Mass Detention Without Due Process: The Institutionalisation of States of Exception in Central America

States of exception have become an institutionalised governance practice across the Northern Triangle and beyond — El Salvador's "régimen de excepción" since March 2022, Honduras's parallel régime since December 2022, and similar emergency-powers normalisation in Ecuador and proposed Costa Rica responses. What began as crisis-response measures have evolved into permanent structures of mass detention without due process, with consequences for international protection assessments.[1]

The evidence base draws on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), UN OHCHR country offices, Cristosal, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CONADEH), and academic research from CLACSO and the Wilson Center Latin America Program.

The Legal Framework

States of exception in Central America are constitutionally permitted instruments — Article 29 of the Salvadoran Constitution and Article 187 of the Honduran Constitution allow temporary suspension of specific guarantees during emergencies. International law constrains their use. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Article 27 permits derogations only "in time of war, public danger, or other emergency", subject to proportionality, non-discrimination, and notification. The UN ICCPR Article 4 imposes parallel constraints.[2]

Inter-American Court jurisprudence has consistently held that emergency derogations cannot suspend judicial guarantees protective of non-derogable rights. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 establishes the basic framework. Yet the practical operation of states of exception in 2022-2026 has departed substantially from these standards.

El Salvador: The Paradigmatic Case

El Salvador's "régimen de excepción" began on 27 March 2022 following 87 gang-related killings over a weekend. Initially declared for 30 days, it has been extended 40+ times by Congress and remains in force in 2026. Key features include the following.[3]

• Mass arrests — 85,000+ detentions; ~2% of total population.
• Suspension of guarantees — right to information on arrest grounds, right to private counsel, 72-hour limit on detention extended to 15 days.
• Mass trial proceedings — group prosecutions of 100-900 defendants.
• CECOT prison — Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo; capacity ~40,000 in single mega-facility.
• Documented deaths in custody — Cristosal documented 350+ between March 2022 and 2025.
• Documented arbitrary detentions — IACHR finding; Cristosal documenting hundreds of innocent detainees.

The Bukele government has framed the régimen as successful — homicides reduced from 18 per 100,000 (2021) to under 3 (2024). Critics frame the cost — mass innocent detentions, deaths in custody, due-process collapse — as unconscionable.

Honduras: The Replication

Honduras's "estado de excepción" began on 6 December 2022 — eight months after El Salvador's. The Castro government (LIBRE) adopted measures resembling Bukele's, though without the architectural commitment to a mega-prison. By 2026 the régime covers 226+ municipalities; 85,000+ detentions documented.[4]

• Periodic Congressional renewals — typically every 45-60 days.
• Suspension of constitutional guarantees in designated areas.
• Mass arrests of suspected gang members and associates.
• Prison overcrowding — 200%+ design capacity.
• Documented arbitrary detentions; due-process concerns.
• Continuing rather than declining gang violence in most metrics.

The Honduran régime has had less dramatic effect on gang structures than the Salvadoran. Gangs adapted — prison-based command, reduced visible territoriality, minor recruitment. CICIH (UN-Honduras anti-impunity commission) was agreed January 2025 but operational launch has been delayed.

Ecuador: The Extension Beyond the Northern Triangle

Ecuador's emergency declarations under President Daniel Noboa (since November 2023) extended similar logic. The January 2024 "internal armed conflict" declaration and subsequent extensions have produced military deployment, gang designations as terrorist organisations, and mass arrests. Conditions differ from Northern Triangle context — Ecuador's prisons were already among the most dangerous globally before 2024.[5]

The Proliferation Logic

State-of-exception governance has proliferated for documented reasons.[6]

1. Bukele model legitimacy — homicide reduction creates political precedent.
2. Public demand — high public support for harsh measures despite due-process concerns.
3. Limited international cost — sanctions and pressure absent in most cases.
4. Constitutional permission — emergency powers built into LATAM constitutions.
5. Gang ungovernability — actual gang control creates governance crisis.
6. Inter-American Court limitations — slow process; weak enforcement.

Due Process Failures

The institutionalisation of states of exception produces documented due-process failures.[7]

• Arrests without warrant — based on appearance, neighbourhood, suspicion.
• No information on charges — for extended periods.
• Public-defender shortage — overwhelmed by caseload.
• Mass trial proceedings — group prosecutions of hundreds.
• Limited judicial review — habeas corpus practical access restricted.
• Detention beyond constitutional limits — extensions normalised.
• Family information barriers — relatives unable to locate detainees.
• Mass acquittals delayed — even where prosecutions fail, release delayed.

Custodial Conditions

Custodial conditions in state-of-exception detention have deteriorated. Specific issues documented include the following. See our companion article on custodial conditions in Latin American prisons.[8]

• Overcrowding — 200-300% design capacity in many facilities.
• Deaths in custody — 350+ Salvadoran; smaller but documented Honduran.
• Medical care absent — chronic conditions untreated.
• Family contact restricted — months without visits.
• Forced labour reports — both contexts.
• Disappearances — documented cases where families unable to locate detainees for extended periods.

Implications for Asylum Cases

The institutionalisation of states of exception creates specific protection issues:[9]

• Risk for returnees — perceived gang affiliation triggers state-of-exception arrest. See our companion deportee vulnerability article.
• Family targeting — relatives of asylum-seekers face state pressure.
• Internal relocation infeasibility — state-of-exception extends nationally.
• State protection inadequacy — protection from gangs entwined with state human rights violations.
• Custodial conditions on return — Article 3 ECHR / CAT Article 3 implications.
• Process for documented former gang members — Salvadoran régimen makes return impossible.

The state of exception has gone from being a tool for extraordinary moments to a permanent feature of how governance happens. The cost is borne in 85,000 detentions in El Salvador, 85,000 in Honduras, deaths in custody, mass innocent imprisonment, and the steady erosion of judicial review. The international protection consequences are still being worked through.
IACHR Annual Report 2024 — Central America chapter

Conclusion

The institutionalisation of mass detention Central America through states of exception represents one of the most significant governance shifts in the region in decades. El Salvador's régimen, Honduras's estado de excepción, and Ecuador's emergency declarations have produced 200,000+ detentions, due-process collapse, custodial deaths, and complex protection consequences. See our companion custodial conditions analysis, deportee vulnerability article, and Honduras asylum guide.