Last updated:
Iraq country conditions in 2026 are more stable than during the war against ISIS. However, the main sources of risk for asylum seekers have not gone away. Iran-aligned militias inside the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) still act with near-total impunity. The Penal Code still reduces sentences for violence with "honourable motives". A 2025 amendment to the Personal Status Law allows a separate Shia family law code. Yazidis, Christians and other minorities still wait to go home. More than one million people remain displaced.
This report updates our earlier Iraq analysis with sources from 2025 and 2026. We wrote it for solicitors and immigration lawyers in the UK and the US. It covers the November 2025 election, the militias, honour-based violence, minorities, LGBTI people, camp closures, return risk, internal relocation to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the INID identity card. It also explains a major change in UK country guidance: the April 2026 country guidance case was set aside in June 2026, so decision makers now apply SMO2 with stated departures. Last reviewed: 26 October 2026.
People still internally displaced in Iraq (IOM/UNHCR, December 2025)
Women and girls killed in the Kurdistan Region in 2025, mostly by male relatives
Yazidis still missing 12 years after the ISIS attack on Sinjar
Prison term for same-sex relations under the April 2024 law
Iraq country conditions at a glance
Iraq is more stable today, but it is not safer for people with a risk profile. Human Rights Watch says Iraq "maintained the fragile stability" of recent years in 2025. At the same time, it lists "continued repression", limits on civic space and "draconian laws rolling back rights" as key concerns.[1] Amnesty International goes further. It says security forces, armed militias and political actors "continued to commit serious human rights violations with near-total impunity" in 2025.[2]
Three changes in Iraq country conditions since our last update matter most for casework. First, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) closed on 31 December 2025 at the request of the Iraqi government.[2] As a result, the UN body that produced most human rights reporting on Iraq no longer exists. Consequently, lawyers will need to rely more on NGOs, the US State Department, UNHCR and the Home Office. Second, Iraq passed new laws on family life and sexuality in 2024 and 2025. Third, the UK rules on documents and returns changed twice in 2026.
In addition, we have removed some figures from the old version of this report. We could not trace them to a current primary source. For example, there is no reliable national count of honour killings in federal Iraq. Amnesty says "no centralized data existed" outside the KRI in 2025.[2] Any expert report that gives a national figure should name its source.
Political context: the 2025 election and a new government
Iraq held parliamentary elections on 11 November 2025. The Supreme Federal Court ratified the results on 14 December 2025. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the most seats, 46 out of 329. Nouri al-Maliki's coalition won 29. The Sadiqoun bloc, led by Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia leader Qais al-Khazali, won 28.[3] Amnesty reports that authorities disqualified dozens of candidates, including independents and women. Moreover, a candidate was killed by a bomb attached to his car in mid-October 2025.[2]
After that, government formation took six months. The Shia Coordination Framework first backed al-Maliki. However, US President Donald Trump warned that support for Iraq would stop if al-Maliki returned. President Nizar Amedi then named Ali al-Zaidi, a 40-year-old with no prior government post, as prime minister-designate on 27 April 2026. Subsequently, parliament approved him on 14 May 2026 with only 14 of 23 ministers. Lawmakers could not agree on the interior and defence ministries.[4] Al Jazeera lists disarming Iran-backed militias as one of the new government's main challenges.
For asylum claims, a change of prime minister has not changed who holds armed power on the ground. Some US-designated militia groups increased their presence in the new parliament, according to AFP.[8] Therefore, a claimant who fears a militia cannot assume that a new government will protect them.
Popular Mobilisation Forces and Iran-aligned militias
Hashd al-Shaabi, or the PMF, is a state-funded umbrella of dozens of armed groups. The PMF formed in 2014 after a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, when ISIS took Mosul.[6] The Home Office estimates that the PMF has at least 200,000 personnel. It also accepts that "the government is generally unable to control it", even though the PMF officially answers to the Prime Minister.[5] The US State Department describes about 60 militia groups. It says several units are aligned with Iran and receive training and resources from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[9]
The PMF law and US pressure
In 2025 the government sent a PMF Authority Law to parliament. The bill would have set ranks, regulated funding and defined links with the Defence and Finance Ministries. In parliament, Shia blocs backed it, while Kurdish and Sunni parties opposed it. On 27 August 2025 the government withdrew the bill. A State of Law MP said it did so under "foreign pressure".[6] Three weeks later, on 17 September 2025, the US State Department designated four more PMF groups as Foreign Terrorist Organisations: Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali.[7] Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq were already on the US list.[7]
In December 2025, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council said several armed factions had agreed to coordinate on a state monopoly of weapons. Nevertheless, none made a binding promise to disarm. Kata'ib Hezbollah said its weapons "will remain in the hands of its fighters" until foreign troops leave Iraq.[8] In our view, these statements do not yet show any real reduction in militia capacity to harm individuals.
Impunity, torture and the targeting of activists
Militias and security forces target people they see as critics. According to the US State Department, Iran-aligned militias "engaged in killing, kidnapping, and extortion throughout the country", particularly in mixed provinces. It adds that the government "did not consistently investigate" PMF abuses or punish those responsible.[9] In addition, courts "routinely accepted forced confessions as evidence". In June 2024, the Ministry of Justice said prisons were running at 300 percent of capacity.[9]
Similarly, activists from the 2019 Tishreen protests remain at risk. Amnesty reports that in 2025 authorities used old arrest warrants against dozens of activists, in what civil society called a "revenge campaign". In Nasiriyah, security forces raided activists' homes and in some cases arrested family members in their place.[2] Amnesty also found that local authorities "operating alongside PMU factions" arrested content creators and protest organisers. Moreover, the State Department notes that Tishreen activists abroad received threats against themselves and their families.[9]
Practice point: The Home Office accepts that the PMF is a state-sponsored actor that the government cannot control.[5] Where the feared actor is a PMF faction, argue that it is a state or hybrid actor. On that basis, protection and relocation are unlikely to be available. For more detail, see our analysis of why the Iraqi state cannot protect people from armed groups.
Honour-based violence and the law
Honour-based violence is widespread in both federal Iraq and the KRI. The Home Office says that violence against women "is deeply ingrained in society". It also says honour killings are often "passed off by families as accidents or suicides".[11] Several estimates suggest hundreds of women and girls die in honour killings across Iraq each year.[11] Amnesty counted at least 53 women and girls killed in the KRI in 2025, mostly by male relatives.[2]
Penal Code Articles 41, 128, 130 and 409
The Iraqi Penal Code (Law No. 111 of 1969) contains four provisions that matter in almost every honour case. The Home Office sets them out in its July 2024 note.[10]
| Article | What it says | Effect in honour cases |
|---|---|---|
| Article 41(1) | No crime if a husband punishes his wife, or parents discipline children, "within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom" | Treats domestic violence as a legal right |
| Article 128(1) | An offence committed with "honourable motives" is a mitigating excuse | Opens the door to a lower sentence for any honour crime |
| Article 130 | With a mitigating excuse, a death sentence falls to imprisonment or detention of at least 1 year; life or fixed-term imprisonment falls to detention of at least 6 months | A killing can lead to a short custodial term |
| Article 409 | A man who surprises his wife in adultery and kills or injures her faces detention of no more than 3 years | Caps the sentence and blocks aggravating factors |
Article 398 also matters in practice. It ends a prosecution for rape if the offender marries the victim.[10] Human Rights Watch confirms that these provisions remained in force throughout 2025. In addition, parliament again failed to pass an anti-domestic violence law, which has been stalled for over a decade.[1] For a detailed legal analysis, see our article on evidence for Iraqi honour killing claims.
The 2025 Personal Status Law amendment and the Ja'fari code
An amendment to the Personal Status Law (Law No. 188 of 1959) entered into force on 17 February 2025. As a result, couples who marry now choose whether the 1959 law or a Shia Ja'fari code (mudawana) will govern marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance. They cannot change that choice later.[12] On 27 August 2025, parliament passed the Ja'fari code "without discussion or debate". According to Human Rights Watch, the code lets a husband move his marriage under the code without his wife's consent or knowledge. It also lets him divorce her without telling her. Furthermore, it moves care of children to the father after age seven, regardless of the child's best interests.[1]
Child marriage
Early drafts of the amendment would have allowed girls to marry at 9. However, the final text says the Ja'fari code cannot go below the age set in the 1959 law. That law sets 18 as the minimum, but allows marriage at 15 with a judge's permission.[12] However, the amendment also legalises unregistered religious marriages. HRW has found that these marriages work as a loophole for child marriage. According to UNAMI data cited by HRW, 22 percent of unregistered marriages involved girls under 14.[12] UNICEF data show that 28 percent of women aged 20 to 24 married before 18, and 7 percent before 15.[9] A woman who fears a forced or child marriage, or a Ja'fari divorce that removes her children, may therefore have a strong claim as part of a particular social group.
Federal Iraq and the KRI compared
On paper, the law differs between the two regions. The KRI adopted a Law against Domestic Violence in 2011, and its law does not accept "honour" as a mitigating circumstance. Federal law still does.[10] In practice, though, the results are not very different. The Home Office's position is that authorities in federal Iraq are "neither willing nor able" to protect people at real risk of honour crimes. In the KRI, they are "willing but not able".[11] For example, police often mediate and return women to their families after the feared relative signs a "pledge" not to harm them.
Shelters
Shelter is a key gap in Iraq country conditions for women. Federal Iraq has no state-run shelters for women fleeing violence. A small number of NGO-run underground shelters exist. Families have attacked them and authorities have raided them, according to HRW.[1] UNHCR describes secret safe houses that can host only a few people for a few months before they close or move.[10] In the KRI, the few government shelters only let women enter or leave with a court order.[13] As a result, the Home Office accepts that internal relocation for a woman fearing honour crimes "is unlikely to be reasonable without family support".[11]
Home Office position (July 2024 CPIN): Women fearing honour crimes form a particular social group. Men who fear revenge for a relationship with a woman do not, unless the claim rests on sexual orientation, but they may qualify for humanitarian protection. Victims of blood feuds also form a particular social group, and the state is "neither willing nor able" to protect them.[11]
LGBTI people and the 2024 anti-LGBT law
On 27 April 2024, parliament amended the Law on Combatting Prostitution (Law No. 8 of 1988). Since then, same-sex relations carry 10 to 15 years in prison. Gender-affirming treatment and "imitating women" carry 1 to 3 years. "Promoting homosexuality", which the law does not define, carries 7 years and a fine of 10 to 15 million dinars.[1] The old version of this report wrongly dated this law to 2023. In August 2023, a separate media directive banned the word "homosexuality" and the term "gender" in published and broadcast language.
Killings, abductions, torture and sexual violence by armed groups against LGBT people continued in 2025 with impunity, according to HRW.[1] The Home Office accepts that LGBTI people in both federal Iraq and the KRI are likely to face persecution. It also accepts that internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable, and that refused claims are unlikely to be certifiable as clearly unfounded.[14]
Religious and ethnic minorities
About 97 percent of Iraqis are Muslim. The constitution protects freedom of belief for Muslims, Christians, Yazidis and Sabean-Mandaeans, but not for other faiths or atheists.[15] The KRG also recognises the Baha'i, Jewish, Kaka'i and Zoroastrian religions. However, people from unrecognised faiths cannot record their religion when they apply for the national ID card. The Home Office accepts that this can leave them without documents, which may breach the Immigration Rules.[15]
Yazidis and Sinjar
ISIS killed more than 5,000 Yazidis in Sinjar in August 2014 and abducted over 6,000, mostly women and children. In August 2026, the KRG prime minister said that "more than 20,000 Yazidi families still live in camps". The KRG rescue office says the whereabouts of over 2,800 Yazidis remain unknown. Of 95 mass graves found in the district, only 68 have been excavated, and only 96 of 850 bodies have been identified.[16]
The 2020 Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad and Erbil was meant to remove the PKK and other armed groups and bring back local services. Six years later, it has not been implemented.[16] Meanwhile, returns continue slowly. In August 2026, Duhok authorities opened registration for 410 families to return with IOM support. IOM now pays only transport and a cash grant of 1.5 million dinars, and no longer rebuilds homes.[17] The Home Office also notes that Yazidi women are "particularly vulnerable" to honour-related violence.[11]
Christians
Fewer than 150,000 Christians remain in Iraq, down from about 1.5 million before 2003, according to the US State Department religious freedom report cited by the Home Office.[15] Christians report land seizures without compensation and pressure from PMF units in the Nineveh Plains. In December 2023 provincial elections, the Babylon Movement, the political wing of the PMF's 50th Brigade, won all four Christian quota seats. Its leader, Rayan al-Kildani, is a US-designated human rights abuser.[15] This means that Christian voters do not control the seats reserved for them.
Shabak and Turkmen
The Shabak are a mostly Shia Muslim minority in the Nineveh Plains. Since ISIS left, a Shabak force backed by the central government, the PMF's 30th Brigade, has changed the balance of power in the area. Christians there describe "Shabak security dominance".[15] Likewise, Turkmen face pressure in Kirkuk and Tal Afar. Australian government reporting cited by the Home Office describes Iran-aligned militias arresting Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk.[5] In addition, Turkmen from Tal Afar need a sponsor to enter or live in Dohuk, according to the Upper Tribunal.[18]
Kaka'i, Sabean-Mandaeans and Baha'is
The Kaka'i (Yarsani) number between 110,000 and 200,000, mainly south-east of Kirkuk, in the Nineveh Plains, in Diyala and in the KRI.[15] Even so, federal Iraq does not recognise their religion. The head of the Sabean-Mandaean community said in 2022 that numbers had fallen from 75,000 in 2003 to about 20,000. Mandaeans face extortion because people link them with the gold trade, and their faith forbids them to carry arms.[15] Federal law bans the Baha'i faith, with up to 10 years in prison, but authorities do not enforce it.
The Home Office's general view is that discrimination against religious minorities does not usually reach the level of persecution. The onus is on the claimant to show a real risk in their own case.[15] However, the same note accepts that a person who fears state or hybrid actors, such as a PMF unit, is unlikely to get protection or to relocate. Expert evidence on the local actor is therefore often decisive.
Internal displacement and camp closures
Displacement is a core part of Iraq country conditions. As of December 2025, according to the IOM and UNHCR update, 1,031,475 people remained internally displaced in Iraq. Of these, 101,886 lived in 20 camps in the KRI.[17] In January 2024, the federal government set a deadline of 30 July 2024 to close all camps in the KRI. It offered a one-time payment of 4 million dinars per family. It later delayed the deadline after rights groups warned that early closure would harm displaced people.[13]
In practice, the camps have not closed. Instead, formal exit has almost stopped. Government procedures for leaving camps were suspended for 18 months, and IOM is the only formal channel out. In 2025, only 6,893 people left the camps. Meanwhile, the camp population grew by 1,666, partly because of "reverse returns" by families who had gone home and come back.[17] IOM and UNHCR list the reasons people do not go home: lack of safety, housing, services and jobs.
In particular, the East Mosul camps show the worst conditions. More than 2,500 residents lack documents, mainly the national ID card. Former detainees are sent back to these camps instead of receiving security clearance. As unregistered residents, 850 people in Hassansham U3 cannot access services. Families with a "perceived affiliation to Da'esh" face legal barriers to getting documents.[17] Even after return, 45 percent of households tracked by IOM had at least one member without civil documents after nine months.
CSID, INID and UK country guidance
Documentation is now the most technical part of any Iraqi claim in the UK. The legal position changed twice in 2026, so lawyers should check which guidance a decision applies.
From SMO2 to AH, AK & AJ and back
In SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) (SMO2), the Upper Tribunal held that a person generally needs a CSID or an INID "to live and travel within Iraq" without treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. It noted that Shia militia staff many checkpoints and "are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass".[18] SMO2 also held that a person must attend their local Civil Status Affairs office in person to enrol biometrics for an INID.
On 14 April 2026, the Upper Tribunal promulgated a new country guidance case, AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 150 (IAC). However, the Home Office then told the Tribunal that the evidence before it did not accurately reflect the wording of a returns agreement signed with Iraq in August 2025. On 29 June 2026, the Upper Tribunal set the decision aside and remitted it for a fresh hearing, likely in spring 2027.[19] As a result, decision makers "must not follow" AH, AK & AJ.
The July 2026 country bulletin
The Home Office now tells caseworkers, in its July 2026 country bulletin, to follow the archived CPIN based on SMO2, but to depart from it on three points.[19]
- The CSID is no longer valid. Citing UNHCR, the bulletin says the Ministry of Interior ended use of the CSID from 1 April 2024. The INID has replaced it.
- An INID can be obtained in London. Since 21 October 2024, the Iraqi Embassy in London has taken INID applications. It asks for a nationality certificate (or a paternal relative's), a CSID, a passport, proof of identity and proof of address. However, the passport field on the online form appears optional.
- The burden is on the claimant. In practice, a person must show they do not have and cannot obtain the required documents, including by having documents sent from Iraq.
The bulletin admits it is "unclear" whether all listed documents are required, and "unclear" what happens if they are lost. The Embassy's own guidance for lost documents requires a police report in Iraq or the UK and proof of court or official procedures.[19] Therefore, an undocumented claimant with no family contact in Iraq still has strong arguments. Evidence of attempts to contact the Embassy, and of missing family book details, will carry real weight.
Returns routes and numbers
Under the bulletin, people from federal Iraq return to Baghdad. People from the KRI and the disputed territories may return to Erbil, Sulaymaniyah or Baghdad. In practice, however, the Home Office returned all enforced returnees from the disputed territories to Baghdad after August 2025, except one person born in Kirkuk.[19] UNHCR, cited in the bulletin, says that passing checkpoints and entering a relocation area "will require" a valid INID or passport.
| Returns from the UK to Iraq | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enforced returns | 10 | 9 | 9 | 19 | 16 |
| Voluntary returns | 70 | 78 | 81 | 88 | 72 |
| Refused entry at port, then departed | 32 | 30 | 75 | 71 | 45 |
Internal relocation to the Kurdistan Region
Whether a person can relocate to the KRI depends mainly on ethnicity, documents and family. SMO2 remains the starting point. For Kurds with a CSID or INID, travel to the KRI is "affordable and practical". There are no sponsorship requirements for Kurds to enter or live in the three KRI governorates.[18] Without a CSID or INID, a person faces "a real risk" of detention at checkpoints on the road from Baghdad.
In practice, family support is the deciding factor for many claimants. SMO2 found that a Kurd without family in the KRI has limited options. Camps are closed to newcomers. Rent for a flat costs about $300 to $400 a month. Living in a "critical shelter arrangement" without food, water and clothing would be unduly harsh. Furthermore, "lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment", and IDPs in the KRI faced 70 percent unemployment.[18]
By contrast, non-Kurds face more barriers. Single Arab and Turkmen people need regular jobs to secure residence in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Arabs from former conflict areas and Turkmen from Tal Afar need a sponsor for Dohuk. The Tribunal held that "an Arab with no viable support network in the IKR is likely to experience unduly harsh conditions" there.[18] Conditions have not clearly improved since 2022. For example, HRW reports that Baghdad withheld KRI public sector salaries in 2025, which hit health care and schools.[1] Our article on whether the Kurdistan Region is safer than Baghdad looks at this question in more detail.
Return risk by profile
The table below sets out the main risk profiles and the strongest current evidence for each. It also shows the Home Office's general position, so lawyers can see where expert evidence needs to push back.
| Profile | Convention ground | Home Office position | Key evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Women at risk of honour crimes | PSG | PSG accepted; no effective protection; relocation unlikely without family | CPIN July 2024; HRW 2026; Amnesty 2025 |
| Victims of blood feuds | PSG (family/tribe) | Risk only if feud is active and cannot be settled | CPIN July 2024 |
| LGBTI people | PSG | Persecution likely; relocation unreasonable | 2024 law; CPIN July 2025 |
| Militia critics, Tishreen activists, journalists | Political opinion | Fact-specific; PMF beyond state control | Amnesty 2025; USSD 2024 |
| Yazidis, Christians, Kaka'i, Mandaeans | Religion; race | Discrimination not usually persecution | CPIN Sept 2024; Sinjar data 2026 |
| People with a perceived ISIS link | Imputed political opinion | Enhanced risk throughout Iraq (SMO2) | IOM/UNHCR Jan 2026; USSD 2024 |
| Undocumented returnees | Article 3 ECHR | Must try the Embassy INID route | Bulletin July 2026; SMO2 |
Above all, people with an actual or perceived link to ISIS face particular danger. SMO2 found they are "likely to be at enhanced risk throughout Iraq".[18] The State Department reports that most arbitrary arrests involve Sunni Arabs, including displaced people. It also reports that authorities held detainees under the anti-terrorism law for months or years without trial.[9] Former residents of Al-Hol camp in Syria must pass through the Al-Amal rehabilitation centre before going home, and they face stigma afterwards.[2] For a structured method, see our Iraq return risk assessment.
In our podcast, we discuss ISIS survivors and why even educated Iraqis are leaving. The full episode is on our YouTube channel.
US asylum practice for Iraqi claims
US claims use the same evidence on Iraq country conditions, but the legal tests differ. An applicant must show that a protected ground is "at least one central reason" for the feared harm.[20] Where the persecutor is not the government, the applicant must also show that the government is unable or unwilling to control it. For the PMF, this test often favours the applicant. The State Department itself says the PMF is part of the security forces and is funded from the defence budget, yet "its operations were often outside of and in opposition to government control".[9]
Internal relocation also works differently in the US. If the persecutor is the government or is government-sponsored, the regulations presume that relocation is not reasonable. Where the PMF is the feared actor, lawyers should argue that this presumption applies.[20] For Convention Against Torture claims, torture must be inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official. The State Department's findings that courts "routinely accepted forced confessions" and that torture "was often hidden from effective legal oversight" are useful here.[9]
Gender claims need care after Matter of K-E-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec 145 (BIA 2025). The Board held that a group defined only by sex, or by sex and nationality, is "overbroad and insufficiently particular".[21] Therefore, "Iraqi women" alone is unlikely to succeed. A narrower group is safer, for example women accused of breaching family honour, or women whose marriage falls under the Ja'fari code. The applicant must still meet the three-part test of immutability, particularity and social distinction.
Finally, US practitioners should note a change in the State Department's own evidence. The 2024 Iraq human rights report, published in 2025, is much shorter than earlier editions. It has no separate sections on women, LGBTI people or minorities, and it refers readers to the religious freedom report instead.[9] Immigration judges may treat silence in the report as evidence that a problem has gone away. An expert report can fill that gap with HRW, Amnesty, UNHCR and Home Office sources.
What an Iraq expert report should cover
A strong expert report on Iraq country conditions should apply the sources to the claimant's own facts. First, it should identify the actor the claimant fears by name and place: a specific PMF brigade, tribe or family. Next, it should explain whether that actor can trace the claimant through checkpoints, tribal networks or family book records. The report should also deal with documents in detail: which Civil Status Affairs office holds the claimant's record, whether they have an INID, and whether the London Embassy route is open to them in practice.
For honour claims, the report should place the claimant's family on the spectrum the Home Office uses: rural or urban, tribal or not, religious or secular. For minorities, it should show who controls the home area today. Above all, it should give the source and date for every fact. Since UNAMI closed, decision makers will look harder at where figures come from. Our Iraq country expert witness reports follow this method.
Conclusion
Iraq in 2026 has a new prime minister and a new parliament. Even so, the main risks for asylum claimants are unchanged or worse. PMF factions remain armed and beyond state control. The Penal Code still rewards "honourable motives", and the 2025 Ja'fari code has weakened women's rights in marriage, divorce and custody. Same-sex relations now carry up to 15 years in prison. More than 100,000 people, mostly Yazidis, still live in camps.
For UK cases, the setting aside of AH, AK & AJ means SMO2 applies again, with the Home Office's July 2026 departures on the CSID and the London INID route. Each of those departures can be tested on the facts. For US cases, the focus should be on the PMF as a state-linked actor and on carefully framed social groups. In both systems, current, specific and sourced evidence on Iraq country conditions will decide most cases.
Footnotes
- Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2026: Iraq, Events of 2025' (February 2026)
- Amnesty International, 'Iraq 2025', Amnesty International Report 2025/26 (2026)
- Arab News (AP), 'Iraq election result ratified by Supreme Federal Court' (14 December 2025)
- Al Jazeera, 'Iraq's parliament approves new Ali al-Zaidi government' (14 May 2026)
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Actors of protection, Iraq' (version 2.0, September 2025) paras 2.1.4, 5.4.4 and 9.1.1
- Shafaq News, 'Iraq withdraws PMF Law under external pressure, MP says' (27 August 2025)
- Rudaw, 'US lists four Iran-backed Iraqi militias as terrorist organizations' (17 September 2025); FDD's Long War Journal, 'US designates 4 Iran-backed Iraqi militias as Foreign Terrorist Organizations' (18 September 2025)
- AFP, 'Iraq top judge says armed factions to cooperate on weapons', Dawn (21 December 2025)
- US Department of State, '2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq' (2025), Executive Summary and ss 1(a), 2(c), 3(a), 3(b), 3(e)
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq' (July 2024) paras 7.3.1, 10.2.1 and 11.1.5 to 11.1.8; Iraqi Penal Code (Law No. 111 of 1969) arts 41, 128, 130, 398 and 409
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq' (July 2024), Executive summary and paras 2.2, 3.2.2, 3.2.11, 4.3 and 5.1.7
- Human Rights Watch, 'Iraq: Personal Status Law Amendment Sets Back Women's Rights' (10 March 2025)
- Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2025: Iraq, Events of 2024' (January 2025)
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, Iraq' (version 3.0, July 2025), Executive summary
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Religious minorities, Iraq' (version 4.0, September 2024), Executive summary and paras 3.1.3 to 3.1.6, 7.1.1, 9.2, 11.1.8, 11.3.6, 15.3.6, 16 and 17.1.1
- The New Region, 'PM Barzani calls on Baghdad to implement Sinjar Agreement, ensure return of Yazidis' (August 2026)
- IOM and UNHCR, 'Update on Internal Displacement in Iraq: As of December 2025' (January 2026); Shafaq News, 'IOM-backed return to Sinjar opens for 400+ families' (23 August 2026)
- SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC), headnote paras 4, 11, 12 and 26 to 35
- Home Office, 'Country bulletin: internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (update following setting aside of country guidance), Iraq' (July 2026) ss 1 to 5; AH, AK & AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG [2026] UKUT 150 (IAC) (set aside 29 June 2026)
- Immigration and Nationality Act s 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 USC 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 CFR 1208.13(b)(3)(ii); 8 CFR 1208.16(c)(2); 8 CFR 1208.18(a)(1) and (a)(7)
- Matter of K-E-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec 145 (BIA 2025); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec 227 (BIA 2014)
Sources
- Home Office, Country bulletin: internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, Iraq, July 2026
- Home Office, Iraq: country policy and information notes (actors of protection, September 2025; sexual orientation and gender identity, July 2025; religious minorities, September 2024; blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, July 2024)
- Upper Tribunal, SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC), 16 March 2022
- Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Iraq, 2026
- Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Iraq, 2025
- Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Personal Status Law Amendment Sets Back Women's Rights, 10 March 2025
- Amnesty International, Iraq 2025, 2026
- US Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 2025
- IOM and UNHCR, Update on Internal Displacement in Iraq, as of December 2025, January 2026
- Arab News, Iraq election result ratified by Supreme Federal Court, 14 December 2025
- Al Jazeera, Iraq's parliament approves new Ali al-Zaidi government, 14 May 2026
- Shafaq News, Iraq withdraws PMF Law under external pressure, MP says, 27 August 2025
- Rudaw, US lists four Iran-backed Iraqi militias as terrorist organizations, 17 September 2025
- FDD's Long War Journal, US designates 4 Iran-backed Iraqi militias as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 18 September 2025
- Dawn (AFP), Iraq top judge says armed factions to cooperate on weapons, 21 December 2025
- The New Region, PM Barzani calls on Baghdad to implement Sinjar Agreement, ensure return of Yazidis, August 2026
- Shafaq News, IOM-backed return to Sinjar opens for 400+ families, 23 August 2026
- AILA, BIA Holds PSG Defined Only by Noncitizen's Sex, or Sex and Nationality, Is Overbroad (Matter of K-E-S-G-), 18 July 2025
Need an expert witness report for your case?
Our country experts provide independent reports for asylum and immigration cases in the UK, US, Canada, and EU.
Order an expert witness report |
Find a country expert witness |
About our expert team