Colombia: ELN Ceasefire Collapse — 2026 Update

Last updated: 16 September 2026

Photo: Bogota, Colombia - Pedro Szekely

The Colombia ELN update for 2026 reflects the collapse of the ELN ceasefire and the consequent escalation of armed conflict in ELN-controlled regions, particularly Catatumbo. The Petro government opened peace talks with the ELN in November 2022, with a bilateral ceasefire agreed in August 2023. Furthermore, the ceasefire was renewed but eventually broke down — culminating in the Catatumbo crisis of January 2025 when ELN attacks displaced over 50,000 people. As a result, ELN-related violence and displacement have escalated significantly in 2025-2026. This update documents the developments and their asylum implications.[1]

For background: Colombia armed groups.

The Peace Talks Process

The ELN-Government peace talks under the Petro administration started in November 2022. Furthermore, the dialogue produced: First Cycle (Caracas, late 2022); Second Cycle (Mexico, early 2023); bilateral ceasefire from August 2023 (renewed); subsequent cycles in Cuba and Venezuela. Key issues included: humanitarian agreements; participation of society; transformations for peace. However, the talks faced significant challenges: ELN's continuing attacks during ceasefire periods; disagreements on scope; internal ELN dynamics. As a result, the process has been characterised by intermittent progress and serious setbacks. Therefore, the peace process status must be monitored carefully for asylum analysis.[2]

The Ceasefire Collapse

The bilateral ceasefire began on 3 August 2023 and was renewed several times. Furthermore, the ceasefire reduced some violence but did not stop all ELN activity. The collapse occurred over 2024-2025: (1) ELN attacks during ceasefire periods undermined trust; (2) Disagreements on agenda content; (3) Government suspended talks following major ELN attacks; (4) Government formal suspension of ceasefire after the January 2025 Catatumbo offensive. As a result, by early 2025, the bilateral framework had collapsed. Therefore, country conditions for asylum reflect renewed open conflict.[3]

The Catatumbo Crisis

The Catatumbo crisis of January 2025 was the most significant escalation. ELN forces launched coordinated attacks across Norte de Santander's Catatumbo region targeting: (1) FARC dissident factions (especially "Frente 33"); (2) Civilian communities perceived to support rivals; (3) Coca cultivators and traffickers refusing ELN control. Furthermore, the attacks displaced over 50,000 people in a few weeks — among the largest single displacement events in Colombia since 2016. The Colombian government deployed military forces and declared a state of emergency. As a result, Catatumbo became the focal point of renewed conflict. Therefore, applicants from Norte de Santander have strong current asylum claims.[4]

"The January 2025 ELN offensive in Catatumbo, with its mass displacement of civilians, represents one of the most serious escalations of armed conflict in Colombia since the 2016 Peace Agreement."UN Verification Mission for Colombia, 2025

Other ELN Regions

Beyond Catatumbo, ELN remains active in: (1) Arauca — long-standing ELN territory; conflict with FARC dissidents; cross-border to Venezuela; (2) Chocó — ELN-Clan del Golfo competition; Afro-Colombian community impact; (3) Bolívar (south) — ELN historical presence; (4) Cauca — ELN cells; (5) Antioquia (Bajo Cauca) — ELN-Clan del Golfo competition. Furthermore, ELN has presence in Venezuela (sometimes regarded as safe haven). As a result, ELN-affected regions are diverse. Therefore, regional analysis is critical for asylum cases.[5]

Current ELN Tactics

Contemporary ELN tactics include: (1) Targeted assassinations of social leaders, ex-FARC combatants, suspected informants; (2) Forced recruitment (especially of minors); (3) Extortion of businesses and individuals; (4) Antipersonnel mines; (5) Attacks on oil infrastructure (historical and continuing); (6) "Armed strikes" (paros armados) — armed shutdowns of regions; (7) Kidnapping; (8) Coca cultivation control; (9) Illegal mining; (10) Cross-border operations. Furthermore, ELN tactics have not fundamentally changed despite peace talks. As a result, civilians in ELN regions continue to face documented risks. Therefore, asylum claims from ELN-affected regions remain valid.[6]

ELN Victims

ELN victims include: (1) Civilians in conflict areas; (2) Ex-FARC combatants in ELN-disputed regions; (3) Social leaders and human rights defenders; (4) Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities in ELN territories; (5) Coca substitution programme participants; (6) Witnesses to ELN crimes; (7) Family members of recruited persons; (8) Migrants in transit through ELN regions. Furthermore, the Catatumbo crisis specifically affected farming communities and coca cultivators. As a result, the victim profile is broad. Therefore, the asylum applicant pool is correspondingly broad.[7]

Asylum Implications

The 2026 ELN update has direct asylum implications. (1) ELN-related risk has increased, not decreased; (2) The ceasefire collapse means the "peace process" framing should not be used to suggest safety; (3) Catatumbo applicants have particularly strong current evidence; (4) Other ELN regions (Arauca, Chocó) face documented risks; (5) Country expert reports must reflect post-2024 dynamics. Furthermore, the UNHCR Colombia position incorporates the new realities. As a result, well-evidenced ELN-related asylum claims continue to be valid. Therefore, asylum decisions must reflect 2026 country conditions.[8]

Conclusion: Renewed Conflict

The Colombia ELN update for 2026 reflects renewed open conflict following ceasefire collapse. Furthermore, the Catatumbo crisis demonstrated the scale of ELN's continued capacity for violence. As a result, ELN-related asylum claims have strengthened country evidence support. Therefore, asylum representatives should engage with the post-2024 ELN landscape, not earlier framings.