Mexico Country Conditions 2026: Cartels and Extortion

Last updated: 6 October 2026

Mexico country conditions in 2026 look better on paper than on the ground. The government says daily homicides fell by 53% between September 2024 and August 2026.[1] However, more than 135,000 people remain on the national register of the disappeared. Extortion also reached its highest level in more than a decade in 2025.[2][3] Meanwhile, the killing of Jalisco cartel leader "El Mencho" in February 2026 set off attacks in 20 states. Two months later, US federal prosecutors indicted the sitting governor of Sinaloa for protecting a cartel faction.

This report sets out the current evidence for UK and US asylum lawyers. It covers the main changes since 2025, the cartel map, violence and disappearance data, extortion, the people most at risk, state protection and internal relocation. It ends with the legal points that now decide most Mexican claims. Every figure is dated and footnoted. Where government and civil society figures conflict, we show both and explain which we prefer.

What changed in Mexico in 2025 and 2026

President Claudia Sheinbaum took office on 1 October 2024. Her security policy differs from the "hugs, not bullets" approach of her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in three ways. It relies more on intelligence and arrests, it gives a civilian ministry the lead, and it works more closely with the United States. At the same time, it keeps the military at the centre of public security.

A new security model, still led by soldiers

Omar García Harfuch heads the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSPC). In April 2025, the Senate approved the National Public Security Strategy 2024-2030. It rests on four pillars: addressing the causes of violence, consolidating the National Guard, building intelligence and investigation, and coordinating with the states.[4] In December 2025, a presidential decree gave the SSPC the lead role in running the model.

The National Guard, however, is no longer a civilian body. A constitutional reform published on 30 September 2024 placed it under the Secretariat of National Defence (SEDENA) as a permanent force of military personnel. It entered into force on 1 October 2024.[5] In practice, this means that the force most likely to respond to a cartel threat is a military one. That matters for asylum claims, because military units have their own record of abuses and they answer to a separate chain of command.

Judicial elections

On 1 June 2025, Mexico elected judges by popular vote for the first time, including all nine Supreme Court justices. Only about 13% of registered voters took part.[6] The new court took office on 1 September 2025. Opposition parties and civil society groups argue that the reform weakens judicial independence and brings in judges close to the ruling party. For asylum purposes, the point is narrower: the reform has not yet shown any effect on the ability of local prosecutors and courts to convict cartel members.

US pressure, terrorist designations and transfers

On 20 February 2025, the US designated six Mexican groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). They are the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG, the Cártel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, the Gulf Cartel and Cárteles Unidos.[7] Mexico then sent 92 detained cartel figures to the US in three transfers: 29 in February 2025, 26 in August 2025 and 37 in January 2026. These people left Mexico without formal extradition orders, and defence lawyers say the transfers broke Mexican law.[8] In addition, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada pleaded guilty in a Brooklyn court on 25 August 2025.[9]

Pressure grew in 2026. President Trump has said more than once that he may order strikes inside Mexico, and Sheinbaum has rejected any foreign military action on Mexican soil. In late September 2026, US officials reported shots fired at Coast Guard members on the Texas border opposite Tamaulipas. Mexico said it found no evidence of the incident. Even so, both countries deployed about 500 troops each in "mirror operations" on their own side of the border.[10] On 29 September, the US Treasury sanctioned 46 people linked to the Sinaloa Cartel.

The two biggest events of 2026

First, on 22 February 2026, Mexican special forces acting on US intelligence killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, "El Mencho", in Tapalpa, Jalisco. The CJNG responded within hours with vehicle burnings, roadblocks and armed attacks in 20 states. According to Lawfare's March 2026 analysis, 25 members of the security forces died in the retaliation.[11]

Second, on 29 April 2026, US prosecutors in New York indicted Sinaloa governor Rubén Rocha Moya. Nine other current and former officials face charges with him. The indictment alleges that they protected Los Chapitos in exchange for drug money. It also alleges that cartel members kidnapped and threatened rival candidates to help Rocha Moya win in 2021. Mexico's foreign ministry and attorney general said the US arrest request lacked evidence.[12] Rocha Moya later took indefinite leave, and on 25 August 2026 the state congress appointed Graciela Domínguez Nava as interim governor until October 2027.[13] For lawyers, the indictment is a formal US criminal charge alleging collusion at the top of a state government. It is an allegation, not a conviction, but it shows how seriously US prosecutors treat the evidence.

Mexico cartel map in 2026

No single source maps every group, and alliances change fast. Any assessment of Mexico country conditions should therefore name the group that controls the client's home town. The table below draws on InSight Crime profiles, Mexican press data and US designations. It lists the six FTO-designated groups because they appear most often in claims.

The CJNG is the group to watch in 2026. The US named El Mencho's stepson, Juan Carlos Valencia González ("El 03"), as the new leader. However, InSight Crime reports that several commanders share power inside the group. On the ground, its criminal business has continued largely as before.[14] Mexican forces arrested Audias Flores Silva, "El Jardinero", one of the possible successors, on 27 April 2026. His network still operates. Therefore, a CJNG threat made before February 2026 has not lapsed simply because the leader is dead.

The Gulf Cartel is no longer one organisation. Rival factions such as Los Ciclones and Los Escorpiones still control Matamoros and Reynosa, and they fight each other as well as the CDN.[15] For a claimant from Tamaulipas, the evidence should name the faction that controls the specific town.

The Sinaloa civil war

The war between Los Chapitos, led by the sons of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, and Los Mayos began on 9 September 2024. It followed the abduction of Zambada and his delivery to US authorities in July 2024. Sinaloa's State Public Security Council and state prosecutor counted 3,724 homicides between 9 September 2024 and 7 September 2026. That is an average of 5.1 a day.[16]

Disappearance figures vary by source. The employers' federation Coparmex Sinaloa estimates about 4,000 disappeared. The state prosecutor recorded 3,889 between 1 September 2024 and 21 June 2026. In contrast, a local search collective counted at least 5,800 by May 2026.[16] In addition, about 190 children were killed between September 2024 and July 2026.[17] The federal government says Sinaloa's daily homicide rate fell from 6.9 in June 2025 to 3.3 in July 2026. Nevertheless, in late September 2026 Sheinbaum promised that no troops would leave the state, as fighting moved into the tourist city of Mazatlán.[10]

Violence and disappearance data

Violence data are the most disputed part of Mexico country conditions. The official homicide trend is real but smaller than the headline. The Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP) counts victims from prosecutors' files each month. By contrast, the national statistics office INEGI counts deaths from death certificates and publishes final figures later. In 2025, the gap between the two was the widest in at least 11 years.[18]

According to SESNSP, homicide victims fell by 21% in 2025. INEGI shows a fall of 17%. In other words, INEGI recorded 3,645 more homicides in 2025 than the government's monthly series.[18] The decline continued in 2026: SESNSP reports a daily average of 40.8 homicides in August 2026, against 86.9 in September 2024.[1]

Critics argue that part of the fall comes from reclassification. México Evalúa found it statistically unlikely that intentional homicide dropped 30.7% in the same period. Over that time, negligent homicide rose 6.3% and "other crimes against life" rose 114.4%. In Chihuahua, for example, intentional homicides fell 10% in early 2025 while "other crimes against life and integrity" rose 250%.[19] The government rejects this and says, "Homicides are homicides." On balance, we prefer INEGI for annual totals, because it counts bodies rather than case files. We treat the SESNSP series as a guide to monthly trends only.

Disappearances keep rising

Disappearance is the clearest counterweight to the homicide story. The National Register of Disappeared and Missing Persons (RNPDNO) listed 135,048 people on 16 June 2026, 791 more than a month earlier. It recorded 12,632 new disappearances in 2024 and 12,373 in 2025.[2] Five states hold 42% of the total: Estado de México, Tamaulipas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Nuevo León. For more background, see our earlier analysis of Mexico's disappeared.

The government is also changing how it counts. On 27 March 2026, it said that 40,308 entries, 31% of the register, showed "signs of life" in other official records such as tax filings. Officials described many cases as "voluntary absences". Search collectives called the report misleading, and the Centro Prodh said it "minimizes the responsibility of the state".[20] Sheinbaum has promised not to purge names. Still, lawyers should expect Home Office or DHS submissions to quote lower totals, and they should check the cut-off date and method behind any figure.

Teuchitlán, graves and the UN

On 5 March 2025, the search collective Guerreros Buscadores de Jalisco entered the Rancho Izaguirre in Teuchitlán, Jalisco. They found human remains, burnt bone fragments, hundreds of shoes and items of clothing, and a training field. The federal Attorney General confirmed that the CJNG used the ranch to recruit and train people, although he denied that it held crematory ovens.[21] Families held protests in 12 states.

The forensic backlog is now a crisis in its own right. In early April 2026, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) cited more than 4,500 clandestine graves and about 72,000 unidentified bodies and remains since 2012.[22] It found evidence of state involvement on a scale that could amount to crimes against humanity. As a result, it decided to bring Mexico before the UN General Assembly under Article 34 of the Convention, the first such referral in UN history. The CED had opened the Article 34 procedure in 2025.[23] Sheinbaum rejected the decision, saying the committee relied on old data from four states.

Extortion in Mexico: a record high

Extortion is the one high-impact crime that has kept rising under Sheinbaum. SESNSP recorded 11,081 victims in 2025, the highest annual total in a decade, up from 10,862 in 2024.[3] Coparmex's analysis of SESNSP data found 6,562 victims in the first half of 2026, a 9.17% rise on the same period of 2025.[24] Another press count, using a different cut-off, showed a small fall for January to July. We prefer the Coparmex figure because it states its method and compares like with like.

Official figures capture only a fraction of the crime. INEGI published its 2026 victimisation survey on 10 September 2026. It found that 93.4% of the 33.8 million crimes committed in 2025 went unreported or uninvestigated. Extortion was one of the three most common crimes, together with fraud and street robbery.[25] Put simply, the 11,081 official victims are a tiny share of real cases. Coparmex also notes that seven in ten recorded extortions in 2026 took place by phone or online.[24]

The National Strategy against Extortion

The federal government launched the National Strategy against Extortion on 6 July 2025. It uses an anonymous 089 reporting line, joint investigation units and action against the phone lines that extortionists use.[3] It has produced arrests and blocked attempts, yet the overall numbers kept rising into 2026. For an asylum claim, the strategy is evidence that the state is trying. However, it does not show that a named victim who refuses to pay can be protected.

Michoacán: limes, avocados and two killings

Michoacán shows how extortion works as a form of territorial control. Cárteles Unidos, Los Viagras, the CJNG, La Familia Michoacana and smaller cells charge farmers, packers and transport firms. The extortion also reaches sellers of chicken, tortillas and groceries.[26] In August 2026, Infobae reported that a CJNG operator charged two pesos for every kilo of avocado sold in his area.[27] Reported extortion in Michoacán rose 52.8% in the first seven months of 2026.

Bernardo Bravo Manríquez led the citrus growers' association of the Apatzingán Valley. On 20 October 2025, police found him dead in his car with signs of torture. He had spoken out publicly against cartel quotas on lime.[28] Then, on 1 November 2025, a gunman shot dead Carlos Manzo, mayor of Uruapan, during the Day of the Dead festival in the town square. Manzo had openly confronted the cartels. Three days later, Sheinbaum announced the Plan Michoacán for Peace and Justice, with security, justice and economic pillars. By 20 January 2026, the plan had led to 430 arrests. They included "El Botox", alleged leader of Los Blancos de Troya and a suspect in the Bravo killing.[29]

Both cases help claimants in two ways. They show that cartels kill well-known people who refuse to accept extortion, and they show that arrests come mostly after a high-profile killing. A small business owner rarely receives that level of attention.

Who is at risk in Mexico

Cartel violence affects everyone in some regions. Asylum claims, however, depend on a specific profile. The table below sets out the main profiles we see and the current evidence for each.

Journalists and defenders

Article 19 documented seven journalists killed and one disappeared in 2025. It recorded an attack on the press every 19 hours, 451 in total, and 175 killings of journalists since 2000.[30] Meanwhile, the Espacio OSC coalition counted 60 human rights defenders and 17 journalists killed from 2024 to mid-2026.[31]

Searching mothers

Mothers who search for missing children face direct reprisals. Infobae's analysis found that 2025 was the deadliest year since the crisis began, with seven searchers killed and four disappeared. According to Article 19, at least 45 searchers have been killed or disappeared since 2010.[32] Most collectives are led by women, and their work at grave sites brings them into direct contact with the groups that buried the victims.

Women and LGBT people

SESNSP recorded 721 femicides in 2025, down from 853 in 2024, and 2,074 women victims of intentional homicide.[33] The same reclassification concerns apply here, since a killing recorded as homicide does not appear as femicide. Letra S documented 60 killings of LGBT people in 2025 that it links to the victim's sexual orientation or gender identity. Trans women made up 58% of the victims. Mexico still has no official register of hate crimes.[34]

Witnesses, defectors and returnees

Former police officers, soldiers and witnesses face a double risk: the cartel they crossed and the officials who work with it. The Rocha Moya indictment makes this concrete. It alleges that a state government shielded a cartel faction. Our article on why witness protection in Mexico does not work explains the gaps in the federal programme.

Returnees are a growing group. Segob reported 145,537 Mexicans deported from the US between 20 January and 17 December 2025, and more than 203,000 by April 2026.[35] Cartels often see deportees as people with US money or relatives who can pay, which exposes them to extortion and kidnapping soon after arrival.

Watch our video on why Mexicans flee, with testimony on cartel violence and religious persecution. Watch it on our YouTube channel.

Why People Flee Mexico: Hernández Pacheco & Gutiérrez Soto, Cartels & Religious Persecution

State protection in Mexico

State protection is where Mexico country conditions matter most in law. Mexico has laws, prosecutors and police in every state. The question is whether they protect a person like the claimant in practice. Four bodies of evidence suggest that, for most profiles above, they do not.

First, impunity. México Evalúa's study of the justice system in 2024, published in March 2026, found that 99.23% of crimes ended without an effective sanction.[36] Its earlier data put impunity for intentional homicide at 96.9%, extortion at 98.2% and enforced disappearance at 98.9%. As a result, a person who reports a threat has little reason to expect that the perpetrator will face trial.

Second, collusion. The Rocha Moya indictment and the CED's findings both point the same way. Our analysis of how Mexican police work for the cartels sets out the pattern at municipal level. Local police are often the first point of contact for a victim, and they are also the institution most exposed to cartel pressure.

Third, failing protection schemes. The federal Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists received 409 requests between 2024 and June 2026. It rejected 289 of them, a rejection rate of 70.66%. Civil society groups say some applicants died while protected or while waiting for a decision.[31]

Fourth, militarisation. Moving the National Guard to SEDENA puts a military force at the front of public security. In particular, the UN's finding of state involvement in disappearances means that soldiers and police are not only absent protectors. In some cases, they are alleged perpetrators.[22]

Internal relocation in Mexico

Decision-makers often argue that a person threatened in Michoacán or Sinaloa can move to Mexico City, Mérida or another large city. The 2025-2026 evidence makes that argument harder to sustain for anyone the cartel has a reason to look for.

Cartel reach is national. The CJNG's retaliation for El Mencho's death hit 20 states within hours.[11] Furthermore, extortion is now highest per head in states such as Morelos, Querétaro and Mexico City, not only in the traditional cartel heartlands.[24]

Cartels also track people. They have moved from human lookouts (halcones) to camera networks. By March 2025, security forces had removed more than 6,500 cameras that criminal groups had installed. They covered at least 75 municipalities in 21 states, including over 1,500 cameras in Sinaloa.[37] In June 2025, a US Justice Department report described a hacker who worked for the Sinaloa Cartel. According to the report, he used Mexico City's camera system and phone data to track an FBI official in 2018. Mexico City's C5 denied any successful intrusion into its core system.[38]

Displacement is large but poorly measured. The IDMC Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026 estimates that 390,000 people lived in internal displacement because of violence in Mexico at the end of 2025. It also recorded 10,000 new displacements that year.[39] IDMC itself warns that data collection in Mexico is not systematic. Mexico still has no federal law on internal displacement, so displaced people receive no dedicated status or support.

For these reasons, relocation is usually unsafe for people with a profile the cartel cares about: a refused extortion demand, a debt, testimony, desertion or public activism. It may be reasonable for someone who faced only general violence. Our return risk assessment for Mexico covers this test in more detail.

Mexico country conditions: implications for UK and US asylum claims

UK claims

The Home Office has not published a Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Mexico. We checked the CPIN collection on 6 October 2026, and Mexico does not appear.[40] Consequently, decision-makers rely on general sources on Mexico country conditions. A well-sourced expert report therefore carries more weight than in countries with a CPIN.

The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 sets the framework. Section 32 requires the claimant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they have the characteristic or belief that causes the fear. Under section 33(2), a particular social group (PSG) must meet both the "immutable characteristic" and the "distinct identity" tests. Section 33(1)(d), however, defines political opinion broadly, as an opinion on a matter related to a potential persecutor "and to its policies or methods". This can cover open opposition to a cartel, as in the cases of Bravo and Manzo. The Act deals with protection and internal relocation in sections 34 and 35.[41]

On protection, Horvath v SSHD [2001] 1 AC 489 asks whether the state provides a system of protection that works in practice, not just on paper. The impunity data and the Mechanism's rejection rate go directly to that test. On relocation, Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 and AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 ask whether relocation would be unduly harsh. The decision-maker must consider all the circumstances of the individual. Where no Convention reason applies, a claim based on cartel threats may still succeed under Article 3 ECHR.

US claims

US law on gang and cartel claims became stricter in 2025 and 2026. The basic PSG tests remain Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). However, on 2 September 2025, the Attorney General decided Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025). It overruled Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) ("A-B- III") and reinstated A-B- I and II. On the same day, Matter of R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 202 (A.G. 2025) overruled L-E-A- III. It restored Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019), under which a nuclear family will rarely be a cognizable PSG.[42]

The Board of Immigration Appeals then issued a series of restrictive precedents. The full list is on the EOIR Volume 29 decisions page. In particular:

• Sex-based groups: Matter of K-E-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 2025) held that a group defined only by sex, or sex and nationality, lacks particularity.
• Political opinion: under Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-, 29 I&N Dec. 570 (BIA 2026), opposition to gangs alone is not a political opinion. The belief must relate to a government, including a de facto one.
• Mexican women: in Matter of V-A-B-, 29 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2026), the Board held that "married Mexican women who are unable to leave their relationship" is not a cognizable PSG.
• Social distinction: Matter of S-E-M-Z-, 29 I&N Dec. 680 (BIA 2026) measures it countrywide, not by neighbourhood, as a general rule.
• Torture claims: according to Matter of H-L-S-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 767 (BIA 2026), a CAT grant for Mexico or Guatemala cannot rest on general evidence and expert testimony about corruption. Government action against cartels, even if ineffective, weighs against acquiescence.

What the new US case law means for Mexican claims

Two points follow for Mexican cases. First, the D-G-E-A- holding leaves room for argument where a cartel acts as a de facto government, for example by taxing crops and controlling a town. Evidence of per-kilo quotas and cartel-run municipalities supports that theory. Second, after H-L-S-M-, the expert evidence must tie corruption and collusion to the claimant's own facts. Under 8 CFR 1208.18(a)(7), acquiescence requires that a public official knew of the torture, or was willfully blind to it, and then failed to intervene. Dated evidence such as the Rocha Moya indictment and named local officers is far stronger than general reports.

Border access in 2025-2026

Border policy has also shifted. Proclamation 10888 of 20 January 2025 tried to suspend asylum at the southern border. On 24 April 2026, however, the D.C. Circuit held in RAICES v. Noem that section 212(f) of the INA does not allow the President to override the asylum statute.[44] Access to asylum at the border remains contested, so lawyers should check the current position for each client.

In both jurisdictions, an expert report should link the client's account to dated, sourced evidence for the specific state and cartel. If you need a country expert, you can find a Mexico expert witness here.

Conclusion

Mexico country conditions in 2026 show a gap between official success and real risk. Homicides have fallen in the government's data, but INEGI counts thousands more, and critics point to reclassification. At the same time, more than 135,000 people remain disappeared, about 72,000 bodies lie unidentified, and extortion is at a record level. The UN has taken Mexico's disappearance crisis to the General Assembly for the first time.

The killing of El Mencho, the Sinaloa war and the indictment of a sitting governor show that cartel power and official collusion remain strong. For people who refused extortion, resisted recruitment, testified or searched for the missing, state protection is rarely effective and relocation is rarely safe. In the US, however, recent precedents raise the bar on nexus, PSG and CAT acquiescence. Strong claims will therefore rely on specific, dated evidence about the client's own persecutor.