Shia Hazara in Quetta: Targeted Attacks on a Besieged Community

Last updated: 15 October 2026

Photo: Man on bus ride between Quetta and Lahore - Robin Jakobsson

Pakistan Hazara attacks have killed more than 2,000 members of the Shia Hazara community in Quetta and the wider Balochistan region since 1999. The Hazaras live in two main neighbourhoods of Quetta — Hazara Town and Marri Abad. They are easy to identify because of their distinct Asian features. They speak Hazaragi, a Persian dialect. They are Shia Muslims. They are an ethnic and religious minority twice over. Sunni extremist groups, especially Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), have made the Hazaras a clear target. Bombs at marketplaces, suicide attacks at mosques, gunfire on buses, and roadside ambushes have repeated for over twenty years. Pakistan Hazara attacks remain one of the clearest examples of religious persecution in South Asia. For asylum decision-makers and expert witnesses, Hazara cases often present strong refugee claims under several Convention grounds at once.

This report explains who the Hazaras are, the major attacks since 1999, the perpetrators, the failure of state protection, daily life under siege, and the implications for asylum. It draws on Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and reporting by Dawn, BBC, and Al Jazeera. For more on Pakistan country background, see our country reports.

Who Are the Hazaras?

The Hazaras are an ethnic group whose history goes back centuries in the central highlands of Afghanistan, called the Hazarajat. Many Hazaras moved to Quetta during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when British India built railways and the city grew. A second wave came after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and again after the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. Today, around 600,000 Hazaras live in Pakistan, mostly in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province.[1]

Three things mark the Hazaras out from most Pakistanis. First, they have East Asian features that make them easy to recognise on the street. Second, they speak Hazaragi, a Persian (Dari) dialect, in addition to Urdu and English. Third, almost all Hazaras are Shia Muslims, while most Pakistanis are Sunni. This combination — face, language, and faith — makes them a "triple minority." Sunni extremist groups have used these markers to identify and kill them.

Most Pakistani Hazaras live in two crowded neighbourhoods on opposite sides of Quetta. Hazara Town is on the western side, near the Mastung road. Marri Abad (also called Mehr Abad) is on the eastern side, on Alamdar Road. Both areas are surrounded by walls, checkpoints, and Frontier Corps posts. They function as protected enclaves but also as open-air prisons. Hazaras need a Pakistani CNIC (national ID) to leave, and even then their identity makes any journey beyond these zones risky.[2]

Major Attacks Since 1999

Pakistan Hazara attacks first reached international attention in the early 2000s, but small-scale killings began in 1999. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, an anti-Shia group, started targeted shootings of Hazara teachers, doctors, and traders. By 2003, the violence escalated to mass-casualty attacks. The list below summarises only the most deadly incidents.

Mastung 2003 (June). Gunmen ambushed a bus carrying Hazara cadets near Mastung, on the Quetta-Karachi highway. They forced the men off the bus, identified the Hazaras by face, and shot them. At least 12 were killed. The attack confirmed that the Hazaras were not just collateral damage of broader violence — they were specifically targeted.[3]

Quetta 2010 (September). A suicide bomber struck an Al-Quds Day rally on Mecongi Road. Around 65 Shia, mostly Hazaras, were killed. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility.

Mastung 2011 (September). Gunmen stopped a bus of Hazara pilgrims travelling to Iran. They again separated Hazaras from other passengers and shot 26 people dead.

Quetta 2013 (January) — twin bombings. The deadliest single day in Hazara history. A double bombing at a snooker hall on Alamdar Road killed at least 96 people. Most were Hazaras. The first explosion drew rescuers, then the second bomb went off. Hazara families refused to bury their dead for four days. They sat with the coffins on the road, in winter, until the federal government finally dismissed the provincial government and imposed governor's rule. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi claimed responsibility.[4]

Quetta 2013 (February) — Hazara Town bombing. Less than a month later, a water tanker bomb exploded in Hazara Town. At least 84 people were killed and around 200 injured. Once again the Hazaras refused to bury their dead in protest.

Quetta 2018 (April). A suicide attack in Marri Abad killed at least 6 Hazaras. The same year saw repeated targeted shootings of Hazara workers and shopkeepers. ISIS-K claimed several of these attacks.

Mach coal mine 2021 (January). Eleven Hazara coal miners were taken from their dormitory near Mach, around 80 kilometres south-east of Quetta. The attackers tied their hands and shot them. ISIS-K claimed the killings. Hazara families again refused to bury the bodies until the Prime Minister visited. The protest sit-in lasted six days in freezing weather.[5]

Quetta 2023-2024. Targeted shootings of Hazara individuals continued. Attacks on Hazara traders, taxi drivers, and Frontier Corps Hazara recruits were reported through 2023 and 2024.

The Perpetrators

Several armed groups have carried out Pakistan Hazara attacks. Each has its own ideology and history, but they share an anti-Shia agenda.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ split from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in 1996 to focus on direct attacks on Shias. It is the deadliest enemy of the Pakistani Hazaras. Pakistan banned LeJ in 2001, but the group reorganised under different names. Many of its leaders had links to Afghan Sunni networks. LeJ claimed responsibility for the 2013 twin bombings, the Mastung ambushes, and many smaller attacks.[6]

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) / Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat

SSP is a sectarian group formed in 1985 in Punjab. The Pakistani government banned SSP in 2002. The group later renamed itself Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat. Some of its leaders have been elected to the National Assembly. SSP/ASWJ is the political and ideological parent of LeJ. It openly preaches against Shias.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)

ISIS-K formed around 2014 from a mix of disillusioned Taliban and other extremists. It treats Shias as apostates and considers their killing a religious duty. ISIS-K became the main claimant of attacks on Hazaras after about 2016, including the 2018 Marri Abad attack and the 2021 Mach coal miners massacre.[7]

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP is mainly anti-state, but several TTP cells have also taken part in anti-Shia attacks. After the Afghan Taliban takeover in August 2021, TTP attacks increased again. The TTP and ISIS-K sometimes compete and sometimes overlap on the same targets.

State Protection Failure

The Pakistani state has placed Frontier Corps and police checkpoints around the Hazara enclaves. Watchtowers and concrete walls protect the entries to Hazara Town and Marri Abad. Hazaras have been moved into "Hazara-only" buses for some routes, escorted by Frontier Corps. These steps have reduced the largest mass attacks since 2014. But targeted shootings, kidnappings, and ambushes continue. The state has not destroyed the LeJ network or stopped the recruitment of new fighters.

The Counter-Terrorism Department has arrested many LeJ suspects. A few high-profile leaders, including Malik Ishaq, were killed in police "encounters." But human rights groups note that "encounter" deaths bypass the courts and create more impunity, while the broader network keeps producing new attackers. Many LeJ-linked detainees have escaped from prisons in Punjab and Balochistan over the years, including in major prison breaks.[8]

Investigations of major Hazara attacks have rarely produced convictions. The 2013 Alamdar Road bombing led to some arrests but few full trials. Witnesses fear to testify because they would be identified by the wider sectarian network. Police often classify the cases under general anti-terrorism laws rather than under any sectarian-specific law. Hazara families say the state has failed to deliver justice for two decades.[9]

A Community Confined to Two Enclaves

Today, around 90 per cent of Quetta's Hazaras live within Hazara Town and Marri Abad. The two enclaves are surrounded by checkpoints. People who leave for work, study, or shopping in the rest of the city face the daily risk of attack. Many take only specific routes, in groups, and avoid markets known for past attacks. Universities, hospitals, and government offices are mostly outside the enclaves, so many young Hazaras must take that risk every day.[10]

Education and Work

Hazara students have been killed at the University of Balochistan, on bus journeys to colleges, and outside coaching centres. Many families now send their children to Iran or, before 2021, to Afghanistan, for university. Others apply for Australian, Indonesian, or European study or asylum routes. Hazara doctors and engineers are leaving Pakistan in growing numbers. Hazara women, who have a strong literacy tradition, often complete schooling but face limits on travel for jobs.

Economic Pressure

Hazara businesses have been forced into the enclaves. Hazara traders avoid the central Quetta market because of the risk. Property prices in Hazara Town and Marri Abad have risen sharply, while Hazara property outside the enclaves is hard to sell. Coal-mining work in the mountains around Mach and Marri became too dangerous after 2021.

Travel and Movement

Long-distance travel for Hazaras is heavily restricted. The journey from Quetta to Karachi or to Iran by road is dangerous. The pilgrim route to Iran for visits to Mashhad and Qom remains a target for sectarian groups. Many Hazaras instead fly directly from Quetta to Karachi or Lahore, but this is expensive. Some Hazaras have been removed from passenger lists for "security reasons."

Pakistan's Shia Hazara community in Quetta has faced sustained, targeted violence by Sunni militant groups for over two decades. The state has failed to provide effective protection, prosecute attackers, or address the conditions that confine Hazaras to two enclaves. The persecution meets the threshold of severe and systematic religious freedom violations.
US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2024 — Pakistan Chapter

"Genocide" or Religious Persecution?

Hazara activists and some scholars use the word "genocide" to describe Pakistan Hazara attacks. They argue that the killings are systematic, target an identifiable group, and aim to destroy the group's ability to live in Quetta. International law uses a strict definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Most international human rights bodies use words like "religious persecution," "crimes against humanity," or "systematic discrimination." Whatever the word used, the legal effect for asylum is the same: the harm is severe, group-based, and ongoing.[11]

Implications for Asylum Cases

Hazara asylum claims are often among the strongest from Pakistan. Several Convention grounds usually apply at the same time:

• Religion. Hazaras are Shia Muslims, targeted by Sunni extremist groups for their faith.
• Race / ethnicity. Hazaras have visible East Asian features and Persian language. They are recognised as an ethnic group.
• Particular social group. The Hazara identity is fixed by birth and well-known in Pakistan.
• Imputed political opinion. Some Hazaras involved in Hazara Democratic Party or anti-sectarian protests are seen as political opponents.

UNHCR's eligibility guidelines for Pakistan have repeatedly identified Hazaras as a group at high risk of religious and ethnic persecution. Many courts in the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and Canada have recognised Hazara claims. The UK Upper Tribunal has issued country guidance on Hazara cases. For broader case strategy, see our asylum guide.[12]

Shia Hazara claimants from Quetta face targeted attacks, and our Pakistan country expert witness reports assess their risk and relocation options.

Conclusion

Pakistan Hazara attacks have continued for more than a quarter-century. More than 2,000 Hazaras have been killed in targeted bombings, ambushes, and shootings. The community now lives in two heavily guarded enclaves on the edges of Quetta. Education, work, and travel are all shaped by fear. The Pakistani state has tried to limit mass attacks but has failed to dismantle the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi network, prosecute leaders, or guarantee daily safety. The arrival of ISIS-K and the renewed strength of the TTP after 2021 mean that Pakistan Hazara attacks remain a present and future threat, not just a historical pattern.

For asylum decision-makers and expert witnesses, Hazara cases combine ethnicity, religion, and social group identity. The risk of return is uniformly high. Even Hazaras who have not been individually targeted face a real and ongoing risk because of who they are. Pakistan Hazara attacks should be understood as systematic religious and ethnic persecution that the state has failed, year after year, to bring to an end.