based on targeted persecution while others qualify for subsidiary protection due to generalised violence.[6]

Organisations Monitoring the Situation

Analytical Assessment

Somalia's federal political system remains structurally weak because sovereignty is divided not only between institutions but among clans, militias, and regional administrations. This produces a system in which political authority is negotiated rather than consolidated, and in which minority groups remain excluded from meaningful protection. The 4.5 clan formula, while preventing total political collapse, entrenches identity-based marginalisation that is directly relevant to refugee status determination on grounds of membership of a particular social group.[7]

Al-Shabaab continues to operate as both an insurgent threat and a parallel governing actor. Its influence is sustained not only through violence but through taxation, coercive justice, and the state's inability to eliminate its territorial presence. For individuals who refuse recruitment, cooperate with the federal government, or engage in journalism or civil society, the risk of targeted persecution by Al-Shabaab satisfies the Convention threshold. The systematic recruitment and use of children adds a further dimension that may ground protection claims for families and young people in areas of insurgent influence.[8]

Humanitarian crisis remains central to the Somali protection picture. Conflict, drought, flooding, and mass displacement create cumulative harm that deepens insecurity and drives migration. The 2026 drought emergency, displacing 180,000 people within days, demonstrates that climate shocks continue to interact with conflict to produce acute humanitarian need. In the absence of stronger state institutions, more effective civilian protection, and a meaningful reduction in armed conflict, Somalia will continue generating both refugee claims based on targeted persecution and broader protection claims arising from chronic insecurity and serious harm.