Haiti Country Conditions: Gang Rule in Port-au-Prince

Last updated: 15 October 2026

Haiti country conditions in 2026 remain among the most dangerous in the Americas for ordinary people. The UN counted 5,915 people killed in 2025, up from 5,601 in 2024, and a further 3,050 in the first half of 2026.[1] Armed gangs still hold most of Port-au-Prince. Haiti has had no elected president since July 2021, and the Transitional Presidential Council left office on 7 February 2026 without an election.[2] Then, on 6 October 2026, the electoral council suspended the campaign for the planned December vote.[3]

This report sets out the current evidence for UK and US asylum lawyers. It covers who governs Haiti, the main gangs, the data on killings and sexual violence, the profiles at risk, the limits of state protection and the case against internal relocation. It also explains the 2026 changes in US law, including the end of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haiti. All figures are dated and footnoted. Where sources disagree, we say so and explain which figure we prefer.

Haiti country conditions in 2026: who governs Haiti

Haiti has no elected national official. President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated on 7 July 2021. The last ten senators left office in January 2023, so the country has no working parliament. In early 2024, a gang offensive blocked the return of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, and he resigned. A nine-member Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) took power in April 2024 with a mandate that ended on 7 February 2026.[2]

The council changed prime minister twice. It appointed Garry Conille in mid-2024 and dismissed him in November 2024. It then appointed Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, a businessman. In late January 2026, several council members tried to remove Fils-Aimé as well. However, the United States backed him openly. Its embassy warned of "serious consequences" for anyone who tried to oust him, and three US warships appeared in the bay of Port-au-Prince.[2]

The council then dissolved on schedule. Since 7 February 2026, Fils-Aimé has led the transition alone and governs by decree. In September 2026, he told the UN General Assembly that Haiti was at a "watershed moment" and asked for full support for the international force.[4] BINUH, the UN political office in Haiti, urged all actors to focus on insecurity and elections.[5] The Security Council extended BINUH's mandate to 31 January 2027 under resolution 2814 (2026).[6]

Elections keep slipping

The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) first aimed for a vote on 30 August 2026. After a new electoral decree on 2 July, it set the first round for 13 December 2026, together with a constitutional referendum, and a runoff for 21 February 2027.[7] On 6 October 2026, the CEP postponed the campaign, which was due to start on 5 October, and extended candidate registration to 31 October. It did not confirm whether 13 December still stands. Only about 768,000 of an estimated 7.7 million eligible voters had registered by then.[3]

UN High Commissioner Volker Türk told the Human Rights Council on 2 October 2026 that it was "difficult to conceive" that conditions for credible elections were in place.[8] For asylum purposes, decision-makers should not treat a promised election as evidence of improving conditions. The vote has moved at least twice in 2026, and gangs control the areas where many voters live.

Gang control in Haiti: the Viv Ansanm coalition

Viv Ansanm ("Living Together") is the alliance that dominates the capital. It formed in September 2023 when the two main rival federations, the G9 and the G-Pèp, joined forces. In 2024, it attacked prisons, police stations, government buildings and the main airport. On 2 May 2025, the US State Department designated Viv Ansanm and the Artibonite gang Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[9] The UN Security Council has also listed both groups under its Haiti sanctions regime.[1]

How much of Port-au-Prince do gangs control?

The most quoted figure is 90%. In March 2026, the UN Designated Expert on Haiti, William O'Neill, said at least 26 gangs controlled "up to 90%" of Port-au-Prince and its surroundings.[10] By September 2026, Associated Press reporting used a lower estimate of 70%.[11] The UN Secretary-General's July 2026 report explains the change. Police operations pushed gangs back from parts of Delmas and downtown around the Champ-de-Mars, and the state retook some public buildings. However, the report calls these gains "partial and fragile". Gangs still control large parts of Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Gressier and Croix-des-Bouquets.[6]

We prefer to describe gang control as "70% to 90%" and to cite both sources. The 90% figure reflects the peak of 2025 and early 2026. The 70% figure reflects modest police gains in 2026. Either way, gangs still hold the main exits from the capital to the north and the south.

Expansion beyond the capital

Gangs now operate across four departments. In the Centre, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan-based Taliban gangs, both part of Viv Ansanm, took Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau on 31 March 2025. More than 515 prisoners escaped from the Mirebalais prison. The Haitian rights group RNDDH counted nearly 80 deaths between 31 March and 8 April 2025, and about 6,000 residents fled.[12]

In the Artibonite, Gran Grif has driven most of the violence since 2022. Between 29 March and 30 April 2026, gang attacks hit Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, Dessalines, Saint-Marc, L'Estère and Gonaïves, killing at least 122 residents. On 29 May 2026, an ambush on National Road 1 near Verrettes killed four police officers. Moreover, gangs have started raiding the South-East, including Séguin and Belle-Anse.[6]

Killings, massacres and sexual violence in Haiti

Killings have risen every year since 2022. The UN Human Rights Service in Haiti, which BINUH and OHCHR run jointly, recorded 5,601 people killed in 2024 and 5,915 in 2025.[13][1] In 2026, it counted 1,642 killed in the first quarter and 1,408 in the second.[14][15] Türk reported more than 5,700 people killed or injured between 1 January and 11 September 2026.[8]

Why the counts differ

Lawyers should read these figures with care, because the UN changed what it measures. The 2022 and 2023 numbers are homicides.[16] From 2024, the totals include everyone killed in gang attacks, in police operations against gangs and by self-defence groups. As a result, many of the dead are suspected gang members.

OHCHR's March 2026 report shows the split. Between 1 March 2025 and 15 January 2026, it counted 5,519 people killed. Gangs killed at least 1,424, security force operations killed at least 3,497, and self-defence groups killed at least 598.[17] In the last quarter of 2025, 13% of people killed or injured in security operations were residents with no gang link, hit by stray bullets or drone blasts.[1] The shares also move from quarter to quarter. Security operations caused 69% of casualties in early 2026, but gang attacks caused 55% between April and June.[14][15]

Therefore, a Home Office or DHS argument that "most of the dead are gang members" is partly correct but misleading. Gangs still kill hundreds of civilians each quarter, and the state's own operations add civilian deaths of their own.

Massacres since 2024

Several mass killings show how gangs punish whole communities:

• Pont-Sondé, 3 October 2024: Gran Grif attacked the Artibonite town by canoe. The UN first reported at least 70 dead, and a local official later put the toll at 115. More than 6,200 survivors fled.[18]
• Wharf Jérémie, Cité Soleil, 6-11 December 2024: The local gang leader ordered the execution of more than 207 people, most of them older residents he accused of using vodou to make his child ill. Gang members burned or dismembered the bodies.[19]
• Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau, March-April 2025: nearly 80 dead as two Centre towns fell to gangs.[12]
• Kenscoff, July and August 2026: Viv Ansanm killed at least 61 people between 4 and 9 July. On 23 August, it killed at least 47 more, including people sheltering in a church compound, and kidnapped more than 50.[20][21]

In addition, clashes between rival gangs in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil killed at least 542 people in the spring of 2026 and displaced 18,000.[6]

Sexual violence, kidnapping and children

Gangs use rape to punish and control the people living in their areas. BINUH documented 1,753 cases of gang-related sexual violence in 2025, according to its quarterly human rights report for October-December 2025.[1] Between April and June 2026, it recorded 796 victims, and 87% suffered gang rape.[15] UN News gave a lower figure of 326 for the same quarter. We rely on BINUH's own release, because BINUH collects the data. Türk reported more than 1,000 women and girls raped between January and mid-September 2026.[8] Our separate report on rape as a tool of gang control in Haiti covers this evidence in depth.

Kidnapping has fallen from its peak but remains common. The UN recorded 1,494 kidnappings in 2024, 647 in 2025 and more than 230 between January and mid-September 2026.[13][1][8] The Secretary-General also noted kidnappings by "individuals wearing police uniforms".[6]

Children are both victims and recruits. UNICEF estimated that child recruitment by armed groups rose by 200% in 2025.[22] O'Neill said about half of all gang members are under 18, while Türk put the share at 30% to 50%.[10][8]

Security forces, drone strikes and Bwa Kale

From the Kenyan mission to the Gang Suppression Force

The Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission arrived in June 2024. Kenya planned to send 1,000 police officers but deployed about 730, and three Kenyan officers died. The mission never had the numbers to retake gang territory. Kenya withdrew its last officers in spring 2026 after a dispute over command of the new force.[23]

On 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793 by 12 votes to none, with China, Pakistan and Russia abstaining. It turned the MSS into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF) of up to 5,500 personnel, with an initial 12-month mandate and a UN support office.[24] The first Chadian troops arrived on 1 April 2026.[25] By 8 July 2026, the military component had 1,083 personnel.[6] On 29 September 2026, resolution 2829 renewed the force for six months, to 31 March 2027. At that point, the GSF had just over 1,500 personnel, still well short of its target.[26]

Drone strikes and civilian harm

Since March 2025, a government "Task Force" has used explosive drones and helicopter fire against gangs. Human Rights Watch says the private military company Vectus Global supports these operations. HRW published a report on drone strikes in March 2026. It counted 1,243 people killed and 738 injured in 141 drone operations between 1 March 2025 and 21 January 2026. The dead included 17 children. On 20 September 2025, a strike in Simon Pelé killed 10 people with no gang link, nine of them children.[27]

OHCHR gives a lower figure. It verified 60 people with no gang affiliation killed in drone and helicopter operations over almost the same period.[17] The two counts measure different things. HRW counts all deaths, including suspected gang members, while OHCHR counts only verified non-gang victims. We cite the OHCHR figure as the minimum for civilian deaths. Strikes continued in 2026, with 69 civilian drone victims in the first quarter and nine, including six children, in the second.[14][15] For a fuller analysis, see our article on drone strikes in Haiti and civilian harm.

The police also commit serious abuses. In 2025, the UN referred 222 alleged extrajudicial executions or attempts to the police inspectorate (IGPNH). By the end of the year, none had reached the courts.[1]

Bwa Kale and self-defence groups

"Bwa Kale" is the vigilante movement that began in April 2023, when crowds started lynching suspected gang members. Self-defence groups killed at least 598 people between March 2025 and January 2026.[17] Victims are often beaten with sticks or stones, and their bodies are burned. For example, on 21 October 2025, residents in Gressier stoned and burned a woman they accused of informing for the 103 Zombies gang.[1] Mob killings also reach towns with no gang presence, such as Hinche and Jacmel, where people die over accusations of theft.[1]

Who is at risk in Haiti

Almost everyone in a gang area faces some risk. However, the evidence shows that some profiles face targeted harm, which matters for both refugee claims and humanitarian protection.

Perceived opponents, informants and rival neighbourhoods

Gangs kill people they suspect of helping the police, a rival gang or a self-defence group. In practice, suspicion often rests only on where a person lives. Someone from a neighbourhood held by one gang can be executed at another gang's checkpoint as a "spy". The Wharf Jérémie killings targeted people who tried to flee or who were suspected of talking to journalists.[19] This "territorial association" is central to many Haitian claims, because the client cannot simply hide their address or family ties.

Police, officials and journalists

Gangs treat police officers as enemies, and the Artibonite ambush in May 2026 shows they can kill them on main roads.[6] Former soldiers of the Forces Armées d'Haïti (FAd'H) and staff of public bodies may face similar risks, especially now that the government is rebuilding the army.

Journalists face killing and abduction. On 24 December 2024, gunmen opened fire on reporters waiting for the reopening of the General Hospital, killing two journalists and wounding seven. Johnson "Izo" André said Viv Ansanm had not "authorised" the reopening.[28] A week earlier, gangs had set fire to the Bernard Mevs hospital. On 13 March 2026, journalists Osnel Espérance and Junior Célestin were abducted in downtown Port-au-Prince and are presumed executed.[29] RSF ranked Haiti 107th of 180 countries in its 2026 index.[29]

Women, girls and LGBT people

Women and girls in gang areas face rape during raids, rape as punishment and abduction into forced relationships with gang members. Reporting is very low. In late 2025, police stations recorded only three collective rape cases by gangs nationwide, because survivors fear reprisals and stigma.[1] LGBT Haitians face hostility from gangs and communities, and the law gives them no specific protection. Our article on LGBT persecution in Haiti sets out that evidence.

Deportees and people linked to foreigners

Returnees are visible. They often arrive with money, foreign clothes or family abroad, so gangs and kidnappers see them as targets. In the first eight months of 2026, Haiti received 196,878 deportees, including 194,465 from the Dominican Republic and 1,187 from the United States, according to the Haitian refugee group GARR.[30] Since August 2026, ICE has run weekly flights to Cap-Haïtien. Deportees receive about US$76 from the government, while a ticket onward to Port-au-Prince costs about US$250.[31] People who work with NGOs, foreign embassies or the diaspora face kidnapping for ransom and accusations of collaboration.

Watch our video on gang and cartel violence cases and what they mean for asylum claims. Watch it on our YouTube channel.

I Fled Gang & Cartel Violence: Can I Get Asylum? Cases from Colombia, Mexico, Honduras & Venezuela

State protection in Haiti

The Haitian state cannot protect most people from gangs. Its police force, the Haitian National Police (PNH), is small and stretched, and it has lost officers to attrition for years. The government says it trained more than 2,000 officers in 2026 under its "P4000" programme, and 1,192 graduated on 29 May alone.[32][6] However, the government itself has said that training figures do not show that the active workforce has grown.[32] Meanwhile, the GSF has about a quarter of its authorised strength.

The justice system barely functions. At the end of 2025, 82% of the 7,448 people in Haiti's prisons were in pretrial detention, and 134 detainees died that year, mostly from lack of care, food and water.[1] The government opened two specialised judicial units for mass crimes, sexual violence and financial crimes on 27 May 2026.[6] It is too early to show results. In one case about gang members buying drones in the Dominican Republic, prosecutors released 23 of the 36 suspects.[1]

Collusion between gangs and officials

Evidence of links between gangs, politicians and business leaders is strong and well documented. The UN Panel of Experts reported in 2025 that an active member of the Brooklyn gang was appointed to a new municipal commission in Cité Soleil. It also found that only two of the nine individuals under UN sanctions had any frozen bank accounts.[33] On 20 August 2024, the US Treasury sanctioned former president Michel Martelly, saying he had "sponsored multiple Haiti-based gangs".[34] By 31 December 2025, Canada had sanctioned 35 individuals, the EU 18, the US 20 and the UK 10. The UN list held ten individuals and two entities.[1]

This evidence matters in two ways. In the UK, it supports the argument that the state is unable to provide effective protection. In US Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims, it supports the argument that public officials acquiesce in gang violence, as discussed below.

Internal relocation and return to Haiti

Under current Haiti country conditions, internal relocation will usually be unduly harsh, and in many cases unsafe. The scale of displacement is the first problem. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round 14, based on August 2026 data, counted nearly 1.5 million internally displaced people. Nearly 80% now live outside Port-au-Prince, and displacement in the Artibonite rose by 16% between May and August 2026.[35] In the capital, 69% of the displaced live in informal sites.[6] Other towns are already absorbing people who fled earlier waves of violence.

Movement itself is dangerous. National Road 1, the route north to the Artibonite and Cap-Haïtien, passes through areas where gangs ambush travellers and police. The southern route leaves the capital through Martissant, Carrefour and Gressier, which gangs have controlled for years. Gangs also attack Kenscoff to open alternative routes south.[6][20] The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has banned US flights to Port-au-Prince since November 2024, after gunfire hit aircraft. It extended the ban to 2 March 2027.[11][36] In practice, returnees land in Cap-Haïtien and must cross gang-held roads to reach the capital or the south.

Living conditions add to the harshness. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) found 5.83 million people, or 52% of the population, in Crisis (Phase 3) or worse between March and June 2026. Of these, more than 1.8 million were in Emergency (Phase 4).[37] The 2026 humanitarian plan was only 25% funded by mid-June.[6]

Cap-Haïtien is the usual answer to a relocation argument. It is not under gang control, but it is not safe for everyone. The UN recorded alleged summary executions by police in Cap-Haïtien and Limbé in late 2025.[1] The city now receives every US deportation flight and many displaced families, with little support. A person with no family there, no money and a profile that gangs or vigilantes might notice will struggle to live a relatively normal life. For the general legal test, see our guide on internal relocation arguments.

Haiti country conditions and asylum claims in the UK and US

United Kingdom

The Home Office has no Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Haiti. We checked GOV.UK on 7 October 2026. Decision-makers must therefore assess Haiti country conditions from UN and NGO sources, which favours a detailed expert report. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) advises against all travel to Haiti, and no British consular staff are present in the country.[38]

For refugee claims made on or after 28 June 2022, sections 31 to 35 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply. Section 32 sets a two-stage test: the claimant must show on the balance of probabilities that they have the relevant characteristic and fear persecution for that reason, and then show a reasonable likelihood of persecution. Section 33 requires a particular social group (PSG) to meet both the "innate characteristic" and the "distinct identity" limbs. Sections 34 and 35 deal with state protection and internal relocation. The evidence above answers both: the state cannot protect, and relocation is unduly harsh.

Where no Convention reason applies, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules remain available. Under Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom (Applications 8319/07 and 11449/07, 28 June 2011), indiscriminate violence can breach Article 3 in the most extreme cases. Dire humanitarian conditions can also breach Article 3 when they result mainly from the conduct of the parties to a conflict. In Haiti, gangs block food, roads and aid, so this test fits closely.

The EU Qualification Directive no longer binds the UK. However, paragraph 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules still defines serious harm to include a serious and individual threat from indiscriminate violence in an internal armed conflict. The Geneva Academy's RULAC project classifies the violence in Haiti as a non-international armed conflict.[39] Lawyers can use this classification, although the Home Office has not accepted it.

United States: the end of TPS

DHS redesignated Haiti for TPS in 2024. In February 2025, it tried to cut the designation short. In July 2025, a federal court in New York ruled in Haitian Evangelical Clergy Ass'n v. Trump that TPS must run until at least 3 February 2026. DHS then published a termination notice on 28 November 2025, effective on that date. On 2 February 2026, Judge Ana Reyes in Washington, DC stayed the termination. On 25 June 2026, however, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in Mullin v. Doe that the TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional challenges. DHS now treats Haiti's TPS as terminated.[40] Weekly ICE flights to Haiti followed from August 2026.[31] Former TPS holders without another status now need asylum, withholding of removal or CAT protection.

United States: asylum, withholding and CAT after 2025-2026 precedents

Two precedents make gang-based claims harder. In Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025), decided on 2 September 2025, the Attorney General overruled Matter of A-B- (2021) and, by extension, Matter of A-R-C-G-. As a result, the restrictive 2018 A-B- decision on private-actor violence applies again.[41] Then, in Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-, 29 I&N Dec. 570 (BIA 2026), decided on 21 April 2026, the Board held that opposition to criminal gangs is not enough to establish a political opinion. The opinion must concern "a discrete cause that is tied to a government of a country, including a de facto government".[42]

Haitian claims can still meet this test, because Haitian gangs act politically. Viv Ansanm forced a prime minister out, attacks government buildings, aims at elections and is a designated terrorist organisation. Therefore, a client who supported the police, the transition, elections or a political party, and whom gangs targeted for that reason, holds an opinion tied to the government of Haiti. Imputed political opinion also fits people the gangs treat as police informants or Bwa Kale supporters.

The de facto government route is harder. The Board defined a de facto government as one exercising sovereignty over "a territory and people large enough for a nation". Gangs in Haiti tax residents, run checkpoints and decide which public services may operate, as the General Hospital attack showed.[28] That evidence is far stronger than the El Salvador record in D-G-E-A-. Even so, we recommend pleading it as an alternative, not the main theory.

For CAT, the client must show torture by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official, including "willful blindness". The Martelly sanctions, the Panel of Experts findings, police summary executions and kidnappings by people in police uniform all support acquiescence.[34][33][6]

An expert report should link the client's story to these dated sources and explain any gaps between them. If you need a country expert, you can find a Haiti expert witness here.

For evidence on gang control of Port-au-Prince and whether a returnee could find safety anywhere in Haiti, see our Haiti country expert witness reports.

Conclusion

Haiti country conditions in 2026 show no lasting improvement. The UN recorded 5,915 killings in 2025 and 3,050 in the first half of 2026. Gangs still control 70% to 90% of Port-au-Prince, and they have spread into the Centre, the Artibonite and the South-East. The Transitional Presidential Council has gone, elections have slipped again, and the Gang Suppression Force is far below strength.

For asylum claims, three points carry most weight. First, the state cannot protect people from gangs, and officials are linked to them. Second, internal relocation means crossing gang-held roads into areas already full of displaced people and facing hunger. Third, in the US, the end of TPS and the new BIA precedents mean claims must be framed carefully around political opinion tied to the Haitian state, with CAT as a strong fallback.