Azerbaijan: New Crackdown on Civil Society — 2026 Update

Last updated: 16 September 2026

Photo: Azerbaijan - Gill M L

Through 2025 and into 2026, the Aliyev government has intensified its crackdown on remaining civil society in Azerbaijan. The post-COP29 period has produced new waves of arrests, NGO closures, and journalist prosecutions. This Azerbaijan crackdown update sets out what has changed since our analytical report, why it matters for asylum cases, and which profiles now face heightened risk on return.[1]

The evidence base draws on the Working Group on a Unified List of Political Prisoners, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, OSCE/ODIHR, Reporters Without Borders, and the Cairo Institute-style civil society monitors operating from exile.

What Has Changed Since 2024

Several distinct developments mark the post-COP29 crackdown. The Aliyev government appears to have interpreted external silence during the November 2024 climate summit as a green light for further repression. As a result, the early months of 2025 produced the largest wave of arrests since the 2014 NGO crackdown.[2]

• New journalist arrests — at least 35 documented arrests since November 2024, including remaining staff of Meydan TV, freelance contributors to Toplum TV, and previously unaffiliated bloggers.
• Bahruz Samadov detention extended — the peace activist and Charles University Prague PhD candidate remains in pre-trial detention on "treason" charges. His detention has been extended several times through 2025-2026.
• EMDSC follow-up arrests — Anar Mammadli was joined by additional Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre staff in early 2025.
• August 2024 LGBTQ+ raid — 48 detained in coordinated police operation across Baku, Sumgayit, and Ganja. Largest LGBTQ+ raid since 2017.
• March 2025 follow-up LGBTQ+ raid — 26 further detentions documented by ILGA-Europe and OSCE/ODIHR.
• Travel bans expanded — at least 76 civil society and opposition figures barred from leaving the country as of April 2026.
• AbzasMedia editors convicted — June 2025 verdicts produced sentences of 7.5-9 years for the AbzasMedia 6 on "smuggling" and "money laundering" charges.

The COP29 Context

Azerbaijan hosted COP29 in Baku from 11 to 22 November 2024. The summit attracted significant international attention. However, Western governments and the EU avoided substantive criticism of Aliyev's human rights record during the run-up to and duration of the summit. Multiple analysts have noted that the post-summit period produced a measurable acceleration of repression.[3]

Profiles Newly at Risk in 2026

The 2025-2026 crackdown has expanded the categories of Azerbaijanis facing risk. Asylum decision-makers should account for the following emerging profiles.[4]

European Court of Human Rights Backlog

Azerbaijan now holds the second-largest backlog of unimplemented ECtHR judgments in Europe, after Russia (suspended from the Council of Europe in 2022). 247 judgments remain unenforced as of April 2026. The Aliyev government has shown no meaningful response to Council of Europe pressure on enforcement. As a result, ECtHR-based arguments for non-refoulement carry weight in asylum proceedings.[5]

Implications for Asylum Cases

The 2025-2026 crackdown reshapes the asylum analysis in several ways. For practitioners working on Azerbaijani cases, the following points are practical.[6]

1. Update country expert reports. Reports dated before November 2024 may underestimate current risk. Commission updated reports for 2026 hearings.
2. Document the post-COP29 timeline. Show the tribunal that conditions have worsened, not improved.
3. Expand the recognised profiles. Academic peace activists, environmental defenders, and LGBTQ+ raid victims now form well-documented categories.
4. Address sur place activity. Diaspora critics increasingly trigger family hostage targeting — see our return risk assessment.
5. Internal flight remains not viable. The crackdown reinforces this baseline analysis.

The post-COP29 acceleration of repression in Azerbaijan demonstrates how international summit-hosting can become a tool of authoritarian legitimation followed by intensified domestic repression. Asylum decision-makers must engage with the most recent country evidence, not pre-2024 baselines.
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report 2025

Conclusion

Azerbaijan in 2026 is more repressive than it was in 2024. The post-COP29 crackdown has produced new arrests, expanded travel bans, intensified LGBTQ+ raids, and consolidated the conviction of journalists. International accountability mechanisms remain blocked or ignored.

For asylum practitioners, the analytical task is to update country evidence for 2026, document the new emerging profiles, and address the sustained worsening of conditions. The legal framework continues to support refugee protection. The work is to make sure the most current country evidence is before the decision-maker.