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Photo: Afghanistan - R9 Studios FL
Afghanistan Hazara communities have faced two threats since the Taliban took Kabul on 15 August 2021. The first is the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which bombs Hazara mosques, schools and minibuses. The second is the Taliban itself, now the de facto state. It has evicted Hazara families from their land, killed former soldiers and limited Shia religious life. This article sets out the evidence for both threats, from October 2021 to October 2026. It then explains how UK and US law treat an Afghanistan Hazara claim, and what a country expert can prove.
We write for lawyers who must show a specific risk. For the general country picture, read our Afghanistan human rights report. Here we focus on the Hazara. Every figure is dated and footnoted, and where sources disagree, we say so.
ISKP-claimed attacks on Shia targets, August 2021 to September 2024 (Afghan Witness)
People killed at the Kaaj education centre, Kabul, 30 September 2022 (UNAMA)
Hazara or Shia members of the Taliban cabinet (Afghan Witness, 2025)
Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan since September 2023 (UNHCR, June 2026)
Who the Hazara are in Afghanistan
The Hazara are an ethnic group from the central highlands of Afghanistan, known as Hazarajat. This area covers Bamiyan and Daykundi and parts of Ghazni, Ghor, Uruzgan and Maidan Wardak. Large Hazara communities also live in western Kabul, especially Dasht-e-Barchi, and in Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat. Most Hazaras speak Dari, often in the Hazaragi dialect.
Religion matters as much as ethnicity. The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) states that most Hazaras are Twelver Shia Muslims. A large number follow the Ismaili branch, and some are Sunni.[1] The Home Office puts the Shia share of the whole population at around 19%.[2] As a result, other Afghans usually see an Afghanistan Hazara as Shia, whatever his or her own beliefs.
Nobody knows the exact size of the group. Afghanistan has held no full census since 1979. Minority Rights Group (MRG) cites an older estimate of 9%. However, it warns that no reliable data on ethnicity exist and that the numbers are highly political.[3] Other estimates run from 10% to 20%, and Hazara groups often claim more. For a claim, the exact share does not matter. What matters is that Hazaras are easy to identify by their features, their names, their home areas and their faith.
A history of persecution before 2021
Hazaras have faced mass violence for more than a century. In the 1890s, Emir Abdur Rahman Khan's campaigns in Hazarajat brought mass killings, slavery and the seizure of land.[4] Many Hazaras today see these events as the start of their exclusion.
The first Taliban government repeated this pattern. When the Taliban took Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998, Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that at least 2,000 people were killed, most of them Hazaras.[5] In January 2001, Taliban forces detained about 300 men in Yakawlang district, Bamiyan. HRW confirmed that about 170 of them were killed.[6] Two months later, the Taliban blew up the Buddhas of Bamiyan, in the heart of Hazarajat.
Attacks continued under the Republic. According to UN data cited by Genocide Watch, more than 65 attacks targeted Hazaras between January 2017 and June 2021, killing more than 750 civilians.[4] In May 2021, a bombing near the Sayed ul-Shuhada girls' school in Dasht-e-Barchi killed about 85 people, most of them Hazara schoolgirls. This history explains why the Afghanistan Hazara community feared the Taliban's return in 2021.
ISKP attacks on Afghanistan Hazara mosques, schools and transport
ISKP sees Shia Muslims as apostates. Afghan Witness counted 41 ISKP-claimed attacks on the Shia community between August 2021 and September 2024. Most were bombs, and the rest were suicide attacks and shootings.[7] HRW found in September 2022 that ISKP had claimed 13 attacks on Hazaras and was linked to 3 more. Together they killed or injured at least 700 people.[8] The table below lists the main attacks on Afghanistan Hazara targets.
| Date | Place and target | Reported deaths | Claim |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 Oct 2021 | Gozar-e-Sayed Abad Shia mosque, Kunduz | 120+ (UN: 150+ killed and wounded) | ISKP |
| 15 Oct 2021 | Imam Bargah-e-Fatima Shia mosque, Kandahar | 47+ | ISKP |
| 19 Apr 2022 | Abdul Rahim Shahid high school, Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul | 20 killed or injured (HRW) | None |
| 21 Apr 2022 | Seh Dokan Shia mosque, Mazar-i-Sharif | 31 | ISKP |
| 28 Apr 2022 | Minibus with Hazara passengers, Mazar-i-Sharif | 9 | ISKP |
| 30 Sep 2022 | Kaaj education centre, Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul | 53 | None |
| 6 Jan 2024 | Minibus, Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul | 5 (UN: 25 killed or injured) | ISKP |
| 29 Apr 2024 | Imam Zaman mosque, Guzara, Herat | 6 | ISKP |
| 17 May 2024 | Tourists and Afghan companions, Bamiyan | 6 | ISKP |
| 12 Sep 2024 | Hazara men meeting pilgrims, Daykundi-Ghor road | 14 | ISKP |
| 10 Apr 2026 | Shia gathering at a shrine, Injil, Herat | 11 | None |
Mosques
The first large attacks came within two months of the takeover. On 8 October 2021, a suicide bomber hit the Gozar-e-Sayed Abad mosque in Kunduz during Friday prayers. The UN Security Council said the attack caused more than 150 casualties, killed and wounded.[9] One week later, on 15 October, bombers struck the Imam Bargah-e-Fatima mosque in Kandahar, killing at least 47 people.[10] ISKP claimed both attacks. In April 2022, a bomb at the Seh Dokan mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif killed 31 people and wounded 87.[8]
Smaller attacks have followed. On 29 April 2024, a gunman killed six worshippers at the Imam Zaman mosque in Guzara, Herat, a Hazara area.[11] On 10 April 2026, gunmen attacked a Shia gathering in front of a shrine in Injil district, Herat. UNAMA, the UN mission in Afghanistan, confirmed 11 killed and 11 injured, including women and children.[12] Nobody has claimed this attack.
Schools and education centres
ISKP and other attackers have also targeted Hazara students. On 19 April 2022, a bombing at the Abdul Rahim Shahid high school in Dasht-e-Barchi killed or injured 20 students, teachers and staff.[8] The worst attack came on 30 September 2022. A suicide bomber entered the women's section of the Kaaj education centre while students sat a practice university exam. UNAMA counted 53 dead, 46 of them girls and young women, and 110 injured.[13] No group claimed it. Moreover, a 2026 Genocide Watch report records a grenade attack on a school in Dasht-e-Barchi that injured more than 40 children, but it gives no date.[4]
Minibuses and transport
Public transport is a constant target, because minibuses carry Hazara workers and students on fixed routes. On 28 April 2022, a bomb on a minibus with Hazara passengers in Mazar-i-Sharif killed 9 people and wounded 13.[8] In Kabul, ISKP has bombed minibuses in Dasht-e-Barchi several times. On 6 January 2024, a blast killed at least 5 people. The UN said at least 25 people were killed or wounded.[14] ISKP also claimed a minibus bombing there on 11 August 2024, which killed one person and injured about 11.[15]
Bamiyan and Daykundi
Attacks have reached Hazarajat itself, which many people saw as relatively safe. On 17 May 2024, gunmen shot foreign tourists and their Afghan companions in Bamiyan market. Three Spaniards and three Afghans died, and ISKP said it had targeted "Christian tourists and their Shiite companions".[16] On 12 September 2024, ISKP gunmen stopped Hazara men on a road between Daykundi and Ghor. The men were waiting to welcome pilgrims back from Karbala. Afghan Witness verified at least 14 dead and 6 injured, while ISKP claimed 15.[7]
Where the death tolls disagree
Death tolls often differ, and lawyers should cite the source and date. For example, the Taliban's Interior Ministry gave 7 dead for the Herat attack in April 2026, while its Herat office and UNAMA gave 11. Genocide Watch gives 12, and some local sources claimed far more.[12] Similarly, the first UNAMA count for Kaaj was 24 dead, and it rose to 53 within days.[13] We prefer UNAMA figures, because UNAMA checks each case. However, its numbers are often minimums. In addition, the Taliban have limited reporting, which makes all counts less complete.
Taliban treatment of Hazaras since 2021
The Taliban did not carry out most of the bombings. Even so, Taliban conduct towards the Afghanistan Hazara population forms a separate body of evidence. It covers land, killings, religion, exclusion and the failure to protect.
Forced evictions and land disputes
Evictions began within weeks of the takeover. HRW reported in October 2021 that Taliban officials had forced at least 2,800 Hazara residents from 15 villages in Daykundi and Uruzgan. In Helmand, the Taliban ordered at least 400 families to leave, and in Balkh, local armed men gave families three days to go.[17] HRW called these evictions collective punishment. In many cases, the land went to Taliban supporters or to Pashtun Kuchi nomads, who have long disputed grazing rights in Hazarajat.
The pattern continues. On 27 July 2025, the Taliban evicted 25 Hazara families, about 200 people, from Rashk village in Bamiyan.[18] UNHCR noted in September 2025 that the de facto authorities have sided with Pashtun groups in land disputes, including by evicting Hazaras.[2] Genocide Watch also reports seasonal Kuchi raids on Hazara farmland in Behsud, Maidan Wardak.[4]
Killings of former soldiers
Hazaras who served in the former army or police face a double risk. On 30 August 2021, Taliban fighters killed 13 Hazaras in Kahor village, Khidir district, Daykundi. Amnesty International found that 11 victims were former members of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). Nine of them were shot after they surrendered, and a 17-year-old girl also died.[19] The Taliban's local police chief denied the killings.
This was part of a wider pattern. HRW documented executions and enforced disappearances of former security staff in its November 2021 report No Forgiveness for People Like You.[20] Furthermore, UNAMA recorded at least 800 violations against former officials and ANDSF members between August 2021 and June 2023, including 218 killings.[21] A Hazara former soldier therefore combines two risk factors.
Limits on Shia religious life
The Taliban have steadily narrowed Shia practice. They removed the Shia Personal Status Law of 2009 and dropped Ashura as a national holiday. They also banned the teaching of Jafari (Shia) jurisprudence in schools and universities.[22] According to Rawadari, an Afghan rights group, the Taliban removed all Jafari books from libraries and schools in Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghazni and Ghor.[22]
Muharram, the month of Ashura, is a yearly flashpoint. In 2025, the Taliban restricted Muharram ceremonies in Kabul, Herat, Ghazni, Parwan, Nimruz, Ghor and Bamiyan. They removed mourning flags and destroyed food stalls.[23] In March 2025, officials in Ghazni ordered Shia clerics to hold Eid prayers on the Sunni date and arrested three who refused. Similar arrests followed in Daykundi in June 2025.[23] Then, on 18 June 2026, the Taliban reportedly detained 45 Shia men in Kabul for displaying Ashura flags.[24]
Exclusion and the 2026 crackdown in Kabul
Afghanistan Hazara leaders have almost no place in Taliban power. Afghan Witness noted in 2025 that the Taliban cabinet has no Hazara or Shia member. The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) added that the Taliban appoint Pashtuns to senior posts even in Hazara provinces.[25] As a result, Hazaras have fewer contacts in power and less access to services such as passports.
In 2026, pressure moved to Shia institutions in Kabul. The Taliban's Ministry of Justice closed Tamadon TV, a Shia channel, in July 2026. On 7 September 2026, it forced students out of the Khatam al-Nabieen seminary, claiming the land belonged to the state. Two days earlier, Taliban forces had detained 28 teachers and students there.[26] On 6 September, Taliban forces also raided the office of Hazara and Shia elders in Karte Seh. They detained its head, Sayed Sufi Gardizi, and two former MPs.[27] Sources disagree on the total detained at the office. KabulNow reports five, while Afghanistan International reports nine.
Failure to protect
The Taliban promised to protect religious minorities after the Kunduz bombing. However, HRW found in 2022 that they had done little to protect Hazara areas and had not raised security in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif or Kunduz. HRW warned that officials who fail to act "may be complicit" in these crimes.[8] This matters for asylum law, because the state is the main actor that cannot or will not protect Hazaras from ISKP.
What the UN found, and where sources disagree
UN experts have described the attacks as more than random violence. Richard Bennett, the UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, reported to the Human Rights Council in September 2022. He said Hazaras had faced arbitrary arrest, torture, summary execution and removal from their land. He said the attacks on them "appear to be systematic in nature and reflect elements of an organisational policy". He called for a full investigation.[28] These words matter, because a systematic attack under an organisational policy is the core of a crime against humanity.
International bodies have since moved towards accountability. In July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for gender persecution.[18] In October 2025, the Human Rights Council created an Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan by Resolution 60/2. HRW said in September 2026 that the mechanism is not yet fully working. It also asked for a dedicated UN report on Hazaras and other minorities.[29]
Not every source agrees on how deep the targeting goes. An international analyst consulted by the EUAA in 2023 said the Taliban leadership does not see Hazaras as a threat. An Afghan analyst added that Hazaras faced no systematic discrimination at that level. Even so, the same source said that local Taliban treat Hazaras "with contempt" and "systematically" differently.[30] In contrast, the New Lines Institute argued in 2025 that the treatment of Hazaras breaches the Genocide Convention. Genocide Watch, for its part, notes that no court has proven genocidal intent by either the Taliban or ISKP.[4]
In our view, the stronger evidence shows two patterns. The state discriminates against Hazaras, and ISKP carries out deadly attacks that the state does not stop. The genocide label is still an advocacy position, not a legal finding. For an Afghanistan Hazara claim, the evidence of risk matters more than the label.
Returns from Iran and Pakistan
Mass returns have added a new group at risk: Afghanistan Hazara returnees. Pakistan began large-scale expulsions in late 2023, and Iran sharply increased deportations in 2025. UNHCR data show about 2.92 million returns to Afghanistan in 2025, about 1.88 million of them from Iran.[31] By 18 June 2026, more than 750,000 people had returned in 2026 alone. UNHCR put the total since September 2023 at more than six million.[32]
Many Hazara returnees were born or raised in Iran or Pakistan. Some have no land, no family network and no documents in Afghanistan. HRW notes that deportees include former security staff, who face arrest and torture, and activists and journalists, who may face reprisals.[18] In practice, many Hazara returnees settle in Dasht-e-Barchi, which is also the main ISKP target area in Kabul. Our Afghanistan return risk assessment covers the treatment of returnees in more detail. For Hazaras who fled to Quetta, our article on attacks on Hazaras in Pakistan explains why Pakistan is not a safe alternative.
UK law on Afghanistan Hazara claims
The Home Office no longer publishes a separate note on Afghanistan Hazara claims. It withdrew all Afghanistan Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) on 16 August 2021, except the medical note. The old Hazara note dated from 2018. Today, Hazaras are covered in the CPIN Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban, version 6.0 of February 2026. That note lists Hazaras among the groups who are "likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the Taliban".[2]
The same note adds a caveat. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts, and not every incident is part of a "systematic campaign". The note also states that a person at risk from the Taliban is unlikely to get protection or to relocate safely.[2] Read the February 2026 CPIN in full, because its country information section quotes many of the sources in this article.
Country guidance cases
The UK country guidance (CG) on Hazaras is old. In MI (Hazara, Ismaili, associate of Nadiri family) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00035, the tribunal held that Hazara ethnicity or Ismaili faith did not, on its own, create a real risk.[33] Later, AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC) held that relocation to Kabul would not, in general, be unreasonable for a healthy single man.[34] Both cases pre-date the Taliban takeover. A tribunal can depart from CG where there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence. Here, the Home Office itself now accepts a general risk to Hazaras. The October 2026 list of pending CG cases has only one Afghanistan case, MA (UI-2024-001603), on westernisation.[35]
The ECtHR judgment in D.M. v Sweden
The European Court of Human Rights gave useful guidance on 26 March 2026. The case was D.M. v Sweden (App no 32694/23). The Court found that removing a Hazara man from Mazar-i-Sharif would breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court did not find that all Hazaras face Article 3 ill-treatment. However, it held that Hazara ethnicity "constitutes a relevant risk-enhancing factor". Decision makers must weigh it together with other risks.[36] Sweden had failed to assess the risks together. UK lawyers can use this reasoning to ask for a cumulative assessment in every Afghanistan Hazara appeal.
US law: race, religion and pattern or practice
In the US, an Afghanistan Hazara claim usually rests on race or nationality (ethnicity) and religion (Shia faith). An applicant does not have to show that he would be singled out. Under 8 CFR 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), it is enough to show a "pattern or practice" of persecution of a group of similar people. The applicant must also show that he or she belongs to that group.[37] The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) requires the persecution to be "systemic, pervasive, or organized" (Matter of A-M-, 23 I&N Dec 737 (BIA 2005)).
We found no published BIA or circuit decision that recognises a pattern or practice against Hazaras after 2021. Older case law is negative, but it rests on facts that no longer apply. In Nikpay v Barr, No 19-60308 (5th Cir 2020, unpublished), the court found no pattern or practice against Hazaras. It also held that the Republic's failure to stop all Taliban violence did not show it was unable or unwilling to protect.[38] Today, the Taliban are the government. Therefore, the question is whether the state itself persecutes Hazaras, or cannot or will not protect them from ISKP. The Afghanistan Hazara evidence in this article speaks to both questions. Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is also available where a public official would take part in or accept torture.
Afghans in the US also face procedural barriers. The Department of Homeland Security ended Temporary Protected Status for Afghanistan from July 2025.[39] USCIS paused asylum decisions in late 2025. A federal court in Rhode Island vacated the asylum hold in June 2026, and the appeal is before the First Circuit.[40] Lawyers should check the current position before filing.
Internal relocation and risk on return
Internal relocation rarely works for an Afghanistan Hazara client. The Taliban control the whole country. The Home Office accepts that a person at risk from the Taliban is unlikely to relocate safely, except in some personal disputes with one Taliban member.[2] Our article on internal relocation in asylum cases explains the legal tests.
Hazarajat is no refuge either. The Taliban appoint Pashtun officials there, evict families from their land and restrict Shia rites. ISKP has killed civilians in Bamiyan and Daykundi. Meanwhile, Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul has suffered more attacks than any other Hazara area. The risk also falls on the wider Shia community, which our article on religious persecution under the Taliban covers.
Risk rises with certain profiles. These include former ANDSF members, Shia clerics and teachers, activists, women and girls in education, people in land disputes and returnees with no network. In particular, women face the full Taliban regime of restrictions on top of their ethnic profile. Our short video If You Are a Woman in Afghanistan shows what those rules mean in daily life.
What a country expert can prove
A country expert cannot decide credibility. However, an expert can explain whether a client's account fits the known facts. In an Afghanistan Hazara case, a report can show:
- whether the client's home area, mosque, school or bus route matches documented attacks, with dates and sources;
- whether the Taliban evicted families or appointed Pashtun officials in that district;
- how the Taliban treat Hazara former soldiers, Shia clerics and people who joined Muharram events;
- why Hazarajat and Kabul do not offer safe relocation for this client;
- how a returnee from Iran or Pakistan would live without land, documents or family support;
- where sources disagree, and which source is more reliable.
Credibility in Afghanistan Hazara cases often turns on small details. For example, a client may describe a minibus bombing that local media reported but UNAMA did not. An expert can confirm the incident from other sources and explain why counts differ. If you need a report, see our Afghanistan expert witness reports page.
Conclusion
The evidence on Afghanistan Hazara risk since 2021 is consistent. ISKP has bombed Hazara mosques, schools, education centres and minibuses, from Kunduz and Kandahar in 2021 to Daykundi in 2024 and Herat in 2026. The Taliban have evicted Hazara families, killed former soldiers, banned Shia teaching, restricted Ashura and, in 2026, moved against Shia institutions in Kabul. They have also done little to stop ISKP.
The law is catching up. The Home Office now lists Hazaras among groups likely to be at risk, and the ECtHR treats Hazara ethnicity as a risk-enhancing factor. US claims can rely on the pattern or practice rule, now that the Taliban are the state. Before each hearing, check the latest sources, such as the HRW report on ISKP attacks, UNAMA updates and the current CPIN.
Footnotes
- European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 'Afghanistan: Country Focus' (January 2026) 147, cited in Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Fear of the Taliban, Afghanistan' (Version 6.0, February 2026) para 12.4.2
- Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note: Fear of the Taliban, Afghanistan' (Version 6.0, February 2026) paras 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 3.6.3, 5.1.1 to 5.1.2 and 12.1.4 (quoting UNHCR, 'Guidance Note on the International Protection Needs of People Fleeing Afghanistan' (September 2025))
- Minority Rights Group International, 'Afghanistan' and 'Hazaras', World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (updated December 2021), noting that no census has been held since 1979 and that ethnic percentages are estimates and highly politicised
- Genocide Watch, 'The Persecution of Afghanistan's Hazaras' (2026), as reported in KabulNow, 'Hazaras Face Violence, Displacement and Discrimination Under Taliban Rule: Report' (5 October 2026) and Afghanistan International, 'Taliban Rule, IS-K Threats Increase Risks For Hazaras, Says Report' (5 October 2026); see also New Lines Institute, 'The Hazara Genocide: An Examination of Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Afghanistan since August 2021' (1 September 2025)
- Human Rights Watch, 'Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i Sharif' (November 1998)
- Human Rights Watch, 'Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan' (February 2001)
- Afghan Witness (Centre for Information Resilience), 'ISKP massacres group of Hazara in Central Afghanistan' (24 September 2024)
- Human Rights Watch, 'Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities' (6 September 2022)
- UN Security Council, 'Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Kunduz, Afghanistan' (SC/14658, 8 October 2021)
- SBS News (AFP), 'At least 47 people killed by suicide blasts at mosque in Afghan city of Kandahar' (15 October 2021); early local figures ranged from 16 to 32 dead
- Afghanistan International, '6 Killed in Mosque Attack in Herat Province, Reports Taliban' (30 April 2024); ISKP later claimed the attack
- KabulNow, 'Attack on Civilians in Herat; UNAMA Confirms the Killing of 11 People' (12 April 2026), reporting UNAMA's statement and the Taliban's differing figures; Genocide Watch (n 4) gives 12 dead
- Afghanistan International, 'Death Toll in September 30 Attack in Western Kabul Increases to 53, Says UNAMA' (3 October 2022); UNAMA's first figure, given to AFP on 30 September 2022, was at least 24 dead
- Voice of America, 'UN Decries IS-Claimed Deadly Attack on Afghan Religious Minority' (7 January 2024)
- KabulNow, 'ISKP Claims Attack Targeting Hazaras in Western Kabul' (August 2024)
- Afghan Witness (Centre for Information Resilience), 'Security: Tourists shot by gunmen in Bamyan attack claimed by ISKP' (May 2024)
- Human Rights Watch, 'Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia' (22 October 2021)
- Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2026: Afghanistan' (January 2026)
- Amnesty International, 'Afghanistan: 13 Hazara killed by Taliban fighters in Daykundi province, new investigation' (4 October 2021)
- Human Rights Watch, ''No Forgiveness for People Like You': Executions and Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan under the Taliban' (30 November 2021)
- UNAMA data for 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2023, summarised in Home Office (n 2) para 3.3.6
- Forum-Asia, 'Afghanistan: Protect the persecuted Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan' (4 August 2023) and Rawadari, 'Afghanistan Human Rights Situation Report 2024' (March 2025) 44, cited in Home Office (n 2) paras 12.4.4 to 12.4.6
- Rawadari, mid-year report January to June 2025, and EUAA, 'Afghanistan: Country Focus' (January 2026), cited in Home Office (n 2) paras 12.4.10 and 12.4.15
- Genocide Watch (n 4), as reported by Afghanistan International (5 October 2026); the figure comes from the report and has not been confirmed by UNAMA
- Afghan Witness (2025) and Afghanistan Analysts Network, 'The Politics of Survival in the Face of Exclusion (2)' (8 April 2025), cited in Home Office (n 2) paras 12.4.8 and 12.4.12 to 12.4.14
- KabulNow, 'Taliban Evict Students From Khatam al-Nabieen Seminary, Arrest Shia Figures' (7 September 2026); KabulNow, 'Taliban Detain 12 Instructors at Kabul's Khatam al-Nabieen Seminary as Residents Protest Evacuation Order' (September 2026), citing Tamadon TV on its July 2026 closure
- Afghanistan International, 'Taliban Detains Hazara & Shia Elders In Kabul, Say Sources' (7 September 2026), reporting nine detainees; KabulNow (n 26) reports five
- Human Rights Council, 'Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett' (September 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/51/6; Al Jazeera, 'UN expert decries 'systematic' attacks on Afghan Shia groups' (12 September 2022)
- Human Rights Watch, 'HRC63: Renew Mandate of Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan and Maintain Dedicated Reporting' (18 September 2026), referring to Human Rights Council Resolution 60/2 (October 2025)
- EUAA, 'Afghanistan: Country Focus' (November 2024) 121, quoting an international analyst and an Afghan analyst consulted in 2023, cited in Home Office (n 2) para 12.4.8
- UNHCR, 'Afghanistan: Operational Data Portal, Total Returns to Afghanistan in 2025' (data to 31 December 2025, compiled from IOM and UNHCR); OCHA gave almost 2.8 million on 19 December 2025
- Pajhwok Afghan News, 'Over 6m Afghans returned from Pakistan, Iran since 2023: UNHCR' (18 June 2026), reporting UNHCR Representative Arafat Jamal
- MI (Hazara, Ismaili, associate of Nadiri family) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00035
- AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC); see also Home Office (n 2) para 5.1.3
- Upper Tribunal (IAC), 'Pending Country Guidance Cases' (October 2026)
- D.M. v Sweden App no 32694/23 (ECtHR, 26 March 2026), as summarised by the European Database of Asylum Law, 'ECtHR: Article 3 violation in the event of applicant's removal to Afghanistan' (2026)
- Immigration and Nationality Act s 101(a)(42); 8 CFR s 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Matter of A-M- 23 I&N Dec 737 (BIA 2005)
- Nikpay v Barr No 19-60308 (5th Cir, 3 December 2020) (unpublished)
- Department of Homeland Security, 'Termination of the Designation of Afghanistan for Temporary Protected Status' 90 Fed Reg 20309 (13 May 2025), effective 14 July 2025
- Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v USCIS (D RI, 5 June 2026), appeal No 26-1703 (1st Cir); First Circuit order of 14 August 2026 granting a partial stay limited to the re-review policy, as summarised by #AfghanEvac, 'Explainer: What the Dorcas vs USCIS Decision Means for Afghan Allies' (updated 4 October 2026)
Sources
- UNAMA and UN Security Council, Security Council press statement on attack against educational centre in Kabul, 30 September 2022
- UN Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Kunduz, Afghanistan, 8 October 2021
- Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: Fear of the Taliban, Afghanistan (Version 6.0), February 2026
- Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities, September 2022
- Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, October 2021
- Human Rights Watch, No Forgiveness for People Like You, November 2021
- Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Afghanistan, 2026
- Human Rights Watch, HRC63: Renew Mandate of Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, September 2026
- Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i Sharif, November 1998
- Human Rights Watch, Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan, February 2001
- Amnesty International, Afghanistan: 13 Hazara killed by Taliban fighters in Daykundi province, October 2021
- Al Jazeera, UN expert decries systematic attacks on Afghan Shia groups, September 2022
- Afghan Witness, ISKP massacres group of Hazara in Central Afghanistan, September 2024
- Afghan Witness, Security: Tourists shot by gunmen in Bamyan attack claimed by ISKP, May 2024
- Afghanistan International, Death Toll in September 30 Attack in Western Kabul Increases to 53, Says UNAMA, October 2022
- Afghanistan International, 6 Killed in Mosque Attack in Herat Province, Reports Taliban, April 2024
- Afghanistan International, Taliban Detains Hazara & Shia Elders In Kabul, Say Sources, September 2026
- Afghanistan International, Taliban Rule, IS-K Threats Increase Risks For Hazaras, Says Report, October 2026
- Voice of America, UN Decries IS-Claimed Deadly Attack on Afghan Religious Minority, January 2024
- KabulNow, ISKP Claims Attack Targeting Hazaras in Western Kabul, August 2024
- KabulNow, Attack on Civilians in Herat; UNAMA Confirms the Killing of 11 People, April 2026
- KabulNow, Taliban Evict Students From Khatam al-Nabieen Seminary, Arrest Shia Figures, September 2026
- KabulNow, Hazaras Face Violence, Displacement and Discrimination Under Taliban Rule: Report, October 2026
- UNHCR, Afghanistan: Operational Data Portal, 2025 to 2026
- Pajhwok Afghan News, Over 6m Afghans returned from Pakistan, Iran since 2023: UNHCR, June 2026
- Upper Tribunal (IAC), MI (Hazara, Ismaili, associate of Nadiri family) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00035, August 2009
- Upper Tribunal (IAC), AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC), May 2020
- Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Pending Country Guidance Cases, October 2026
- European Database of Asylum Law, ECtHR: Article 3 violation in the event of applicant's removal to Afghanistan (D.M. v Sweden), 2026
- US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Nikpay v Barr, No 19-60308, December 2020
- Federal Register, Termination of the Designation of Afghanistan for Temporary Protected Status, May 2025
- #AfghanEvac, Explainer: What the Dorcas vs USCIS Decision Means for Afghan Allies, October 2026
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