Colombia's Peace Agreement Didn't Bring Peace: Successor Groups Kill

Last updated: 2 October 2026

Photo: Searching for drugs - Colombia police - Mussi Katz

Colombia's peace failure is the gap between the formal 2016 Peace Agreement and the continuing reality of armed conflict. The November 2016 Agreement was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and ended FARC's 50-year insurgency — yet armed conflict continues today through FARC dissident factions, the ELN, the Clan del Golfo, and other groups. Furthermore, the killing of ex-FARC combatants (~400 since 2016), social leaders (~1,500 since 2016), and civilians demonstrates that "peace" has not arrived for many Colombians. As a result, asylum analysis based on a "post-conflict" framing misunderstands current conditions. This article documents the peace failure and its asylum implications.[1]

Related: Colombia armed groups; Colombia HR report.

The 2016 Peace Agreement

The Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC was signed on 24 November 2016 (revised from a rejected October version). The Agreement contains six points: rural reform; political participation; end of conflict; drug substitution; victims; implementation. Furthermore, it created institutions including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) for transitional justice, the Truth Commission, and the Special Unit for the Search of Disappeared Persons. As a result, the Agreement is a comprehensive transitional framework. However, implementation has been uneven and inadequate to address all conflict drivers.[2]

Implementation Failures

The Kroc Institute (University of Notre Dame), which has been mandated to monitor Peace Agreement implementation, reports that as of late 2025, approximately 30% of commitments are "fully completed" while 40% are "in progress" and 30% are "minimally or not implemented." Furthermore, rural reform — the most contested element — has barely moved forward; coca substitution programmes have stalled; political participation has been complicated by killings of UnComún (former FARC party) members. As a result, the Agreement's transformative potential has been only partially realised. Therefore, the conditions that drove the original conflict — rural inequality, weak state presence, illicit economies — remain.[3]

Successor Armed Groups

The 2016 Agreement did not address all Colombian armed conflict. The ELN was not party. FARC dissident structures emerged from members who refused to demobilise or returned to arms. The Clan del Golfo (successor to paramilitary AUC) continued operations. Furthermore, all these groups have expanded into territories previously controlled by FARC. As a result, the geographic conflict pattern has shifted but not ended. Therefore, "former FARC areas" are now contested among successor groups, often producing more violence than during the FARC era for specific communities.[4]

"The 2016 Peace Agreement ended the FARC war, but it did not end armed conflict in Colombia. Successor groups have expanded into former FARC territories and continued the patterns of violence against social leaders, ex-combatants, and civilians."Kroc Institute, Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Report 2025

Killing of Ex-Combatants

Approximately 400 ex-FARC combatants have been killed since 2016. Furthermore, the killings are concentrated in regions where FARC dissidents and paramilitary successors operate. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has issued precautionary measures for protected ex-combatants. The UN Verification Mission for Colombia tracks the killings and reports regularly. As a result, ex-combatants face high persecution risk despite the Peace Agreement protections. Therefore, ex-FARC combatant asylum claims have strong basis. They engage particular social group and imputed political opinion grounds.[5]

Social Leaders Continue to Die

The killing of social leaders has continued or intensified post-2016. Indepaz statistics: ~1,500 social leaders killed between 2016 and 2025. Furthermore, the killings target persons working on: land restitution; coca substitution; environmental defence; indigenous and Afro-Colombian rights; victims' rights. As a result, the very persons whose work would help implement the Peace Agreement are being killed. Therefore, social leader asylum claims demonstrate the broader peace failure — those who would build peace are the targets.[6]

The Petro "Total Peace"

The Petro government (since August 2022) has pursued "Total Peace" — negotiations with multiple armed groups simultaneously. Talks have occurred with ELN, FARC dissident factions (especially EMC), and Clan del Golfo elements. Furthermore, some ceasefires have been declared. However, violence has continued during talks and some armed groups have used talks to consolidate. As a result, "Total Peace" has not yet fundamentally reduced violence. Therefore, the formal peace process should not be cited as evidence of safety.[7]

Asylum Implications

The peace failure has direct asylum implications. (1) "Post-conflict" framing of Colombian claims is incorrect; (2) Armed conflict in different forms continues; (3) State protection remains inadequate in conflict regions; (4) Ex-combatants, social leaders, witnesses, and indigenous/Afro-Colombian communities face documented risks; (5) Internal relocation has limited safety. Furthermore, the UNHCR Colombia position recognises continuing conflict dynamics. As a result, Colombian asylum claims should be assessed on current conditions, not on the formal Peace Agreement status. Therefore, the framing of the case matters substantially.[8]

Conclusion: Peace Has Not Yet Arrived

Colombia's 2016 Peace Agreement was a significant achievement but did not bring peace. Furthermore, the continuing armed conflict through successor groups, the killings of social leaders and ex-combatants, and the displacement of communities demonstrate that asylum-relevant risks persist. As a result, Colombian asylum claims remain valid and necessary. Therefore, decision-makers should engage with the peace failure as country evidence, not dismiss it.