Political Instability Fuels Mass Migration from Somalia

Last updated: 5 October 2026

Somalia's federal parliamentary republic operates through negotiated arrangements among clan actors, federal authorities, and regional administrations rather than consolidated constitutional governance. The Federal Government controls the capital and parts of South-Central Somalia but its authority elsewhere is inconsistent. Puntland maintains significant autonomy and has repeatedly challenged Mogadishu over constitutional questions. Somaliland has functioned as a de facto independent entity since 1991 with more stable institutions but remains internationally unrecognised. Clan affiliation remains central to political life through the 4.5 formula, which allocates representation among major clan families while assigning a reduced share to minority groups, entrenching identity-based competition for power and resources.

Political Fragmentation and Contested Sovereignty

The Federal Government controls the capital and parts of South-Central Somalia but its authority elsewhere is inconsistent. Puntland maintains significant autonomy and has repeatedly challenged Mogadishu over constitutional questions. Somaliland has functioned as a de facto independent entity since 1991 with more stable institutions but remains internationally unrecognised.[1]

Clan affiliation remains central to political life through the 4.5 formula, which allocates representation among major clan families while assigning a reduced share to minority groups, entrenching identity-based competition for power and resources.[2]

Armed Conflict and Civilian Insecurity

Al-Shabaab remains the most significant armed threat, combining military operations with systems of local taxation, parallel justice, and coercive governance. Between January and November 2024, the group killed 205 civilians and injured 506 others. It systematically recruits children by raiding schools and communities.[3]

Clan violence operates as a separate driver of displacement, with land disputes, water access, and resource competition triggering confrontations that displaced tens of thousands in 2024. Minority groups such as the Bantu, Benadiri, and Gabooye face particular vulnerability, lacking the armed protection and political influence of dominant clans. Sexual violence remains a serious concern across all conflict actors.[4]

Humanitarian Emergency and Mass Displacement

By end 2024, approximately 6.9 million people required humanitarian support, with 4.4 million needing urgent food assistance. UNHCR recorded 279,000 internal displacements in the first eight months of 2025, primarily caused by insecurity and conflict.[5]

In early 2026, a newly declared drought emergency displaced around 180,000 civilians within days. Conditions in IDP settlements remain extremely poor, with overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, limited healthcare, and heightened risks of exploitation and gender-based violence. Climate shocks and armed conflict reinforce each other, disrupting livelihoods and humanitarian access.[6]

Migration and International Protection

Somalia continues to generate substantial outward migration driven by conflict, economic collapse, environmental stress, and lack of state protection. The 56% EU+ recognition rate reflects the complexity of Somali claims: some applicants establish refugee claims based on targeted persecution while others qualify for subsidiary protection due to generalised violence and state failure.[7]

South-Central Somalia remains the primary area of concern in protection assessment.

Analytical Assessment

Somalia's political instability is structural rather than episodic. Sovereignty is divided between federal institutions, regional administrations, clan structures, and an armed insurgency that controls significant territory. The federal political system has not produced consolidated state authority capable of providing consistent protection across the national territory. For international protection claims, this means that the availability of state protection must be assessed at the local rather than national level, and that the formal existence of a federal government does not equate to effective protection capacity in the regions from which most asylum seekers originate.[8]

The interaction between political fragmentation, armed conflict, and climate vulnerability produces cumulative displacement pressures that exceed what any single driver would generate in isolation. Al-Shabaab's territorial control creates direct persecution risk for targeted profiles, while the generalised insecurity and humanitarian crisis in South-Central Somalia create conditions that may satisfy the subsidiary protection threshold under Article 15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive for civilians from the most affected areas.

Conclusion

The 2026 drought emergency, displacing 180,000 people within days on top of existing multi-million displacement, demonstrates that Somalia's crisis is not stabilising but continues to produce acute shocks within a chronic emergency. The 56% EU+ recognition rate confirms that the international protection system recognises both the targeted and generalised dimensions of risk. Without stronger state institutions, reduced armed conflict, and effective humanitarian response, Somalia will remain one of the world's most significant sources of international protection claims.