China Country Conditions 2026: Uyghurs, Churches, Exit Bans

Last updated: 8 October 2026

China country conditions in 2026 show a state that has turned years of repression into written law. In March 2026, the National People's Congress passed a national ethnic unity law that critics say turns assimilation into a legal duty.[1] In Sichuan, police detained an elder of Early Rain Covenant Church in January 2026 and then arrested him for inciting subversion. Meanwhile, new State Council rules on exit bans came into force on 15 September 2026.[2] In Hong Kong, a court gave Jimmy Lai 20 years in prison in February 2026, the longest sentence yet under the National Security Law.[3]

This report sets out the current evidence for UK and US asylum lawyers. It covers Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, house churches, exit bans, political critics, Hong Kong, Tibetans, Falun Gong and transnational repression. It ends with the Home Office position in each current Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) and the main points of US law. Every figure has a date and a footnote. Where sources disagree, we say so and explain which one we prefer.

What changed in China in 2025 and 2026

Three trends define the period. First, the Communist Party (CCP) has put its policies on ethnic groups and religion into national law. Second, it has widened the legal basis for stopping people from leaving China. Third, it keeps reaching critics abroad, through bounties, pressure on relatives and deportations from third countries.

The ethnic unity law

The NPC adopted the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress on 12 March 2026. The vote was 2,756 in favour and 3 against. According to NPC Observer, the phrase "sense of community of the Chinese nation" appears at least 30 times in the text.[1] The law took effect on 1 July 2026. In particular, it backs Mandarin teaching, ideological education and the "Sinicisation" of religion. Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia already had regional rules of this kind. The new law, however, applies the same model across the whole country.

The Council on Foreign Relations describes the law as a move "from autonomy to assimilation".[4] For asylum purposes, the law matters in a narrow way. It gives a written legal basis for measures that Uyghur and Tibetan claimants describe, such as limits on mother-tongue schooling and religious teaching. Consequently, a decision-maker can no longer treat those accounts as local excess. They follow national policy.

New rules on religion

Two sets of rules tightened control of religion in 2025. On 1 May 2025, revised implementing rules on the religious activities of foreigners came into force. They bar foreign clergy from leading services for Chinese citizens without an official invitation.[5] Then, in September 2025, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued a Code of Conduct for Religious Clergy on the Internet. It requires clergy to "uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China" online and bans religious content that the state has not approved.[5] A few weeks later, police detained the leaders of Zion Church, a network that relies on online worship.

New rules on exit bans

On 31 July 2026, the State Council passed new regulations on exit and entry, in force from 15 September 2026. According to Safeguard Defenders, Article 4 allows exit bans on Chinese citizens who break export control or technology rules. It also covers people who act abroad against "national security and interests". Article 6 lets officials skip notice of a ban where it may affect national security or a criminal case.[2] We return to exit bans in detail below.

Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang

Uyghurs remain the group with the strongest evidence base in China country conditions. On 31 August 2022, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published its assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang. It found that arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs and other mainly Muslim groups "may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity".[6] China rejects the report.

No follow-up from Beijing

Four years on, there is no sign that China has acted on the OHCHR's recommendations. High Commissioner Volker Türk gave his global update to the Human Rights Council in June 2025. In it, he said his office still received "worrying reports of violations in Xinjiang", including prison sentences and incommunicado detention. He also said there had been no resolution of the individual cases his office had raised.[7] Human Rights Watch reports that "several hundred thousand" Uyghurs remain unjustly imprisoned. In October 2025, UN experts also raised concern about the growing criminalisation of Uyghur cultural expression.[8]

From camps to prisons

Over time, the detention system has moved from camps to formal prisons. In April 2024, the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) analysed official data. It found that the Uyghur Region held about 34% of China's estimated prison population, while it has about 1% of the national population. The region's imprisonment rate was about 2,234 per 100,000 people, the highest in the world.[9] These figures do not include camps or pre-trial detention. Moreover, China has published no new prison data for Xinjiang since then, so the true figure may be higher.

Long sentences also follow minor religious acts. UHRP reports terms of ten years or more for studying the Quran or teaching it to children.[9] As a result, ordinary religious practice can lead to prosecution. So can contact with relatives abroad or a past trip to a "sensitive" country. Our earlier analysis of systematic detention and cultural erasure of Uyghurs sets out the camp period in more detail.

Deportations from third countries

On 27 February 2025, Thailand deported 40 Uyghur men to China after holding them in immigration detention for about a decade. Türk called the move "a clear violation of international human rights laws and standards". Thai police said China had given written assurances of safety.[10] In December 2025, Thailand's National Human Rights Commission reportedly found that the deportation broke Thai and international law. Overall, the case shows two things. Chinese pressure reaches Uyghurs in third countries, and diplomatic assurances offer little protection.

House churches and Christians in China

Christians in China worship either in state-registered churches or in unregistered "house churches". Estimates of the Christian population range from 38 million to 130 million.[11] The 2025-2026 period brought the largest coordinated action against house church networks in several years.

Zion Church

On 10 October 2025, police took Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri, founder of Beijing's Zion Church, from his home in Beihai, Guangxi. His detention notice cited "illegal use of information networks".[12] Police detained about 30 Zion pastors and staff in seven cities. In November 2025, they formally arrested 18 of them.[8] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned the detentions.

China released Jin on 3 July 2026 and he flew to Los Angeles the next day. Church in Chains reports that President Trump had raised his case with Xi Jinping at a May 2026 summit.[13] However, the release followed high-level diplomacy and did not signal any change of policy. Open Doors reports that eight other Zion ministers and staff remain in detention. In June 2026, prosecutors changed their charges to "illegal business activities" and "fraud".[13]

Early Rain Covenant Church

Early Rain, in Chengdu, has faced repeated raids since its founding pastor Wang Yi received nine years in prison in December 2019. On 6 January 2026, police detained elder Li Yingqiang at his home in Deyang and preacher Dai Zhichao at the church office in Chengdu. They also took Li's wife and held the couple's two children overnight at a police station.[14] On 12 February 2026, police formally arrested Li for "inciting subversion of state power", the same charge used against Wang Yi. Dai faces the same charge.[15]

Nevertheless, the raids continued through the year. On 10 September 2026, police entered a teahouse where church elders were meeting and detained 11 of them. Two received ten days of administrative detention and fines for "illegally organizing proselytizing activities".[16]

Fraud charges against church leaders

Increasingly, however, officials charge church leaders with economic crimes rather than religious ones. In April 2025, a court sentenced Pastor Wang Xiaoguang of Linfen Golden Lampstand Church to nine years and seven months. His wife, Yang Rongli, received 15 years, and more than a dozen others were convicted of "fraud".[8] For lawyers, therefore, this matters. A Home Office or DHS reviewer may see a fraud conviction and treat it as ordinary crime. Evidence that the "fraud" was church offerings links the prosecution back to religion. Our report on the crackdown on underground churches in China covers earlier closures and demolitions.

Exit bans in China

Exit bans are now a standing feature of China country conditions. An exit ban stops a person from leaving China. Officials often impose one without a court order and without telling the person until they reach the border. Exit bans affect Chinese citizens, foreign nationals, and the relatives of people whom the state wants to pressure.

The legal basis

Several laws allow exit bans, and they overlap. Article 12 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law (2012) lists the grounds for refusing exit to a Chinese citizen. They include being a criminal suspect, having an unfinished sentence and being party to an unresolved civil case. The widest ground covers anyone whose exit "may endanger national security or cause major losses to national interests" in the view of State Council departments.[17]

The revised Counter-Espionage Law took effect on 1 July 2023. Under Article 33, state security officials may bar a Chinese citizen from leaving "within a certain period of time". The test is whether the person "may, after exiting China, cause harm to national security". The same article allows provincial state security organs to stop anyone suspected of espionage from leaving, whether Chinese or foreign.[18] In addition, the 2026 State Council regulations add grounds linked to technology, export controls and "illegal" activities abroad.[2]

How many people are affected

Unfortunately, China publishes no full data on exit bans. In its 2023 report, Safeguard Defenders estimated that "tens of thousands" of people are under an exit ban at any one time. Mentions of exit bans in the Supreme People's Court database rose from under 5,000 in 2016 to 39,000 in 2020.[19] By August 2026, the group said its sample of court records showed bans "roughly doubling each year". However, this database covers only bans imposed through courts. It misses police and state security bans, which are the ones most relevant to political cases.[2]

Foreign nationals face bans as well. In July 2025, it emerged that China had barred Chenyue Mao, a US citizen and Wells Fargo banker, from leaving. The foreign ministry said only that she was "involved in a criminal case". China lifted the ban in September 2025 after US talks.[20]

Political critics and human rights defenders

July 2025 marked ten years since the "709 crackdown", when police detained more than 300 lawyers and activists. Since then, the pressure on critics has not eased. In 2025, Human Rights Watch recorded several new sentences:[8]

• Citizen journalist Zhang Zhan received another four years in September 2025. She had already served four years for reporting on Covid-19 in Wuhan.
• Peng Lifa, the "Bridge Man" who hung protest banners in Beijing in 2022, was reportedly sentenced to nine years in July 2025.
• Filmmaker Chen Pinlin received three and a half years in January 2025 for a film about the 2022 "White Paper" protests.
• Human rights lawyer Lu Siwei received 11 months in April 2025 for "illegally crossing the border" after Laos returned him to China.

Consequently, the Home Office accepts that this group faces real risk. In particular, its January 2026 CPIN states that a person whose views or activities come to official attention "is likely to be at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm" (para 3.1.1).[21] Bloggers who openly criticise the state are "likely to attract adverse attention" (para 3.4.1). By contrast, the CPIN treats short arrests of low-level protesters as not serious enough to count as persecution on their own (para 3.2.2). Therefore, the expert evidence must show the client's profile, the reach of any posts and any past official interest.

Our video below on why people flee China includes testimony from Ai Weiwei, Wuer Kaixi and Wang Dan.

Why People Flee China for Asylum: Ai Weiwei, Wuer Kaixi & Wang Dan | The Silent Repression

Hong Kong national security cases

Any assessment of China country conditions must now include Hong Kong, which has two national security laws. Beijing imposed the National Security Law (NSL) in June 2020. Hong Kong's own Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), passed under Article 23 of the Basic Law, followed in March 2024. Human Rights Watch cites official figures showing that police had arrested at least 365 people under the two laws by December 2025. Courts had convicted 174, and nearly every person charged ends up convicted.[8]

The system grew wider during 2025. First, new subsidiary rules in May gave mainland state security officers more powers in Hong Kong. Then, in June, police and mainland officers ran their first joint operation and arrested six people for "foreign collusion". Finally, amended prison rules in July made it easier to refuse visits, including by lawyers.[8]

Above all, Jimmy Lai's case shows the reach of these laws. In December 2025, the High Court convicted the Apple Daily founder of two counts of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces. It also convicted him of conspiracy to publish seditious material. On 9 February 2026, it sentenced him to 20 years. The judges called Lai "no doubt the mastermind" of all three conspiracies.[3] Six former Apple Daily staff received between about six and ten years. Lai is a British citizen and is 78 years old.

The Home Office published a CPIN on Hong Kong national security legislation in April 2025.[22] Many Hong Kongers in the UK use the British National (Overseas) visa route rather than asylum. However, the BN(O) route does not cover everyone, for example people without BN(O) status or those born after 1997 without a qualifying parent. For them, an asylum claim with evidence of national security risk may be the only route.

Tibetans and Falun Gong

Tibetans

Tibetans face pressure on language, religion and the succession of the Dalai Lama. For example, officials closed schools that taught Tibetan language and culture in eastern Tibet in February 2025. Later, in July 2025, they banned celebrations of the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday and increased security. In August 2025, Xi Jinping visited Lhasa and called for Tibetan Buddhism "to adapt to socialist society".[8]

On 2 July 2025, the Dalai Lama said the institution would continue after his death. He also said only his own office would have authority to recognise his reincarnation.[23] Beijing insists that it must approve the next Dalai Lama. As a result, officials may treat any Tibetan who shows loyalty to the Dalai Lama, keeps his image or rejects the state-chosen Panchen Lama as a separatist. The Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, has been missing since 1995.

Falun Gong

China banned Falun Gong in 1999 and still calls it an "evil cult". Human Rights Watch reports continuing harassment, arbitrary imprisonment and torture of practitioners.[8] In May 2025, the US House of Representatives passed the Falun Gong Protection Act (H.R. 1540) without opposition.[24]

In the UK, the position therefore turns on visibility. Specifically, the November 2025 CPIN states that practitioners whose activities attract official attention "are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state" (para 3.1.1). Such activities include public practice, recruiting members and spreading Falun Gong material (para 3.1.2). However, a person who practises "in private and with discretion" is unlikely to be at real risk (para 3.1.3).[25] The CPIN follows LL (Falun Gong) China CG [2017] UKUT 504 (IAC). Lawyers should test any finding of "discretion" against HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31, which asks why the person would be discreet.

Transnational repression by China

Transnational repression means a state reaching across borders to silence people abroad. For Chinese claimants, it carries China country conditions into the host country itself. According to Freedom House, China carried out 272 of the 1,219 direct, physical incidents it recorded from 2014 to 2024, about 22% of the total. That made China the leading perpetrator.[26] In April 2026, Freedom House named China, Vietnam and Russia as the top perpetrators in 2025.[27] Physical incidents are only part of the picture. Threats to family members in China, online harassment and spying on diaspora groups are far more common.

Similarly, Hong Kong shows the method in its legal form. In July 2025, police issued arrest warrants and bounties for 19 overseas activists linked to the "Hong Kong Parliament" group. They offered HK$200,000 each for 15 of them, while the other four already carried bounties of HK$1 million. Police then listed 34 people as wanted for national security offences.[28] By the end of 2025, Human Rights Watch counted 38 overseas activists with warrants. In May 2025, police also charged the father of activist Anna Kwok. It was the first time police had used the NSL against a Hong Kong-based relative of an overseas critic.[8]

Likewise, mainland Chinese critics abroad face similar tactics. HRW reports that Zhang Yadi, a student who campaigned for Tibetan rights, was arrested for "inciting separatism" when she returned to China in July 2025.[8] Our article on how China monitors its diaspora abroad explains the role of police "service stations" and United Front groups.

Sur place activity is therefore a strong basis for claims. The January 2026 CPIN accepts that a person abroad who openly criticises the CCP "is likely to attract adverse attention from the Chinese state" (para 3.6.1).[21] The question then becomes whether the Chinese state knows about the activity. Evidence of contact with relatives, police visits to the family home or online threats goes directly to that question.

Who is at risk in China

The table below sets out the main profiles we see in China country conditions reports, with the Home Office position for each.

State protection and internal relocation

On state protection, China country conditions point one way. In almost every China claim, the state is the persecutor. That makes state protection and internal relocation simpler than in claims involving gangs or armed groups. The Home Office accepts this point. In fact, each recent CPIN states that a person with a well-founded fear of the state is "unlikely to be able to obtain protection". Similarly, such a person is unlikely to be able to relocate to escape the risk.[21]

Moreover, China's surveillance system supports that view. For example, the household registration (hukou) system ties people to their home area. In addition, real-name rules for phones, trains and hotels, and wide use of facial recognition, make it hard to live unnoticed in another city. The 2026 CPIN on Christians adds a qualification, however. Where the fear is of local officials only, the risk is generally limited to the home area (paras 5.1.1-5.1.4). The exception is a person who faces an arrest warrant, appears on a blacklist or has a pending sentence.[11] This follows QH (Christians - risk) China CG [2014] UKUT 86 (IAC). An expert report should therefore say whether the client's case has reached a level that would place them on a national list.

China country conditions: implications for UK and US asylum claims

UK claims

The Home Office keeps nine current CPINs on China. They are listed on the GOV.UK China CPIN page, last updated on 1 September 2026.[29] The newest cover modern slavery (August 2026), Christians (June 2026) and opposition to the state (January 2026). Falun Gong (November 2025) and Muslims, including Uyghurs in Xinjiang (July 2025), follow.

As a result, two points follow from these notes. First, for Uyghurs and for known political opponents, the Home Office accepts real risk, no protection and no relocation. In these claims the main issue is usually credibility and identity. An expert can help with language, place names, family history and documents. Second, for Christians and Falun Gong, the dispute is about profile and visibility. The 2026 Christians CPIN keeps the QH finding that the risk for Christians expressing their faith is "very low". It also says the situation has not changed enough to depart from that country guidance (paras 3.1.3, 3.1.11).[11] However, the Zion and Early Rain arrests support an argument that the risk has grown. This applies above all to leaders, online preachers and members of large or visible networks.

For sur place claims, Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000 confirms that activity abroad can found a claim even if it was done in bad faith. The issue is whether the Chinese state is likely to know of it and how it would respond on return.

US claims

US decisions on asylum have dropped sharply since 2025. TRAC found that immigration courts granted asylum in only 19.2% of decisions in August 2025, against 38.2% in August 2024.[30] We could not find a published current grant rate for Chinese nationals. Nevertheless, strong China claims still succeed. On 28 January 2026, an immigration judge in New York granted asylum to Guan Heng, who secretly filmed detention sites in Xinjiang in 2020. The judge found him credible and noted that Chinese police had questioned his family about him.[31]

In general, most US claims from China rest on religion, political opinion or race and nationality, where the persecutor is the state. Under 8 CFR 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), an applicant need not show that the state singled them out. Instead, they can rely on a "pattern or practice" of persecution of a group they belong to. The Uyghur evidence above supports that argument. In addition, section 101(a)(42) of the INA still treats forced abortion, forced sterilisation and resistance to coercive population control as persecution for political opinion.

In practice, corroboration is often the main hurdle. Under INA section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), a judge may require corroborating evidence unless the applicant cannot reasonably obtain it. Detention notices, church records and police summonses are hard to get from China, and relatives risk punishment for sending them. Therefore, expert evidence on China country conditions can explain why a document is missing. It can also test the account against known patterns, such as charges, detention centres and police practice in the client's city.

In both jurisdictions, the expert evidence should link the client's account to dated, sourced evidence for the specific region and profile. Our return risk assessment for China in 2026 covers the risk at the airport and after return. If you need a country expert, see our China and East Asia expert witness reports.

Conclusion

China country conditions in 2026 are worse on paper and no better in practice. First, the ethnic unity law gives national legal force to assimilation policies in Xinjiang and Tibet. Second, the 2025 religious rules and the arrests at Zion and Early Rain show that large and online house churches are now direct targets. Third, the new exit ban regulations widen the state's power to keep people inside China. Meanwhile, bounties and pressure on families reach those who have already left.

For Uyghurs and known political opponents, the Home Office accepts that the state is the persecutor and that protection and relocation are not available. For Christians, Falun Gong practitioners and critics abroad, claims still turn on profile and visibility. Strong claims will therefore rely on specific, dated evidence about how the Chinese state would see the client. General reports alone will rarely be enough.