Iraq After ISIS: The Persecution That Remains

Last updated: 5 October 2026

Photo: Iraq Tour 810 - Elliott Plack

The Iraqi government declared territorial victory over ISIS in December 2017. The narrative since then — adopted by many Western governments and frequently echoed in asylum decisions — has been that Iraq is "improving" and that returnees are no longer at risk. The reality, eight years on, is more troubling. ISIS no longer holds territory, but the persecution that defined the post-2003 and post-2014 periods continues in modified forms. Sunni Arab men face collective suspicion at PMF checkpoints. Yazidi survivors of genocide have not been able to return safely to Sinjar. Christians have continued to leave even after their towns were liberated. New laws — particularly the 2023 anti-LGBT law — have created entirely new persecution. This article maps the persecution that remains in Iraq in 2026.[1]

For broader analysis see the Iraq human rights report and the related articles on militia violence and honour killing.

Continuing Persecution 1: Sunni Arab Collective Suspicion

Sunni Arab men who lived in areas under ISIS control between 2014 and 2017 — Mosul, parts of Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Diyala — continue to face collective suspicion of ISIS affiliation. Even where no individual involvement is alleged, residence in an ISIS-held area for any period generates a suspicion that follows a person across years.[2]

The mechanisms of collective suspicion

Several mechanisms produce ongoing risk for Sunni Arab returnees:

• Biometric checkpoints: The Iraqi government and the PMF run biometric screening at major checkpoints. Names are matched against ISIS-related lists, sometimes inaccurately.
• Tribal informant networks: Informant systems, often tribally based, identify men suspected of ISIS sympathies.
• PMF interrogation: PMF factions detain Sunni Arab men for interrogation without judicial oversight. UNAMI has documented cases of disappearance from PMF custody.
• Counter-Terrorism Law application: The 2005 Counter-Terrorism Law (Law No. 13 of 2005) has been applied to family members and acquaintances of suspected ISIS fighters, not only to fighters themselves.
• Property and home seizure: Sunni Arab properties in mixed areas have been seized by PMF or militia members in some cases.

Continuing Persecution 2: Yazidis Cannot Return

The Yazidi community in Sinjar (Shangal) suffered a systematic genocide by ISIS in August 2014. Over 5,000 Yazidi men were killed. At least 6,417 Yazidi women and children were abducted. Most were enslaved. Many were killed. As of 2026, more than 2,700 Yazidis remain missing. UNITAD has formally characterised these acts as genocide. The territorial defeat of ISIS in 2017 did not, however, allow the return of the Yazidi community to Sinjar.[3]

Why return remains blocked

Sinjar is contested between multiple armed actors: PKK-affiliated forces (especially the YBŞ Yazidi defence force), various PMF factions linked to Iran, the Iraqi Army, and the KRG Peshmerga. Reconstruction has been minimal. Public services are limited. Turkish drone strikes in the area have killed Yazidi civilians. Many Yazidis who returned briefly have left again. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad and Erbil was meant to normalise the area but has been only partially implemented.

Yazidi women and the genocide's continuing impact

Yazidi women who survived ISIS captivity face additional barriers. Re-integration into Yazidi communities has been complex. Children born of ISIS rape have faced rejection in some cases. The Iraqi state has moved slowly on Yazidi compensation. The 2021 Yazidi Female Survivors Law was a step forward but enforcement has been limited.

Continuing Persecution 3: Christian Decline

Iraq's Christian population has fallen from approximately 1.4 million in 2003 to an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 in 2026 — a decline of more than 80%. The 2014 ISIS occupation of the Nineveh Plain accelerated an already severe decline. After the 2017 liberation, some Christians returned briefly. Many have left again.[4]

The factors driving continued decline include: PMF presence in Christian-majority Nineveh Plain villages; property disputes over land seized during ISIS occupation; lack of basic services in returned-to areas; demographic pressure from incoming Shia populations; and economic absence of pre-ISIS Christian-owned businesses. Several Christian denominations — Chaldean, Syriac, Assyrian — face overlapping pressures. Sporadic targeted attacks on Christians continue.

Continuing Persecution 4: The 2023 Anti-LGBT Law

In April 2023, the Iraqi parliament passed amendments to the Law to Combat Prostitution that criminalised same-sex relations with penalties of up to 15 years in prison. The 2023 law is a new, post-ISIS legal development that creates entirely new categories of persecution. Before 2023, LGBT individuals in Iraq faced extralegal violence; after 2023, they face the criminal law as well.[5]

Beyond the formal law, militia-linked groups have publicly targeted LGBT individuals. Bodies of LGBT individuals have been recovered with militia-style execution wounds in Baghdad and Basra. There are no LGBT organisations operating openly in Iraq. UNHCR recognises Iraqi LGBT individuals as a group requiring international protection.

Eight years after the territorial defeat of ISIS, Iraq's structural problems of accountability, sectarian tension, minority displacement, and gender-based and sexual orientation persecution remain unresolved.
UNAMI, Human Rights Report on Iraq (2025)

Continuing Persecution 5: Protracted Displacement

Iraq still has approximately 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2026. Many are Sunni Arab families who cannot return to areas now under PMF control. Others are Yazidis, Christians, Turkmen, and Shabaks. IDP camps in the KRI and federal Iraq host hundreds of thousands. Conditions in some camps are deteriorating. Forced camp closures have pushed people into informal settlements without infrastructure.[6]

Protracted displacement has implications for asylum claims. Returnees from abroad cannot simply "go home" if their home no longer exists, has been seized by another community, or sits in PMF-controlled territory. Internal relocation analysis must engage with these realities.

Asylum Implications

Asylum claims from Iraq in 2026 must engage directly with the post-ISIS narrative used by decision-makers. The argument that "Iraq has improved since ISIS" is partially true — territorial control by ISIS no longer threatens most of the country. The argument fails when applied to specific risk profiles. Each profile group above continues to face protection-relevant harm.[7]

Expert reports for Iraq cases should: (1) acknowledge the post-2017 territorial reality; (2) identify the specific continuing risk to the claimant's profile; (3) document this with current sources from UNAMI, HRW, Amnesty, and the Home Office CPIN; (4) engage with internal relocation arguments using current data on PMF control and tribal reach.

Conclusion

The territorial defeat of ISIS in 2017 was a real military achievement. It did not end Iraq's structural problems. Sunni Arab collective suspicion, Yazidi displacement, Christian decline, the 2023 anti-LGBT law, and protracted IDP displacement are all live in 2026. For asylum lawyers, the post-ISIS narrative cannot be allowed to obscure the continuing persecution facing specific Iraqi groups. Expert evidence is essential to bring the current reality before tribunals. To commission a report, use the find expert witness service. For wider context see the country reports section.