Al-Shabaab Controls More Territory Than Most People Realize

Last updated: 5 October 2026

Photo: Mogadishu Daily Life one year after Al Shabaab 22 - AMISOM Public Information

Al-Shabaab territory control extends far beyond what many asylum decision-makers realise. The group controls or contests large parts of south-central Somalia. It runs courts, collects taxes, and governs millions of people. For anyone making decisions about Somali asylum claims, this reality matters greatly. Understanding Al-Shabaab territory control is essential for assessing risk, internal relocation, and the real security situation on the ground.[1]

This article draws on data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the International Crisis Group, the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, and Human Rights Watch. It covers the period through early 2026. For more country-specific analysis, see our country reports section. Watch our latest country analysis on our YouTube channel, The Human Rights.

Current Al-Shabaab Territory Control

Al-Shabaab is not a small rebel group hiding in forests. It is a large armed organisation that holds territory across south-central Somalia. According to ACLED data, Al-Shabaab controls or actively contests roughly 35% of Somali territory. This includes large rural areas in Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Hiraan, Galgaduud, and parts of Middle Juba.[2]

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) controls most major cities and towns. However, its control often ends at the city limits. Travel between towns is dangerous because Al-Shabaab controls the roads. The group operates checkpoints on major highways. It stops vehicles, checks identities, and collects taxes. People who refuse to pay face violence or death.[3]

In many areas, there is no clear front line. Instead, control shifts throughout the day. The government may control a town during daylight. At night, Al-Shabaab moves in. This is called "night-time control." It means that even in areas the government claims to hold, people live under Al-Shabaab rules after dark. This pattern is common across the Mogadishu hinterland and in regional capitals outside of Mogadishu itself.[4]

How Al-Shabaab Governs: A Parallel State

Al-Shabaab does not just fight. It governs. In areas it controls, Al-Shabaab runs a parallel state. This means it provides many of the services that a government normally provides. It collects taxes, runs courts, polices communities, and even manages disputes over land and water.

The group collects zakat (an Islamic tax). It also charges fees on businesses, livestock, and crops. The UN Panel of Experts estimated that Al-Shabaab earns over $100 million per year from taxation. In some areas, people must pay taxes to both Al-Shabaab and the government. Refusing to pay Al-Shabaab taxes leads to punishment. This can mean beatings, property destruction, or execution.[5]

Al-Shabaab courts are often faster and seen as less corrupt than government courts. Many Somalis use them even when they do not support the group. However, these courts apply a strict form of Sharia law. Punishments include flogging, amputations, and public executions. There is no right to appeal. Women and minorities face especially harsh treatment.[6]

Territory Control: Government vs. Al-Shabaab vs. Contested

The Problem with "Liberated" Areas

Since 2022, the Somali government has claimed to "liberate" many areas from Al-Shabaab. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud launched a major military offensive with clan militia support. The government announced the recapture of dozens of towns. However, the reality on the ground is different from these claims.[7]

In many so-called liberated areas, Al-Shabaab simply retreated from the towns. It moved to the surrounding countryside. It then used guerrilla tactics. These include roadside bombs (IEDs), targeted assassinations, and night-time raids. Al-Shabaab's shadow governance continued even after the military left. Tax collectors still visited. People who cooperated with the government were killed.[8]

The government often cannot hold the areas it captures. It lacks the troops to garrison every town. When soldiers move on, Al-Shabaab comes back. This cycle has repeated many times. As a result, "liberated" does not mean "safe." For asylum decision-makers, this is a key point. A person cannot safely relocate to an area that the government claims to control but where Al-Shabaab still operates freely at night.

Al-Shabaab Operational Presence by Region

Military Operations and Their Limits

The Somali government uses several military forces against Al-Shabaab. The main ones are the Somali National Army (SNA), the Danab special forces (trained by the United States), and clan militias called "macawisley." The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) also plays a role, but it is withdrawing.[9]

ATMIS replaced AMISOM in 2022. Its mandate was to hand over security to Somali forces by the end of 2024. However, Somali forces are not ready. The SNA is underpaid, poorly equipped, and organised along clan lines. Many soldiers desert or sell their weapons. The Danab forces are effective but small in number. They cannot cover the whole country.[10]

The AU withdrawal creates a serious security gap. As international troops leave bases, Al-Shabaab can move in. This has already happened in some areas. The UN Security Council extended the ATMIS mandate, but with reduced troop numbers. By mid-2025, the force will be much smaller. This raises serious questions about the government's ability to hold territory. For expert witnesses providing evidence in asylum cases, the AU withdrawal is a critical factor to consider.[11]

Al-Shabaab remains the most potent threat to the Somali state. Its territorial control is extensive, its governance structures are deeply embedded, and its financial networks are resilient. Military operations alone will not defeat it.
International Crisis Group, 'Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab' (2024)

What This Means for Internal Relocation Arguments

In asylum cases, governments often argue that a person can safely relocate within their own country. This is called the "internal flight alternative" or "internal relocation." For Somalia, this argument is very weak. Here is why.

First, Al-Shabaab operates across most of south-central Somalia. A person fleeing Al-Shabaab in one region cannot safely move to another region where the group also operates. Second, Al-Shabaab has intelligence networks in Mogadishu. People who have refused to join, pay taxes, or cooperate can be found even in the capital. Third, IDP camps (camps for displaced people) are among the most dangerous places in Somalia. They offer no protection from Al-Shabaab recruitment or sexual violence.[12]

Additionally, clan identity determines safety in Somalia. A person can only safely live in an area controlled by their own clan. Moving to another clan's territory brings new dangers. Minority clan members have no safe area at all. For more on this topic, see our analysis of human rights in Somalia.[13]

Implications for Asylum Claims

Al-Shabaab territory control has direct consequences for asylum claims from Somali nationals. Several key points matter for decision-makers and expert witnesses.

People who have refused Al-Shabaab recruitment, taxation, or forced marriage face a real risk of persecution. Al-Shabaab treats refusal as betrayal. The punishment is often death. This creates a well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion (imputed opposition to Al-Shabaab) or religion (refusal to follow its interpretation of Islam).[14]

For Article 15(c) claims under the EU Qualification Directive, the level of indiscriminate violence in south-central Somalia remains high enough that civilians face a real risk of serious harm. ACLED recorded over 2,000 violent events linked to Al-Shabaab in 2024 alone. The UK Upper Tribunal in MOJ and others (Return to Mogadishu) recognised the continued security risks, though country guidance is under review.[15]

Conclusion

Al-Shabaab territory control is more extensive than many decision-makers assume. The group governs large parts of south-central Somalia through a parallel state. It collects taxes, runs courts, and enforces its rules through violence. Even in areas the government claims to hold, Al-Shabaab maintains a strong presence through shadow governance and night-time operations.

The AU troop withdrawal makes the situation worse. Somali forces are not able to fill the gap. Military offensives have stalled. For people fleeing Al-Shabaab, there is no safe place in south-central Somalia. Internal relocation arguments fail because Al-Shabaab's reach extends across regions and into major cities including Mogadishu.

For asylum practitioners and expert witnesses, the evidence is clear. Al-Shabaab territory control creates serious risks for a wide range of Somali asylum seekers. Claims must be assessed against the real situation on the ground, not against official government statements about "liberated" areas.