Iraq's Militias: When the State Can't Protect You from Armed Groups

Last updated: 7 October 2026

Photo: Iraq Tour 84 - Elliott Plack

Iraq's militias hold a position that has no easy parallel in modern asylum law. They are armed, organised, and well-funded. They operate openly in cities and along highways. They run businesses, import goods, and tax merchants. They kill activists, detain civilians, and run informal prisons. And — uniquely — they are formally part of the Iraqi state. The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, or al-Hashd al-Shaabi) were officially integrated into the Iraqi security forces in 2016. Their commanders draw state salaries. The Iraqi prime minister is, on paper, their commander-in-chief. Yet the state cannot effectively control them, prosecute them, or hold them to account.[1]

This article explains the structure of Iraq's militias, who they target, and what their formal-but-uncontrollable status means for asylum claims. For broader background see the Iraq country report. For asylum process guidance see the asylum guide.

The Origins and Integration of the PMF

The Popular Mobilisation Forces emerged in June 2014 in response to the rapid advance of ISIS into Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to defend the country. Tens of thousands joined newly formed brigades, many of which had links to existing political-military networks — particularly the Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and Saraya al-Salam (Muqtada al-Sadr's group).[2]

The 2016 PMF Law (Law No. 40 of 2016) integrated the PMF into the Iraqi security forces. The law placed the PMF under the formal command of the prime minister and granted PMF members status equivalent to other state security personnel. In practice, integration has not produced control. Major factions retain separate command structures, separate funding streams, and separate political agendas. Several factions are openly aligned with Iran's IRGC.

The major factions and their agendas

Key PMF factions in 2026 include:

• Kata'ib Hezbollah: Iran-aligned; designated terrorist group by the US; involved in attacks on US forces; implicated in killings of activists.
• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: Iran-aligned; led by Qais al-Khazali; political party with seats in parliament; has been linked to assassinations and abductions.
• Harakat al-Nujaba: Iran-aligned; designated terrorist group by the US; deployed to Syria; involved in domestic violence inside Iraq.
• Badr Organisation: Older organisation; political party with parliamentary representation; controls the Interior Ministry at various points.
• Saraya al-Salam (formerly Mahdi Army): Loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr; less Iran-aligned; operates parallel power structures.
• Atabat Brigades (loyal to Sistani): Less politically aligned with Iran; some have left the PMF structure since 2020.

Who Iraq's Militias Target

Militia targeting is patterned, not random. Specific profile groups have faced sustained targeting since 2019.[3]

Tishreen protest activists and journalists

The October 2019 (Tishreen) protests demanded the end of corruption, sectarian quotas, and Iranian influence. Security forces and Iran-aligned militias killed over 600 protesters between October 2019 and mid-2020. Thousands were injured. Since the formal end of the protests, militias have continued to assassinate activists in what are publicly reported as "unknown gunmen" killings. Human Rights Watch documented at least 35 such killings between 2020 and 2025.

Critics of Iranian influence

Politicians, journalists, and academics who have publicly criticised Iranian influence in Iraq face threats and assassination. The 2020 killing of Hisham al-Hashimi, a leading expert on jihadist movements, in front of his home in Baghdad was widely attributed to Iran-aligned militias. The 2021 attempted drone assassination of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was also linked to such factions. Several academics and journalists have left Iraq for Europe and filed asylum claims.

Sunni Arab men from former ISIS-controlled areas

Sunni Arab men who lived in Anbar, Salah al-Din, parts of Nineveh and Diyala during the 2014-2017 ISIS occupation face suspicion of ISIS affiliation. PMF checkpoints, social media surveillance, and informant networks lead to detention and disappearance even where no actual ISIS involvement existed. UNAMI has documented this pattern across multiple provinces.

LGBTQ+ individuals

Iraq's 2023 anti-LGBT law formally criminalised same-sex relations. Beyond the formal law, militia-linked groups have conducted public targeting of LGBT individuals — including raids on apparent meeting places, online entrapment, and killings. Bodies of LGBT individuals have been recovered with militia-style execution wounds in Baghdad and Basra.

Why State Protection Fails Against Militias

The Iraqi state's failure to protect civilians from militia violence is not a matter of administrative weakness. It is structural. Several mechanisms reinforce one another to produce near-total impunity.[4]

• Formal integration: PMF members carry state credentials. Police cannot detain them in practice without political authorisation.
• Political representation: Major militias have allied political parties in parliament. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq's political wing has held cabinet positions.
• Judicial intimidation: Judges who pursue cases against militia members have faced threats and attacks. Several cases have been dropped under pressure.
• Sectarian coverage: Iran-aligned Shia factions enjoy political coverage from key Shia parties; Sadrist factions enjoy coverage from the Sadrist movement.
• External patronage: Iran provides funding, training, and political coverage to multiple factions.

Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces operate within and beyond the formal security structure. The state's nominal authority over them does not translate into accountability for their members.
UNAMI, Human Rights Report on Iraq (2025)

Geographic Reach and Internal Relocation

Asylum decision-makers regularly suggest internal relocation to escape militia targeting. The geographic reality undermines this option for most claimants.[5]

Asylum Implications

Militia targeting cases need expert evidence that addresses three specific points. First, the identity of the targeting militia and its known operational patterns. Second, the geographic reach of that militia across Iraq. Third, the failure of state protection — including political coverage of the militia and prosecutorial inaction.[6]

Convention grounds

Militia targeting cases typically engage multiple Convention grounds. Tishreen protesters: political opinion. Critics of Iranian influence: imputed political opinion. Sunni Arab men from ISIS-area: religion (in the wider Sunni-Shia sectarian sense), nationality (Iraqi Arab), and PSG. LGBTQ+ individuals: PSG. Women: PSG. Each profile needs profile-specific evidence rather than reliance on generic militia-violence reporting.

Article 3 ECHR / Article 15(c) ECHR Qualification Directive

Where the militia threat is not Convention-grounded but still amounts to torture or inhuman treatment, Article 3 of the ECHR may apply. The UK Upper Tribunal's SMO and KSP [2022] UKUT 110 country guidance addresses Article 15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive (continuing post-Brexit influence) for Iraq. Expert reports should engage directly with this framework.

Conclusion

Iraq's militias are not a residual problem of the post-ISIS period. They are the dominant non-state-but-state-affiliated armed power in Iraq in 2026. They target political opponents, journalists, activists, and members of communities they consider suspect. The state — formally responsible for them — cannot effectively control or prosecute them. For asylum lawyers, the conclusion is direct: where a claimant fears militia targeting, state protection will not be available. Internal relocation is rarely a meaningful answer. Expert evidence is essential. For wider context, see the Iraq country report. To commission a report, use the find expert witness service.