Criminalising Dissent: How Arab Monarchies Use Lèse-Majesté Laws to Silence Political Opposition

Last updated: 16 September 2026

Photo: Arabian letters - Mesut Sahin

Across the Arab monarchies — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar — broad legal provisions protect the ruling family from criticism. These lèse-majesté Arab monarchies laws criminalise insulting the king, the royal family, the flag, state institutions, or "national unity." Penalties range from administrative fines to prison sentences of 20 years or more. The laws function as the principal legal instrument for suppressing political dissent and have been used to imprison journalists, lawyers, online activists, and ordinary social media users. This article examines the legal architecture and the implications for asylum claims.[1]

The evidence base draws on Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights, ALQST for Human Rights, MENA Rights Group, Reporters Without Borders, the Committee to Protect Journalists, ARTICLE 19, and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

The Legal Concept

Lèse-majesté — literally "injured majesty" — is a centuries-old legal concept protecting rulers from criticism. In modern Arab monarchies, lèse-majesté provisions are usually combined with broader public-order, cyber-crime, and counter-terrorism offences. The result is a layered framework that allows authorities to prosecute virtually any critical expression directed at state institutions, royal families, or "national values."[2]

Country-by-Country Framework

Saudi Arabia: The Most Severe Application

Saudi Arabia applies lèse-majesté and adjacent provisions most severely. The combination of the 2007 Anti-Cybercrime Law (Articles 3, 6), the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law (Article 1's broad definition of "terrorism"), and the Press Law produces a framework where social media criticism can be prosecuted as terrorism. Documented sentences include the following.[3]

UAE: The Cybercrime Framework

The UAE's Federal Decree-Law 34/2021 on Combating Rumours and Cybercrimes is the most comprehensive of the Gulf cybercrime laws. Article 22 criminalises "publishing news, rumours, or false statements likely to harm public interest" with up to life imprisonment where terrorism framing applies. Article 25 prohibits any criticism of the President, Vice-President, royal family members, or state institutions through information technology. Penalties scale to terrorism levels when combined with counter-terrorism provisions.[4]

Jordan: The 2023 Cybercrime Law

Jordan's August 2023 Cybercrime Law substantially expanded existing provisions. Article 15 criminalises spreading "false news" or content "harming national unity." Article 17 criminalises content that "undermines public order." Penalties up to 3-5 years apply. Combined with Penal Code Article 195 (insulting the King), the framework has been used against journalists, lawyers, MPs, and online activists. Multiple prosecutions in 2024-2025 confirm the documented application.[5]

Morocco: Article 179 and Combined Charges

Morocco's Penal Code Article 179 criminalises insulting the King with up to 5 years' imprisonment. Article 263 covers other public officials. As covered in our companion article on Morocco Hirak Rif prosecutions and combined-charge convictions, Moroccan prosecutors typically combine lèse-majesté with other charges to produce extended sentences against journalists and activists.[6]

Who Is Targeted

The pattern of lèse-majesté prosecution across Arab monarchies is consistent. Key categories include the following.[7]

• Journalists — print, broadcast, and online; particularly investigative reporters.
• Lawyers — particularly those representing political defendants.
• Women's rights activists — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE prominent cases.
• Religious reformers — Wahhabi clerics critical of royal family (Saudi Arabia).
• Online influencers and YouTubers — Gulf states especially.
• Ordinary social media users — single tweets sufficient.
• Diaspora critics — multiple in absentia and abduction cases.
• Family members of prominent dissidents.

Diaspora and Transnational Repression

Arab monarchies extend their reach to diaspora critics. Documented patterns include the Khashoggi assassination (Saudi Arabia, October 2018), the Saud al-Qahtani-linked surveillance network exposed by Citizen Lab, the Princess Latifa abduction (UAE, 2018), the UAE-Pegasus deployment against multiple targets globally, and Jordanian intelligence operations against critics in Europe. As a result, lèse-majesté risk extends beyond home-country borders for prominent critics.[8]

Lèse-majesté provisions in Arab monarchies are not symbolic survivals from earlier eras. They are operational instruments of political control, sustained by modern cybercrime and counter-terrorism legislation, used to imprison journalists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens. The combination of broad legal definitions and severe penalties creates documented risk for many profiles.
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, multiple opinions on Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain

Implications for Asylum Claims

For asylum applicants from Arab monarchies, lèse-majesté and adjacent prosecutions support multiple legal arguments.[9]

1. Political opinion — the prosecution targets political expression directly.
2. Particular social group — journalists, lawyers, women's rights activists all recognised.
3. Imputed political opinion — for family members and associates.
4. Article 3 ECHR / CAT — torture in Saudi, UAE, Bahrain detention documented.
5. Sur place activity — diaspora social media reliably triggers in absentia cases.

Conclusion

Lèse-majesté provisions across Arab monarchies operate as the principal legal instrument for suppressing political dissent. Saudi Arabia applies the framework most severely; UAE follows with the broadest cybercrime architecture; Jordan's 2023 law represents recent tightening. Other monarchies show variation in severity but consistent application of the framework.

For asylum decision-makers, the analytical task is to engage with the substance of the prosecution, not the formal charge label. Where the conduct prosecuted is peaceful expression, refugee protection on political-opinion or PSG grounds is the appropriate outcome. Country expert evidence is essential to translate the systemic pattern into individualised risk analysis.