Return Risk Assessment: Ethiopia (2026) — Ethnic Targeting Continues

Last updated: 5 October 2026

Photo: Ethiopia - naomii.tumblr.com

Ethiopia return risk in 2026 is shaped by overlapping conflicts and a federal government that increasingly relies on coercive measures against ethnic and political opponents. Three risks dominate. First, ethnic targeting of Tigrayans, Amharas (since the 2023 Amhara conflict), and Oromos continues despite the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. Second, mass arbitrary detention has become the federal government's default response to political dissent. Third, surveillance of diaspora activists has intensified. As a result, returnees from Europe, North America, and Australia face credible risk depending on their profile. This article maps the risks and identifies the specific groups most at risk on return in 2026.[1]

Read alongside the broader Ethiopia country report and the article on Tigray war crimes.

Risk 1: Tigrayan Ethnic Targeting

Ethnic Tigrayans returning to Ethiopia face uneven protection. The Pretoria Agreement formally ended the Tigray war but has not resolved several specific risks. First, Eritrean forces continue to operate in some Tigrayan border areas. Second, Western Tigray remains under Amhara administration; Tigrayan IDPs from Western Tigray cannot return. Third, ethnic Tigrayans in Addis Ababa and elsewhere face arbitrary detention waves connected to political tensions. Furthermore, Tigrayan diaspora activists who have engaged in advocacy abroad face surveillance and risk on return.[2]

High-risk Tigrayan profiles

• Former TPLF or TDF members (any era).
• Civilians from Western Tigray who fled the 2021 ethnic cleansing.
• Sexual violence survivors with continuing trauma.
• Tigrayan activists and journalists who covered the war.
• Diaspora protesters who have been photographed at advocacy events.
• Tigrayan healthcare workers who documented or testified about violations.

Risk 2: Amhara Ethnic Targeting (Since 2023)

The conflict in Amhara region since mid-2023 has produced new risk profiles for ethnic Amhara returnees. Federal forces have conducted mass arrests of ethnic Amhara individuals — particularly in Addis Ababa — under emergency powers. UNHCHR and Amnesty International have documented detention without charge, often in unregistered facilities. Additionally, Fano militia members and their families face targeted arrest. Therefore, ethnic Amhara returnees with any politically active history face credible risk.[3]

High-risk Amhara profiles

• Members or supporters of Fano armed formations.
• Former Amhara Special Forces members (the 2023 dissolution sparked the conflict).
• Amhara opposition party members (NAMA, Amhara Prosperity dissenters).
• Ethnic Amhara civilians from conflict zones (North Shewa, North Gondar, parts of Wollo).
• Amhara activists who have organised diaspora protest.

Risk 3: Oromo Political Targeting

Ethnic Oromo activists, opposition party members (OFC, OLF), and Qeerroo movement organisers continue to face detention under the 2020 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Proclamation No. 1176/2020). Conflict in West Oromia between federal forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) produces additional civilian risk. Furthermore, family members of named OLA members face collective targeting through detention and harassment.[4]

High-risk Oromo profiles

• OFC or OLF members (current or former).
• Qeerroo movement organisers from 2014-2018 protests.
• Family members of named OLA members.
• Oromo journalists who covered the OLA conflict.
• Civilians from West Oromia conflict zones (Wollega).
• Returning exile activists who lived in Asmara, the US, or Europe.

Risk 4: Press and Civil Society Targeting

Journalists, civil society activists, and human rights defenders face increasing risk regardless of ethnicity. Several have been detained under broad provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention Proclamation (Proclamation No. 1185/2020). Internet shutdowns during conflict periods have left journalists exposed without communications. Therefore, journalists who have published critically face credible risk on return.[5]

Risk 5: Diaspora Surveillance and Sur Place Claims

The Ethiopian government surveils diaspora communities in Europe and North America. Embassies have been documented monitoring protests and demonstrations. Photographs from overseas events have been used to identify activists. As a result, returnees who participated in diaspora advocacy face heightened risk on return — even where their pre-departure profile was modest.[6]

Ethiopia continues to engage in surveillance of its diaspora critics, with photographs and social media monitoring used to identify dissident voices for action upon return.
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024 — Ethiopia

Internal Relocation: Often Not Viable

Decision-makers in UK, US, Canadian, and EU asylum systems sometimes propose internal relocation to Addis Ababa. Several factors limit the viability of this option in 2026.[7]

Evidence Required for a Strong Ethiopian Asylum Claim in 2026

Strong Ethiopian cases include the following evidential elements.[8]

• Profile-matched country expert report: Citing UNAMI-equivalent UN bodies (OHCHR, ICHREE final report, UN OCHA), HRW, Amnesty.
• Evidence of past detention or threats: Court summons, family witness statements, photos.
• Ethnic identity documents: ID cards, family records establishing claim profile.
• Diaspora activity evidence: Photos, videos, public profile establishing sur place claim.
• Medical/psychiatric evidence: Where torture, sexual violence, or other harm is part of the claim.

Conclusion

Ethiopia return risk for 2026 is high for ethnic Tigrayans (especially Western Tigray), ethnic Amharas (especially since the 2023 conflict), Oromo political activists, journalists, and diaspora protesters. The Pretoria Agreement did not extinguish ethnic targeting; it shifted the geography. Mass arbitrary detention has become a routine federal response. Furthermore, internal relocation is rarely a meaningful answer for the most affected profiles. Therefore, decision-makers who default to "Ethiopia is improving since Pretoria" must engage with profile-specific current evidence. To commission an expert report, use the find expert witness service. For wider context, see the country reports section.